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ABSTRACT 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to disseminate research work done towards a higher degree and report 
on the findings of the research that was conducted relative to South African Public Private 
Partnership (PPP) projects.  The research investigated perceptions of PPP actors on the performance 
of operational PPP projects.  
 
The aim of the research was to fulfil the requirements for the award of the degree of philosophiae 
doctor in construction management; contribute to the PPP body of knowledge; contribute further 
understanding of the performance of PPP projects in South Africa; and develop a systemic model for 
a sustainable PPP system within the country and beyond. All the aforementioned have been 
achieved, despite the research limitations as indicated in Chapter 1. 
 
A case study approach was adopted to examine various performance aspects of operational South 
African PPP projects.  The research was a multi-case study design.  Each individual case study 
consisted of a ‘whole’ study, in which facts were gathered from the selected PPP projects and 
conclusions drawn on those facts.  A web-based questionnaire was used to capture the experiences 
and perceptions of various actors involved directly, or indirectly in selected PPP projects. 
 
The sample stratum consisted of all operational PPP projects registered in accordance with Treasury 
Regulations as of December 2005 and other projects that reached financial closure before the Public 
Finance Management Act of 1999 became effective. 
 
PPPs involve highly complex procurement processes, are relatively new in South Africa and to date 
have attracted limited investigation to refine our understanding of the operational performance of PPP 
projects.  This is notable, as significant financial and other resources are involved, and the perception 
exists that service delivery in most parts of the country is poor. 
 
Key empirical evidence from the research indicates that South Africa has developed a robust policy 
and regulatory framework for PPPs; has an inadequate level of PPP awareness and training; and 
lacks the project management capacity to facilitate deal flow. 
  
It is suggested that further research be conducted on a yearly basis, preferably every six months, so 
that trends can be established concerning various aspects of other operational PPPs.  Further, it is 
recommended that the PPP Unit commission sector-specific studies that will conduct further 
research, to compare research across PPP and non-PPP contracts. 
 
 iv 
The choice to conduct a multi-case study required extensive resources and time beyond the means 
available to the researcher.  Further, the sensitive nature of PPP projects made it difficult to obtain 
required data at the first attempt.  However, the researcher made several follow up calls and 
reminders before eventually obtaining the required data from the respondents. 
 
A systemic PPP model has been developed for PPP implementation and management.  This model 
was tested for appropriateness by conducting a further survey on PPP participants attending an 
international conference on ’Financing of Infrastructure Development in Africa through Public Private 
Partnerships’ staged in August 2007, in the St. George Hotel, Johannesburg, South Africa.   
 
The findings from this research make an invaluable and original contribution to the PPP body of 
knowledge, provide insight for further research in this important field, refine the understanding of 
operational PPP projects, and provide direction for policy and decision makers in the public and 
private sectors, within South Africa and beyond.  
 
KEYWORDS: Construction, Projects, Public Private Partnerships. 
 
 
 
 
 v 
DECLARATION 
 
I, Josiah Nyangaresi Nyagwachi do hereby declare that the thesis is my own work and certify that the 
thesis has not been previously submitted to another university. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Signed:   
 
 
Date: 23 January 2008 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 vi 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
I wish to thank the Almighty for guiding me in these studies and to express appreciation to Professor 
John Smallwood, who continuously motivated me and was always available with guidance and 
encouragement as my promoter.  He, a renowned researcher at the Nelson Mandela Metropolitan 
University (NMMU) and beyond, has played a significant role in my doctoral studies.  I also sincerely 
appreciate the advice given by Prof. Alfred Ngowi, Dean of the Faculty of Engineering, University of 
Botswana, whose advice in 2003 provided the catalyst for the pursuit of my doctoral studies.  
 
I also sincerely thank Dr. Thomas Hilmer of the NMMU Computer Studies Department, who provided 
me with ICT logistical support by setting up a website link to the university’s main portal for data 
collection during the data collection phase.  I am grateful for the assistance given by Miss Pelisa 
Venda, the then Library Information Services Officer at the Summerstrand South Campus Library, for 
her input and expertise in the rigorous search for relevant PPP literature. 
 
I am also thankful to the lecturers in the Department of Construction Management and the then 
Department of Quantity Surveying for their meticulous review and recommendation of my research 
proposal to the Faculty Research, Technology and Innovation Committee (RTI) for approval.  Special 
recognition goes to Ms Jackie Szcerbinski, the Faculty Officer, for her efforts in ensuring the 
approved research topic was registered correctly in the NMMU Information Technology System (ITS).  
I would also like to thank the non-academic staff in the Department of Construction Management for 
their support during my doctoral studies. 
 
I wish to make a special thank you to the staff at the International Admissions office for the 
professional manner in which they processed my admission to the NMMU.  Special mention needs to 
be made about the soft-spoken lady, Mrs Juliet Kakembo, for her support and encouragement. 
 
I deeply appreciate the financial support provided by the NMMU and the National Research 
Foundation over the course of my studies.  I am also thankful to my country, the Republic of Kenya 
and the University of Nairobi, which laid the firm foundation for my academic background, and without 
which it would not have been possible to attain this level of academic achievement. 
 
Special thanks are extended to the various respondents who voluntarily participated in the study 
during data collection and interviews.  
 
Most of all, I wish to express my sincere love and gratitude to my wife Maria Ndinda  
 vii 
Nyagwachi, my son Einstein, daughters Rebecca and lovely Anita, without whose patience, support, 
love and understanding, I would not have managed to complete this study. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 viii 
LIST OF TABLES 
 
Table 1: Types of PPP projects by region and type (1984-2005). ......................................... 6 
Table 2: Main types of PPPs and their use......................................................................... 19 
Table 3: Projected monthly household income distribution ................................................. 28 
Table 4: Delivery of running water...................................................................................... 28 
Table 5: Electricity delivery................................................................................................. 29 
Table 6: Housing delivery................................................................................................... 29 
Table 7: Healthcare delivery............................................................................................... 30 
Table 8: Roads and drainage ............................................................................................. 30 
Table 9: Delivery of waterborne sewerage ......................................................................... 31 
Table 10: Delivery of public transport ................................................................................. 31 
Table 11: Delivery of waste removal................................................................................... 31 
Table 12: Delivery of telephones ........................................................................................ 32 
Table 13: PPP Investment Incentives................................................................................. 39 
Table 14: Investment Promotion Agencies (IPAs) .............................................................. 39 
Table 15: Legal and Regulatory Framework....................................................................... 39 
Table 16: Planned and Funded PPP Projects by Geographical Area. ................................ 62 
Table 17: Planned and Funded PPP Projects by Sector..................................................... 62 
Table 18: Examples of PPP projects in Asia....................................................................... 68 
Table 19: Examples of PPP projects in Africa..................................................................... 76 
Table 20: Examples of PPP projects in South Africa .......................................................... 81 
Table 21:  PPP Projects Supported by PPIAF funding by March 2004. .............................. 90 
Table 22: Traditional Procurement versus Public Private Partnerships............................... 95 
Table 23: Top 25 countries for PPPs during the period 1990–2003.................................... 99 
Table 24: Evaluation Checklist ..........................................................................................108 
Table 25: Work Plan Format..............................................................................................110 
Table 26: Summary of survey responses by sector ...........................................................117 
Table 27: PPP Projects surveyed by sector and type ........................................................118 
Table 28: Type I Operational South African PPP Projects .................................................118 
Table 29: Type II Operational South African PPP Projects by sector before 1999.............119 
Table 30: Inkosi Albert Luthuli Hospital..............................................................................119 
Table 31: Fleet Management.............................................................................................120 
Table 32: Eco-tourism .......................................................................................................120 
 ix 
Table 33: Universitas and Pelonomi ..................................................................................121 
Table 34: Information Systems..........................................................................................121 
Table 35: Chapman’s Peak Drive ......................................................................................121 
Table 36: State Vaccine Institute.......................................................................................122 
Table 37: Humansdorp District Hospital. ...........................................................................122 
Table 38: Head Office Accommodation. ............................................................................123 
Table 39: Cradle of Humankind (Maropeng)......................................................................123 
Table 40: Social Payment Grant........................................................................................124 
Table 41: Ilembe Water Concession..................................................................................125 
Table 42: N4 Toll Road .....................................................................................................125 
Table 43: Correctional Facilities ........................................................................................126 
Table 44: N3 Toll Concession ...........................................................................................126 
Table 45: Queenstown Water Concession ........................................................................127 
Table 46: Nelspruit Water Concession ..............................................................................127 
Table 47: Amanzu Abantu Water Concession ...................................................................128 
Table 48: Fleet Management.............................................................................................128 
Table 49: Bakwena Platinum Toll Road* ...........................................................................129 
Table 50: Sectors Responses ...........................................................................................129 
Table 51: PPP project models ...........................................................................................129 
Table 52: Contract duration ...............................................................................................130 
Table 53: Investment level.................................................................................................130 
Table 54: Responsibility transfer .......................................................................................130 
Table 55: Finance structure...............................................................................................130 
Table 56: PPP actors ........................................................................................................130 
Table 57: Cost savings......................................................................................................131 
Table 58: Factual Data ......................................................................................................131 
Table 59: Affordability........................................................................................................132 
Table 60: Transaction costs subsidies...............................................................................132 
Table 61: High transaction costs .......................................................................................132 
Table 62: PPP benefits......................................................................................................133 
Table 63: Investment acceleration.....................................................................................133 
Table 64: Risk management system .................................................................................133 
Table 65: Risk management training .................................................................................134 
Table 66: Risk is transferred in practice.............................................................................134 
 x 
Table 67: Risk allocation ...................................................................................................134 
Table 68: Risk shifting .......................................................................................................135 
Table 69: PPP effectiveness and sustainability .................................................................135 
Table 70: Credibility of legal and regulatory framework .....................................................135 
Table 71: Private sector participation ................................................................................136 
Table 72: Market access and competition .........................................................................136 
Table 73: Public interest and value added.........................................................................136 
Table 74: Investment climate.............................................................................................136 
Table 75: Effective PPP Options .......................................................................................137 
Table 76: PPP policy environment.....................................................................................137 
Table 77: Consistency of PPP policies ..............................................................................137 
Table 78: PPP agreements. ..............................................................................................137 
Table 79: Management of PPPs........................................................................................138 
Table 80:    Debt agreements by the PPP agencies. .........................................................138 
Table 81:    PPP procurement, management and auditing.................................................138 
Table 82: Capacity constraints ..........................................................................................139 
Table 83: Project management approach..........................................................................139 
Table 84: Lack of PPP training and awareness .................................................................139 
Table 85: The level of PPP awareness and training. .........................................................140 
Table 86: Organisational Level of Respondents ................................................................140 
Table 87: Summary of test results .....................................................................................151 
Table 88: Infrastructure and poor service delivery .............................................................154 
Table 89: Project management .........................................................................................154 
Table 90: PPP awareness and training..............................................................................154 
Table 91: Investment level.................................................................................................154 
Table 92: PPP monitoring..................................................................................................155 
Table 93: Policy and regulatory framework........................................................................155 
Table 94: Costs and affordability .......................................................................................155 
Table 95: Risk transfer ......................................................................................................155 
Table 96: Project Management .........................................................................................159 
Table 97: Budget...............................................................................................................160 
Table 98: Costs and affordability .......................................................................................160 
Table 99: PPP model selected for projects........................................................................161 
Table 100: Level of responsibility transfer .........................................................................161 
 xi 
Table 101: Risk transfer ....................................................................................................161 
Table 102: Policy and regulatory framework......................................................................162 
Table 103: PPP awareness and training............................................................................163 
Table 104: Project Deal Flow ............................................................................................163 
 
 
 xii 
LIST OF FIGURES 
 
Figure 1: Generic Structure for PPPs ................................................................................. 17 
Figure 2: Gautrain Model Photo.......................................................................................... 18 
Figure 3: PPP Project Management Structure .................................................................... 53 
Figure 4: A Generic PPP Model.........................................................................................144 
Figure 5: Generic Systems Engineering Flow Chart ..........................................................147 
Figure 6: Proposed PPP structure .....................................................................................148 
Figure 7: Model Systemic Phases, Parallel and Linked Tasks...........................................149 
Figure 8: Causal Loop Diagram.........................................................................................150 
 
 
 
 
 
 xiii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
DEDICATION...............................................................................................................................................ii 
ABSTRACT..................................................................................................................................................iii 
DECLARATION........................................................................................................................................... v 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.......................................................................................................................... vi 
LIST OF TABLES......................................................................................................................................viii 
LIST OF FIGURES.....................................................................................................................................xii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS............................................................................................................................xiii 
Contents of Study ..................................................................................................................................... xxi 
Preliminaries ........................................................................................................................................... xxi 
GLOSSARY OF TERMS......................................................................................................................... xxiv 
CHAPTER 1 .................................................................................................................................................. 1 
THE PROBLEM AND ITS SETTING ......................................................................................................... 1 
1.1 Introduction .......................................................................................................................................... 1 
1.2  Background.......................................................................................................................................... 1 
1.2.1  Service Contracts .......................................................................................................................... 3 
1.2.2  Management Contracts.................................................................................................................. 4 
1.2.3  Lease Contracts............................................................................................................................. 4 
1.2.4  Concession Contracts.................................................................................................................... 4 
1.2.5  DBOT / DBOO............................................................................................................................. 4 
1.2.6  Full or Partial Divestiture .............................................................................................................. 4 
1.2.7  Historical Context of PPPs ............................................................................................................ 5 
1.3  The Problem and Problem Statement .................................................................................................... 6 
1.3.1  The Problem ................................................................................................................................. 6 
1.3.2  Problem Statement ........................................................................................................................ 6 
1.4  Purpose of the Study............................................................................................................................. 7 
1.5  Objective of the Study........................................................................................................................... 7 
1.6  Research Hypotheses............................................................................................................................ 7 
1.6.1  First Hypothesis............................................................................................................................ 7 
1.6.2  Second Hypothesis........................................................................................................................ 7 
1.6.3  Third Hypothesis .......................................................................................................................... 8 
1.6.4  Fourth Hypothesis......................................................................................................................... 8 
1.6.5  Fifth Hypothesis............................................................................................................................ 8 
1.6.6  Sixth Hypothesis........................................................................................................................... 8 
1.6.7  Seventh Hypothesis....................................................................................................................... 8 
1.6.8  Eighth Hypothesis......................................................................................................................... 8 
1.6.9  Ninth Hypothesis .......................................................................................................................... 8 
1.7  Research Approach .............................................................................................................................. 8 
1.7.1  Methodology and Sample Stratum................................................................................................. 8 
1.7.2  Selection of Case Studies ............................................................................................................ 11 
 xiv 
1.8  Rationale and Significance ................................................................................................................. 12 
1.8.1  Rationale .................................................................................................................................... 12 
1.8.2  Significance ................................................................................................................................ 12 
1.9   Limitations and Assumptions ............................................................................................................. 13 
1.9.1 Limitations of the Study............................................................................................................... 13 
1.9.2   Assumptions of the Study........................................................................................................... 14 
1.10   Delimitation of the Study ................................................................................................................. 14 
1.11   References and Appendices.............................................................................................................. 14 
CHAPTER 2 ................................................................................................................................................ 15 
2. REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE .............................................................................................. 15 
2.1   Introduction ............................................................................................................................... 15 
2.2   Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) in Infrastructure......................................................................... 16 
2.2.1  Overview.................................................................................................................................... 16 
2.2.2  What is a PPP?............................................................................................................................ 16 
2.2.3  Brief History of PPPs .................................................................................................................. 20 
2.2.4  Rationale for PPPs ...................................................................................................................... 21 
2.2.5  Benefits of PPPs ......................................................................................................................... 21 
2.2.6  Advantages and Disadvantages of PPPs....................................................................................... 22 
2.2.6.1  Advantages.......................................................................................................................... 22 
2.2.6.2  Disadvantages ..................................................................................................................... 23 
2.2.7  Models of PPPs in Infrastructure Development............................................................................ 23 
2.2.7.1  Service contracts.................................................................................................................. 23 
2.2.7.2  Delegated management contracts ......................................................................................... 23 
2.2.7.3  Construction support............................................................................................................ 24 
2.2.8   Current Infrastructure and the Need for Accelerated Development in South Africa...................... 26 
2.2.8.1 Background.......................................................................................................................... 26 
2.2.8.2   The White Paper of 1994 .................................................................................................... 26 
2.2.8.3   Overview of ANC Policy on Infrastructure.......................................................................... 27 
2.2.9   Housing ..................................................................................................................................... 28 
2.3   Perceptions of South Africans Regarding Service Delivery ................................................................. 28 
2.3.1   Introduction ............................................................................................................................... 28 
2.3.1.1   Running Water ................................................................................................................... 28 
2.3.1.2   Electricity........................................................................................................................... 29 
2.3.1.3   Housing.............................................................................................................................. 29 
2.3.1.4   Healthcare .......................................................................................................................... 30 
2.3.1.4   Roads and Drainage............................................................................................................ 30 
2.3.1.5   Waterborne Sewerage......................................................................................................... 30 
2.3.1.6   Public Transport ................................................................................................................. 31 
2.3.1.7   Waste Removal .................................................................................................................. 31 
2.3.1.8   Telephone services ............................................................................................................. 32 
2.4   Constitutional, Legislative and Institutional Frameworks ................................................................... 32 
2.4.1   Introduction ............................................................................................................................... 32 
2.5   Key Issues in Decision-making.................................................................................................... 34 
2.6   Policy and Guidelines........................................................................................................................ 35 
2.6.1   The Public Finance Management Act, 1999 No. 1 of 1999.......................................................... 35 
2.6.1.1   Module 1: South African Regulation of PPPs ...................................................................... 35 
2.6.1.2   Module 2: Code of Good Practice for BEE in PPPs ............................................................. 36 
2.6.1.3   Module 3: PPP Inception .................................................................................................... 36 
2.6.1.4   Module 4: PPP Feasibility Study......................................................................................... 36 
 xv 
2.6.1.5   Module 5: PPP Procurement ............................................................................................... 37 
2.6.1.6   Module 6: Managing the PPP Agreement ............................................................................ 37 
2.6.1.7   Module 7: Auditing PPPs.................................................................................................... 37 
2.6.2   The Municipal Finance Management Act No.56 of 2003............................................................. 38 
2.7   Project Preparation: Turning Abstract Ideas into Projects................................................................. 40 
2.8   Project Implementation: Getting it done............................................................................................. 41 
2.9   Nature of Partnership Projects .......................................................................................................... 42 
2.9.1   Objectives.................................................................................................................................. 43 
2.9.2   Principles................................................................................................................................... 43 
2.10   Public Interest ................................................................................................................................. 44 
2.11   Value-for-money.............................................................................................................................. 45 
2.12   Risk Identification, Allocation and Management............................................................................... 45 
2.13   Market Interest ................................................................................................................................ 46 
2.14   Support Structures and Accountability ............................................................................................. 46 
2.15   How to Develop a PPP: South African Context ................................................................................ 46 
2.15.1   Introduction ............................................................................................................................. 46 
2.15.2   Project Inception (Service needs).............................................................................................. 47 
2.15.2.1   Objectives, Outputs and Outcomes.................................................................................... 47 
2.15.2.2   Focus on Outputs.............................................................................................................. 47 
2.15.2.3   Aggregate needs ............................................................................................................... 48 
2.16   Feasibility Study.............................................................................................................................. 48 
2.16.1   Option Identification ................................................................................................................ 48 
2.16.2   PPP as an Option...................................................................................................................... 49 
2.16.3   Reporting on Evaluation Options.............................................................................................. 49 
2.17   Business Case.................................................................................................................................. 50 
2.17.1   Function of the Business Case .................................................................................................. 51 
2.17.2   Content of the Business Case.................................................................................................... 51 
2.18   Procurement.................................................................................................................................... 53 
2.18.1   Assembling Resources – The Project Team............................................................................... 53 
2.18.2   The Project Plan....................................................................................................................... 55 
2.18.3   Public Sector Comparator......................................................................................................... 55 
2.18.4   Consultation Process ................................................................................................................ 56 
2.18.5   Bidding Process ....................................................................................................................... 56 
2.18.6   PPP Agreements ...................................................................................................................... 56 
2.18.7   Contract Management .............................................................................................................. 56 
2.19   PPP Funding and Programmes of Support....................................................................................... 57 
2.19.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................................... 57 
2.19.2   Sources of Project Finance ....................................................................................................... 57 
2.19.3   PPP Project Finance ................................................................................................................. 58 
2.19.3.1   Definition ......................................................................................................................... 58 
2.19.3.2   Types of PPP Finance ....................................................................................................... 58 
2.19.4   PPP Investment Constraints...................................................................................................... 58 
2.20 Programmes Designed to Overcome PPP Development ..................................................................... 59 
2.20.1   Public Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility (PPIAF)............................................................ 59 
2.20.2. Public Private Partnership for the Urban Environment (PPPUE)................................................. 59 
2.20.3   Global Partnership of Output-Based Aid (GPOBA)................................................................... 60 
2.20.4   Community-Led Infrastructure Financing Facility (CLIFF)....................................................... 60 
2.20.5   Slum Upgrading facility (SUF)................................................................................................. 60 
2.20.6   Private Infrastructure Development Group (PIDG) ................................................................... 60 
 xvi 
2.21   Public Private Partnerships: Global Synthesis ................................................................................. 61 
2.21.1   Overview ................................................................................................................................. 61 
2.21.2   PPPs in North America............................................................................................................. 63 
2.21.2.1   Canada ............................................................................................................................. 63 
2.21.3   PPP in Europe.......................................................................................................................... 63 
2.21.3.1  . United Kingdom .............................................................................................................. 63 
2.21.3.4   Czech Republic................................................................................................................. 64 
2.21.3.5   Slovakia ........................................................................................................................... 64 
2.21.3.6   Finland ............................................................................................................................. 64 
2.21.3.7   France .............................................................................................................................. 64 
2.21.3.8   Germany........................................................................................................................... 65 
2.21.3.9   Greece .............................................................................................................................. 65 
2.21.3.10   Hungary.......................................................................................................................... 65 
2.21.3.11   Ireland ............................................................................................................................ 65 
2.21.3.12   Italy................................................................................................................................ 65 
2.21.3.13   Netherlands .................................................................................................................... 66 
2.21.3.14   Poland ............................................................................................................................ 66 
2.21.3.15   Portugal.......................................................................................................................... 66 
2.21.3.16   Romania ......................................................................................................................... 66 
2.21.3.17   Slovenia.......................................................................................................................... 67 
2.21.3.18  Spain ............................................................................................................................... 67 
2.21.3.19  Scotland .......................................................................................................................... 67 
2.21.4   PPPs in Australia...................................................................................................................... 67 
2.21.5  PPPs in Asia ............................................................................................................................. 68 
2.21.5.1 Sri Lanka - Colombo Port Development Project .................................................................. 68 
2.21.5.2   Sri Lanka - Kelanitissa Power Project................................................................................ 69 
2.21.5.3   Philippines - North Luzon Toll way Project ....................................................................... 70 
2.21.5.4   China - Chengdu Water Supply Project ............................................................................. 71 
2.21.5.5   Bangladesh - Grameenphone Telecommunications Project ................................................ 72 
2.21.5.6   Vietnam - Phu My 2.2 Power Project ................................................................................ 72 
2.21.5.7   China - Tsinghua Water Project......................................................................................... 74 
2.21.5.8   India - Central Uttar Pradesh Gas Ltd. Project ................................................................... 74 
2.21.5.9   Laos - GMS Theun 2 Hydro project .................................................................................. 75 
2.21.5.10   Afghanistan - Roshan Cellular Project ............................................................................. 76 
2.21.6   Public-Private Partnerships in Africa ........................................................................................ 76 
2.21.6.1   Toga - EcoBank (ETI) Project ........................................................................................... 77 
2.21.6.2   Mozambique - Moma Mining Project ................................................................................ 77 
2.21.6.3   Tunisia - Tunisie Leasing Project ...................................................................................... 78 
2.21.6.4   Kenya - CFC Bank Project ................................................................................................ 79 
2.21.6.5   Ethiopia - Djibouti Bulk Terminal Project ......................................................................... 79 
2.21.7   South African Public-Private Partnership Projects..................................................................... 80 
2.21.7.1   Independent Development Corporation (IDC) ................................................................... 81 
2.21.7.2   SASOL Natural Gas Project .............................................................................................. 82 
2.21.7.3   Port of Maputo in Mozambique......................................................................................... 83 
2.21.7.4   N4 Toll Road from South Africa to Mozambique .............................................................. 84 
2.21.7.5   Prison Contracts in South Africa ....................................................................................... 84 
2.21.7.6   Ilembe Water Concession.................................................................................................. 85 
2.21.7.7   Eco-tourism Concessions in South Africa’s Kruger National Park ..................................... 86 
2.22   The Future and Sustainability of PPPs: Challenges and Issues......................................................... 86 
2.22.1   Politics..................................................................................................................................... 86 
2.22.2   Conflicts .................................................................................................................................. 87 
2.22.3   Policies and Legislative Frameworks ........................................................................................ 87 
2.22.4   Pricing and Cost Recovery ....................................................................................................... 87 
2.22.5   Technical and Management Capacity........................................................................................ 87 
2.22.6   Financing................................................................................................................................. 87 
 xvii 
2.22.7   Risk Management .................................................................................................................... 88 
2.22.8   Corruption and Lack of Transparency....................................................................................... 88 
2.22.9   Range of PPP Options .............................................................................................................. 88 
2.22.10 Local Empowerment Programmes ............................................................................................ 88 
2.22.11   Affordability .......................................................................................................................... 88 
2.22.12   Unclear Objectives ................................................................................................................. 89 
2.22.13   Misperceptions....................................................................................................................... 89 
2.22.14   Lack of Information and Poor Communication........................................................................ 89 
2.22.15   Competition ........................................................................................................................... 89 
2.22.16   Labour Movement Resistance................................................................................................. 89 
2.22.17 Public Acceptance.................................................................................................................... 90 
2.22.18   Value-for-money.................................................................................................................... 90 
2.22.19 Transaction Costs..................................................................................................................... 90 
2.22.20   Accounting for PPPs .............................................................................................................. 91 
2.22.21   Budgetary Constraints ............................................................................................................ 91 
2.22.22 Taxation................................................................................................................................... 91 
2.22.23  Lack of Incentives ................................................................................................................... 91 
2.22.24   Consensus Building................................................................................................................ 91 
2.22.25  Lack of International PPP Standards........................................................................................ 91 
2.22.26   Lack of Cooperation and Coordination of PPPs....................................................................... 92 
2.22.27   Insufficiency of Judicial Systems............................................................................................ 92 
2.22.28   Limited Number of PPP Operators.......................................................................................... 92 
2.22.29   Inappropriateness of Existing Procurement Systems................................................................ 92 
2.22.30   Roles of Different Parties ....................................................................................................... 93 
2.22.31 PPP Knowledge and Dissemination .......................................................................................... 93 
2.22.32   Lack of PPP Institutional Frameworks and Facilities............................................................... 93 
2.22.33  Safety and Environmental Issues ............................................................................................. 93 
2.22.34 Management of PPP Projects and Contracts.............................................................................. 94 
2.22.35 Inadequate PPP Awareness and Training .................................................................................. 94 
2.22.36 Poor PPP Project Conceptualisations ........................................................................................ 94 
2.22.37 Poor PPP Project Implementation ............................................................................................. 94 
2.23   Traditional Procurement Systems and.............................................................................................. 94 
2.23.1 Overview................................................................................................................................... 94 
2.23.2 Standard Forms of Conditions of Contract .................................................................................. 95 
2.24 Limitations & Problems..................................................................................................................... 96 
2.25 Other Issues of Concern .................................................................................................................... 96 
2.25.1 Rising Demand for Services ....................................................................................................... 96 
2.25.2 Making PPPs Work.................................................................................................................... 97 
2.25.3 Infrastructure Maintenance......................................................................................................... 97 
2.25.4 Risk Mitigation .......................................................................................................................... 97 
2.25.5 Procurement Reforms................................................................................................................. 98 
2.25.6 PPPs in Developing & Developed Countries............................................................................... 98 
2.25.7 Advantages of PPP Approach..................................................................................................... 98 
2.26   Recent Trends in PPP Investments in Developing Countries............................................................. 98 
2.26.1 Overview................................................................................................................................... 98 
2.26.2 International investments in PPPs............................................................................................... 99 
2.27   Summary ....................................................................................................................................... 100 
CHAPTER 3 .............................................................................................................................................. 102 
3. RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY.................................................................................. 102 
3.1  Introduction .............................................................................................................................. 102 
 xviii 
3.2 Purpose of the Study.......................................................................................................................... 103 
3.3 Scope and Objectives of the Study...................................................................................................... 103 
3.3.1 Scope......................................................................................................................................... 103 
3.3.2 Objective ................................................................................................................................... 103 
3.4 Setting............................................................................................................................................... 103 
3.5.1 Advantages of the Case Study Approach .................................................................................... 105 
3.5.2 Disadvantages of the Case Study Approach ................................................................................ 105 
3.6 Selection of Case Studies ................................................................................................................... 106 
3.6.1 Population ................................................................................................................................. 106 
3.6.2 Sample Stratum.......................................................................................................................... 106 
3.6.3 Unit of Analysis......................................................................................................................... 107 
3.6.4 Sampling Approach ................................................................................................................... 107 
3.6.5 Sample Adequacy ...................................................................................................................... 108 
3.6.6 Justification ............................................................................................................................... 109 
3.7 Research Methodology ...................................................................................................................... 109 
3.7.1 Data Collection - Approach and Strategy.................................................................................... 109 
3.7.2 Work Plan.................................................................................................................................. 110 
3.8  Research Instrument and Data Collection......................................................................................... 110 
3.8.1  Instrument Design and Construction.......................................................................................... 110 
3.8.2   Piloting of Survey Instrument................................................................................................... 112 
3.8.3   Cover Letter............................................................................................................................. 112 
3.8.4   Cost of Implementing Survey................................................................................................... 112 
3.9   Procedures for Data Collection ....................................................................................................... 113 
3.9.1   Web-based questionnaire.......................................................................................................... 114 
3.10   Procedures for Data Analysis ........................................................................................................ 114 
CHAPTER 4 .............................................................................................................................................. 116 
4.   PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS OF THE DATA................................................................ 116 
4.1  Introduction .............................................................................................................................. 116 
4.1.1   Executive Summary ................................................................................................................. 117 
4.1.2   Response Summary (Type I & II PPPs) .................................................................................... 117 
4.2   Data Collection............................................................................................................................... 118 
4.2.1   Operational PPP Projects.......................................................................................................... 118 
4.3   Description of the PPP Projects....................................................................................................... 118 
4.3.1   Case A: Inkosi Albert Luthuli Hospital, Department of Health, KwaZulu Natal......................... 119 
4.3.2   Case B: Fleet Management, Department of Public Works, Northern Cape................................. 119 
4.3.3   Case C: Eco–tourism, Manyeleti 3 sites, Department of Environment and Tourism, Limpopo ... 120 
4.3.4   Case E: Information Systems Project, Department of Labour .................................................... 121 
4.3.5   Case F: Chapman’s Peak Drive Toll Road, Department of Public Works, Western Cape ........... 121 
4.3.6   Case G: State Vaccine Institute, Department of Health.............................................................. 122 
4.3.7   Case H: Humansdorp District Hospital, Department of Health, Eastern Cape ............................ 122 
4.3.8   Case I: Head Office Accommodation, Department of Trade and Industry, Gauteng ................... 123 
4.3.9   Case J: Cradle of Humankind – Maropeng, Departments of Finance and Tourism ..................... 123 
4.3.10   Case K: Social Payment Grant System, Department of Social Development, Free State. .......... 124 
4.3.11   Case L: Ilembe Water Concession, Ilembe District Municipality, KwaZulu Natal.................... 124 
4.3.12   Case M: The Pretoria to Maputo N4 Toll Road, Trans African Concessions ............................ 125 
4.3.13   Case N: Correctional Facilities in South Africa ....................................................................... 125 
4.3.14   Case O: N3 Toll Concession – Cedara in KwaZulu-Natal to Heidelberg in Gauteng ................ 126 
4.3.15   Case P: Queenstown Water Concession, Queenstown ............................................................. 127 
4.3.16   Case Q: Nelspruit Water Concession, Ehlanzeni District Municipality, Mpumalanga............... 127 
 xix 
4.3.17   Case R: Amanzu Abantu Water Concession Water Project, Eastern Cape................................ 127 
4.3.19   Case S: Bakwena Platinum Toll Road PPP project .................................................................. 128 
4.4   Survey Data.............................................................................................................................. 129 
4.4.1   Part I: Project Background ................................................................................................... 129 
4.4.2   Part II: Perceptions on performance of PPP projects.................................................................. 131 
4.4.2.1. Costs and Affordability...................................................................................................... 131 
4.4.2.2   Budget.............................................................................................................................. 133 
4.4.2.3   Risk Transfer .................................................................................................................... 133 
4.4.2.4   Policy Framework and Guidelines..................................................................................... 135 
4.4.2.5   Project Management Competency Levels .......................................................................... 139 
4.4.2.6   PPP Awareness and Training ..................................................................................... 139 
CHAPTER 5 .............................................................................................................................................. 141 
A SYSTEMIC MODEL FOR PPP PLANNING AND IMPLEMENTATION ........................................ 141 
5.1   Introduction .................................................................................................................................... 141 
5.2   Purpose........................................................................................................................................... 141 
5.3   Scope .............................................................................................................................................. 142 
5.4   A Systemic Model ............................................................................................................................ 142 
5.5   Motivation for a Systemic Model for PPPs ....................................................................................... 142 
5.6   The Status Quo................................................................................................................................ 145 
5.7   Project Inception............................................................................................................................. 145 
5.8   Shortcomings - The ’Missing Link’................................................................................................... 145 
5.9  Proposed PPP Model ................................................................................................................ 146 
5.9.1  The Political Champion......................................................................................................... 146 
5.9.2  The PPP Project Manager ..................................................................................................... 146 
5.9.3  PPP Project Auditor .............................................................................................................. 147 
5.9.4  PPP Training and Awareness ............................................................................................... 147 
5.9.5  Motivation for the New Model ............................................................................................. 147 
5.10 Testing of New Model................................................................................................................ 151 
5.11   Application of the New Model................................................................................................... 154 
5.12  Causal Loop Analysis - Results................................................................................................. 154 
CHAPTER   6 ............................................................................................................................................ 157 
6   SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ................................ 157 
6.1   Introduction .................................................................................................................................... 157 
6.2   Summary of the Study ...................................................................................................................... 157 
6.2.1   First Hypothesis ....................................................................................................................... 157 
6.3   Summary of Findings....................................................................................................................... 159 
6.3.1   Project Management................................................................................................................. 159 
6.3.2   Budget ..................................................................................................................................... 160 
6.3.3   Costs and affordability ............................................................................................................. 160 
6.3.4   Relevant PPP model selected.................................................................................................... 161 
6.3.5   Responsibility transfer.............................................................................................................. 161 
6.3.6   Risk transfer ............................................................................................................................ 161 
6.3.7   Policy and regulatory framework.............................................................................................. 162 
 xx 
6.3.8   PPP awareness and training...................................................................................................... 163 
6.3.9   Project Management................................................................................................................. 163 
6.4  CONCLUSIONS....................................................................................................................... 163 
6.5   RECOMMENDATIONS................................................................................................................... 164 
6.6   RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH ....................................................................... 166 
REFERENCES.......................................................................................................................................... 167 
APPENDICES ........................................................................................................................................... 174 
APPENDIX 1:......................................................................................................................................... 174 
COVER LETTER ............................................................................................................................ 174 
APPENDIX 2:......................................................................................................................................... 175 
QUESTIONNAIRE .......................................................................................................................... 175 
APPENDIX 3:......................................................................................................................................... 177 
SYSTEMIC MODEL – COVER LETTER...................................................................................... 177 
APPENDIX 4 ............................................................................................................................................. 178 
SYSTEMIC MODEL – QUESTIONNAIRE ................................................................................... 178 
APPENDIX 5 ............................................................................................................................................. 180 
LIST OF PPP PROJECTS............................................................................................................... 180 
APPENDIX 6 ............................................................................................................................................. 183 
PPP Model-Mean Scores .................................................................................................................. 183 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Contents of Study 
 
The thesis document is structured as follows: 
 
Preliminaries 
 
This part contains the title page, dedication, abstract, declaration, acknowledgements, list of tables 
and figures, table of contents, and glossary of terms. executive summary. 
 
Chapter 1: Introduction and the Problem Statement 
 
This chapter contains background information regarding the technological, industrial and 
organizational setting for the study.  It describes and gives a thorough overview of the historical 
development and current state of PPPs.  It gives reasons for selecting the particular topic, the 
rationale for the study, as well as the statement of the research problem. 
 
Chapter 2: Review of related Literature 
 
This chapter contains a comprehensive review of the literature from various sources including: 
textbooks; journals; theses; conference papers; reports and contemporary sources.  These represent 
the most authoritative scholarship in the construction industry.  The study contains a wide-ranging 
survey of PPP projects in developed and developing countries with specific focus on the application 
of the PPP model in the South African context.  Current and previous works in related fields of 
construction are also reviewed. 
 
Chapter 3: Research design and methodology 
 
The case study research design is discussed and the reasons for choosing this particular approach 
are explained.  The advantages and disadvantages of choosing this case study method are also 
provided.  The methodology section includes the research design, population, sample frame and 
sampling, data collection and analysis procedures that were followed during the study. 
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Chapter 4: Presentation and analysis of the data 
 
This chapter contains the presentation and discussion of data collected and analysed in the study.  
The chapter also includes the testing of the hypotheses by showing whether the findings of the study 
support the hypotheses or not. 
 
Chapter 5: A Systemic Model for Planning and Implementation of PPPs 
 
This chapter contains the development of a systemic model and introduces a ‘systems thinking 
approach’ in the PPP environment. The basis for the evolving of the systemic model is systems 
theory developed by Forrester in 1961 and popularized by Peter Senge, a senior lecturer at 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). The methods of systems thinking provide the tools for 
better understanding complex planning and management problems.  The systems thinking approach 
requires a change of mindset from seeing problems as isolated events and their causes and start to 
looking at issues as systems made up of interacting parts. The model also defines the systemic 
processes that will be used to implement PPP projects.  It clarifies the complexity of elements and 
causal interrelationships within the PPP system.  It then provides suggestions for current and future 
researchers concerning new discoveries in PPPs. 
 
Chapter 6: Summary of Findings, Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
In this chapter, the main conclusions of the study are summarised, discussed and interpreted.  Where 
appropriate, recommendations are made for further research, practice and or implementation
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GLOSSARY OF TERMS 
 
Accountability: This is the ability of the public to hold to account those responsible for managing the 
use of public funds in the delivery of services. 
Bidder: A bidder is one who submits a bid in response to a project brief or to a request for an 
expression of interest.  
Build, own, and operate (BOO): This is when a developer is responsible for the design, funding, 
construction, operation and maintenance of the facility, during the concession period, with no 
provision for transfer of ownership to the government. 
Build, own, operate, transfer (BOOT): This is an arrangement whereby a facility is designed, 
financed, operated and maintained by a concession company.  The concessionaire retains ownership 
until the end of the concession period, after which ownership and operating rights are transferred 
back to the government. 
Built, operate, transfer (BOT): This is an agreement where a facility is designed, operated and 
maintained by the concessionaire, for the period of the concession.  Thereafter, legal ownership of 
the facility may or may not rest with the concession company. 
Bundling: This refers to the integration in a PPP of functions such as design, construction, financing, 
operations and maintenance of the facility. 
Business case: The business case provides an overview of a partnership approach.  This is where 
the project is fully scoped, risks and costs are identified to develop a cost-benefit analysis and test the 
net benefit of the proposal. 
Concession: Concession-based approaches are the oldest form of Public Private Partnership, and a 
variety of arrangements are based on the concept of a fixed-term concession, using various 
combinations of private sector resources to design, construct, finance, renovate, operate and 
maintain facilities.  Ownership of the facility may remain with the government, or may be transferred 
to the government on completion, or at the end of the concession period. 
Contracting out: This is an outsourcing arrangement in which a public agency contracts with an 
external supplier for the provision of goods and / or services. 
Conventional procurement: This is a public procurement approach in which a public agency 
secures the finance directly and pays the contractor as work progresses. 
Core activities: These consist of operational elements involving the making of key decisions and / or 
the delivery of services, which may remain with government. 
Default: The failure of a party to perform a contractual requirement or obligation, including failures to 
meet deadlines, to perform to a specified standard, to meet a loan repayment or to meet its 
obligations in relation to an established agreement. 
Design, build, finance (DBF): A form of PPP that involves the procurement of asset using private 
finance, without private sector operations and provision of the associated services. 
 xxv 
Design, build, finance and operate (DBFO): This is the main form of contract in the PFI, whereby 
the service provider is responsible for the design, construction, financing and operation of an asset. 
Design, build, operate (DBO): A form of PPP in which the public sector provides finance for a 
capital investment project, but the providers of the project retain the design and construction, and 
deliver some or all of the operational elements. 
Discount rate: The rate used to calculate the present value of future cash flows, usually determined 
on the basis of the cost of the capital used to fund the investment from which the cash flow is 
expected. 
Discounted cash flow: This is a general term of analysis, which discounts a stream of future cash 
flows, in order to calculate the net present value. 
Expected value: The weighted average of possible values of a variable, where the weights are the 
probabilities of cost estimates. 
Internal rate of return (IRR): This is the discount rate that would give a project a present value of 
zero. 
Joint Venture (JV): This is a distinct legal form of PPP arrangement, involving public and private 
bodies, assuming some form of equity stake in a PPP. 
Key Performance Indicators (KPIs): These are measures developed under a performance 
management regime, to indicate how well specified performance targets are being realized. 
Net present value (NPV): This is the discounted value of a stream of either future costs of benefits, 
with NPV used to describe the difference between the present value of a stream of costs and a 
stream of benefits. 
Output specification: The output specification sets out the range of services that government is 
seeking to procure and the performance levels required for each of those services. 
Private Finance Initiative (PFI): A UK programme encompassing arrangements whereby a 
consortium of private sector partners come together, to provide an asset-based public service under 
contract to a public body. 
Private party: This is a private sector entity, which the government contracts in a PPP. Traditionally 
the private party has been a special purpose vehicle created specifically for the project. 
Probity: This is uprightness, honesty, proper and ethical conduct and propriety in dealings and is 
used by government to mean ‘good process’. 
Procurement: This is a component of the commissioning process that deals specifically with 
purchasing a service from a provider.  This occurs once decisions have been taken over what 
outcomes, or outputs are to be secured and involves the negotiation of contracts. 
Project brief: The project brief details government’s objectives, service delivery requirements, policy 
and commercial matters, material background information and the process for lodging and evaluating 
submissions. 
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Project Finance: A way of financing capital projects that depends for its security on the expected 
cash flow of the project itself, rather than guarantees from the borrower or third parties. 
Public interest test: An assessment of the impact of the project on effectiveness, accountability and 
transparency, affected individuals and communities, equity, consumer rights, public access, security 
and privacy. 
Public Private partnership (PPP): A risk-sharing relationship based on a shared aspiration between 
the public sector and one or more partners from the private and or voluntary sectors, to deliver a 
publicly agreed outcome and or public service. 
Public sector: Refers to public agencies and enterprises that are financed, owned and controlled. 
Public sector comparator (PSC): A hypothetical constructed benchmark to assess the value-for-
money of conventionally financed procurement in comparison with a privately financed scheme for 
delivering a publicly funded service. 
Risk Allocation: The allocation of responsibility for dealing with the consequences of each risk to 
one of the parties to the contract, or agreeing to deal with the risk through a specified mechanism 
which may involve sharing the risk. 
Shadow toll: A payment for road usage made by the government, rather than road users, based on 
vehicles using a kilometre of the project road, in accordance with a tolling structure. 
Sensitivity analysis: This is an analysis of the effects on an appraisal, of varying the projected 
values of important variables. 
Special purpose vehicle (SPV): An organization that can be established as a distinct legal entity, to 
bring together the companies involved in a PPP in order to manage the project and share the risks 
and rewards. 
Unitary payment: Payment for services delivered by an SPV under PPI- or PPP-type arrangement. 
Value-for-money: The optimum combination of whole-of-life cycle costs, risks, completion time and 
quality, in order to meet public requirements. 
Whole-of-life cycle: Costs associated with the ongoing repair and maintenance of a facility for the 
term of a facility’s economic life. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
THE PROBLEM AND ITS SETTINGS 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter contains background information regarding the technological, industrial and 
organizational setting for the study.  It describes and provides a thorough overview of the 
historical development, current state, organization and technology underpinning the growth of 
Public Private Partnerships (PPPs).  It presents reasons for selecting the particular topic, the 
rationale for the study, as well as the statement of the research problem. 
 
1.2  Background 
 
In the recent past, many countries have seen a tremendous increase in cooperation between the 
public and private sectors for the development and operation of infrastructure. Notable similar 
approaches are common in Great Britain popularly referred to as Private Finance Initiatives 
(Patricia et al., 2006).  Such PPP arrangements have been driven by limitations in public funds 
needed to fund desired investments and the need to leverage expertise from the private sector, in 
order to improve the quality and efficiency of public services (Grimsey & Lewis, 2004).  
 
PPPs are relatively new in South Africa and to date have attracted limited investigation.  This is 
notable, as significant financial and other resources are involved, and according to Khosa (2000), 
there is the perception that service delivery in most parts of the country is still of a low standard. 
 
This research project aims to further knowledge on the performance of operational South African 
PPP projects.  The objectives of the study are to: examine the performance of operational South 
African PPP projects; contribute towards the existing PPP body of knowledge, and provide 
direction for a sustainable PPP system in South Africa and beyond.  The results of the study will 
lead to formal conclusions and recommendations to inform decision-making. 
 
The government of South Africa, as with many other sub-Saharan African countries is under 
increased pressure to accelerate the development of infrastructure and provide much needed 
social services to its population.  Many people in South Africa do not have access to basic 
services, such as potable water, sanitation systems, transportation and electricity.  Furthermore, 
many neighbourhoods in urban and rural areas are inadequately supplied with social amenities.  
According to Mandela (1999), though the situation has improved since 1994, there still remains a 
lot to be done to meet the ever-increasing demand for service delivery.  This situation is worsened 
by the current skills crisis within the provincial and municipal departments, in various parts of the 
country. 
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Limited funding and capacity constraints for infrastructure development and service delivery in 
South Africa has created a financial and capacity gap.  Various PPP initiatives have emerged 
over the past two decades, to provide assets and services that traditionally have been provided 
by the public authority. 
 
The involvement of the private sector, in partnership with government, has been advocated as a 
means of improving the development of infrastructure and service delivery in various sectors.  
This is largely due to internal pressure arising from increasing levels of unemployment, competing 
demands for dwindling national resources, escalating crime and the deteriorating state of existing 
infrastructure.  This has compelled many governments to introduce PPP arrangements. 
 
PPP is used as a general term to cover a wide range of agreements or partnerships made 
between public agencies and private sector entities, in relation to the delivery of services such as 
water, sanitation, housing or power. 
 
According to Rintala and Root (2005), PPP is an umbrella term for a wide range of procurement 
methods that are alternatives to traditional procurement.  Concession procurement is one of the 
PPP procurement methods.  PPP is just one name for the involvement of the private sector in the 
delivery of public services (Ramaema, 1997). 
 
PPP infrastructure projects provide a framework that enables both the public and private sectors 
to work together, to improve public service delivery through the provision of infrastructure and 
related non-core services.  The partnership provides competitive and transparent mechanisms to 
pursue opportunities that bring together the ideas, experiences and skills of both sectors, to 
develop innovative solutions to meet the community’s needs, expectations and aspirations.  
 
The PPP approach provides an alternative and does not mean privatisation of public services 
(Savas, 2000).  The government continues to deliver core services while contracting out the 
development and management of infrastructure and non-core services to the private sector.  As a 
result, there is value addition in efficiency and cost effectiveness (Robbins, 2003). 
 
According to Currie (2005), the government of South Africa is facing a rising demand for the 
acceleration of infrastructure development due to the social and economic transformation 
process.  The prevailing capacity constraints for project implementation means a lot of funding 
meant for development remains unlocked or unutilised.  However, the use of PPPs will not only 
stimulate growth in the construction sector, but also promote black business equity empowerment 
enterprises, create employment, provide mandatory skills training, curb the spread of informal 
settlements and reduce crime rates and poverty. 
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Lack of infrastructure, or poorly maintained infrastructure, has a negative affect on the economy 
of any country, and will discourage local and foreign investment.  The use of the PPP approach is 
proposed as one way of solving the problem of the slow implementation of infrastructure 
development and the provision of social infrastructure in South Africa. 
 
PPPs provide a framework that enables both public and private sectors to work together to 
improve service delivery in an efficient and cost effective manner.  PPPs provide competitive and 
transparent mechanisms for the chasing up of opportunities that can bring together ideas, 
experiences and skills that can address the needs, expectations and operations of different 
communities. 
 
South African government institutions can focus their efforts on the provision of core services and 
use savings earned to improve or expand other essential services such as health, security and 
the provision of social infrastructure.  Governments are turning to PPP arrangements for the 
provision of services due to a variety of reasons, which include: 
 
• Lack of capacity of government institutions to deliver a reasonable level of service or 
to improve service quality; 
• Financial weakness of some public agencies; 
• Lack of public sector financing capability; 
• Inability of public institutions to respond to increasing growth in demand, due to such 
things as rapid urbanization, and 
• Low productivity levels in some public institutions. 
 
Some of the types of contractual arrangements between public and private sector in the provision 
of utility services are: 
 
• Service contracts; 
• Management contracts; 
• Lease contracts; 
• Concession contracts; 
• Design build operate own transfer, and 
• Divesture. 
 
1.2.1  Service Contracts 
 
A service contract is usually for a few years and involves contracting out specific operations and / 
or maintenance activities to the private sector for an agreed period of time.  
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1.2.2  Management Contracts 
 
Management contracts normally cover a broader scope of operations and maintenance.  Under 
this arrangement, a private firm manages the operations of a state owned enterprise without 
committing its own investment capital, or accepting full commercial risks.  
 
1.2.3  Lease Contracts 
 
Under lease, a private firm operates and maintains a government owned enterprise at its own 
commercial risk.  However, except for agreed maintenance obligations, a leaseholder has no 
obligation to invest in infrastructure.  Lease contracts can vary between 6 and 10 years.  
 
1.2.4  Concession Contracts 
 
Under a concession, the private sector operator manages the infrastructure facility at his or her 
own commercial risk and accepts investment obligations, which may include the construction of a 
new facility or the expansion of an existing one.  
 
1.2.5  DBOT / DBOO 
 
The build operate transfer (BOT) and or build own operate (BOO) arrangement is similar to a 
concession for the provision of for example, bulk services.  BOT contracts are normally used for 
Greenfield projects, such as a water treatment plant, or a new wastewater treatment plant.  For 
example, the private sector may undertake to construct a new water treatment plant and operate 
it for a number of years before transferring the facility back to the public sector.  
 
1.2.6  Full or Partial Divestiture 
 
Divesture of utility assets can be partial or complete.  In a complete divesture, as in a concession, 
the private sector takes on full responsibility for operations, maintenance, and investment in a 
utility.  Unlike a concession, a divesture transfers ownership of the assets to the private sector.  
 
Infrastructure projects suitable for use of the PPP approach include: 
• Roads; 
• Bridges; 
• Waterways; 
• Canals; 
• Water / Waste water; 
• Sports facilities; 
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• Schools; 
• Hospitals; 
• Telecommunication facilities; 
• Railways; 
• Ports and Harbours; 
• Airports / Airfields, and 
• Power. 
 
1.2.7  Historical Context of PPPs 
 
PPPs, though relatively new in South Africa, have a long history dating back to the time of 
concessions, which were used in the nineteenth century to finance infrastructure such as railways 
and highways in Europe, America, Asia and Africa.  
 
One of the best-known infrastructure projects, under the category of waterworks, was the Suez 
Canal, which according to Hamilton (1996) was a tremendous financial success until it was 
nationalized in the mid-1950s.  Unfortunately, during the same period, many other large 
infrastructure projects failed elsewhere in the world, resulting in huge financial losses.  
 
Between 1789 and 1900 large numbers of toll roads were established in the United States.  More 
than 2 000 private corporations were engaged in operating turnpikes in Pennsylvania, New York, 
Ohio, Michigan and elsewhere, because of the United States government’s inability to provide 
adequate highways.  
 
Italy opened the world’s first modern tolled motorway between Milan and the Lakes in 1924.  The 
first modern motorways in France and Italy were constructed in the 1950s and 1960s.  
 
According to Walzer and Jacobs (1998), France enjoys a modern and innovative economic 
infrastructure.  France is also at the forefront of Europe’s nuclear power industry and is one of the 
world’s leading producers of nuclear fuels.  In transportation, France has a dense network of 
highways, railroads, and navigable inland waterways.  It was the first European country to 
develop a high-speed railway passenger service, and rapid transit systems.  In 
telecommunications, France has pioneered Mintel, a forerunner of the Internet.  Policy framework 
in the 1960s saw a shift from state intervention to private participation.  This led to the creation of 
four private concession companies at that time.  
 
Spain embarked on its motorway programme in the mid-1960s.  As the national budget was 
considered inadequate to meet the demands of a booming tourist industry, the Spanish 
government decided to approach the private sector for financing.  Hence, the new Spanish 
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motorway companies were all private entities, although they were subjected to a high degree of 
state monitoring and control.  
 
The energy crisis of the 1970s led to the collapse of most PPP companies in Italy, Spain and 
France.  In France, the state had to intervene and take over some of the companies, and 
assimilate them into the public system of infrastructure.  
 
A similar development in Spain, in 1983, led to the collapse of three companies representing 
about 15 percent of the motorway sector.  Changed economic conditions saw the reverse process 
later in the 1980s.  Today, PPP projects in Italy and Spain are profitable, with some of these 
operating on local stock exchanges.  
 
Table 1: Types of PPP projects by region and type (1984-2005). 
PPP Type 
East Asia 
and 
Pacific 
Europe 
and 
Central 
Asia 
Latin 
America 
and the 
Caribbean 
Middle 
East and 
North 
Africa 
South 
Asia 
Sub-
Saharan 
Africa 
Concession 28 13 8 6 0 16 
Divesture 75 192 171 1 15 6 
      Greenfield 
project 285 33 279 20 101 32 
      Management 
and Lease 
Contract 
 
3 
 
6 
 
20 
 
0 
 
0 
 
15 
Grand Total 391 244 478 27 116 69 
Data Source: World Bank and PPIAF, PPI Project database. 
 
Table 1 provides a snapshot of infrastructure projects in low and middle-income countries, by 
region and by type.  Projects include management or lease contracts, concessions, greenfield 
projects, and divestitures.  The database contains projects dating from 1984 to 2005.  In sub-
Saharan Africa, there are a total of 69 PPP projects, of which 12 (17%) reached financial closure 
by the end of 2005.  
 
1.3  The Problem and Problem Statement 
 
1.3.1  The Problem 
 
There is a lack of infrastructure development and service delivery in many parts of South Africa. 
 
1.3.2  Problem Statement 
 
There is a growing demand in South Africa for the acceleration of infrastructure development and 
the improvement of service delivery in order to meet the ever-growing needs of its populace. 
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A large part of the national infrastructure in informal settlements remains undeveloped and 
inaccessible.  According to Rwelamila (2002), dwindling national resources, increasing demand 
for infrastructure development, capacity constraints and high maintenance costs further aggravate 
the problem.  The above situation pertains to most parts of the country, despite South Africa being 
rated as having the best-developed infrastructure in Africa (Lemon et al., 2004).   
 
The most highly developed infrastructure and services are mainly found in major urban areas and 
intercity links, in the form of: impressive skylines; beautiful national monuments; highways and 
recreational facilities.  The historical past has also contributed immensely to the current pathetic 
situation on infrastructure and service delivery (ANC, 2002; Khosa, 2000). 
 
1.4  Purpose of the Study 
 
The purpose of this study was to undertake in-depth research of PPP projects in South Africa and 
to gain a deeper understanding of the operational, and where applicable, maintenance 
performances of these projects. 
 
1.5  Objective of the Study 
 
The main objective of this study was to investigate selected operational South African PPP 
projects that were registered as per Treasury Regulation 16, as on December 2005.  
 
1.6  Research Hypotheses 
 
In order to guide the investigation and to gather evidence about the lack of infrastructure 
development and service provision in South Africa, the research was conducted using the 
following hypotheses: 
 
1.6.1  First Hypothesis 
 
The low number of PPP projects is due to inadequate project management skills among 
government accounting officials and other staff, leading to an inability to conceptualise viable PPP 
projects. 
 
1.6.2  Second Hypothesis 
 
PPP projects are considered to be costly owing to government budgetary constraints, which result 
in inadequate subsidies for PPP projects. 
 
  
8 
1.6.3  Third Hypothesis 
 
The levels of investment in PPP projects depend on the public sector’s marketing strategy, and 
the number of government incentives made available to it. 
 
1.6.4  Fourth Hypothesis 
 
The PPP model used for procurement is determined by the type and nature of the proposed 
project, the expected value-for-money gained and the degree of public interest. 
 
1.6.5  Fifth Hypothesis 
 
The degree of transfer of responsibilities determines the success or failure of a PPP project. 
 
1.6.6  Sixth Hypothesis 
 
Ineffective risk distribution can lead to huge financial losses and renegotiation of PPP contracts. 
 
1.6.7  Seventh Hypothesis 
 
The existing South African PPP policy framework and guidelines are adequate and if properly 
interpreted and applied, will result in the emergence of more PPP projects and thus a growth in 
infrastructure development. 
 
1.6.8  Eighth Hypothesis 
 
Sustained PPP awareness, training and community education is fundamental to the 
mainstreaming and success of the PPP sector in South Africa. 
 
1.6.9  Ninth Hypothesis 
 
The slow implementation of infrastructure development and the provision of social services in 
South Africa are due to capacity, finance constraints, resulting from inadequate utilisation of the 
PPP approach in the procurement, development and management of government projects. 
 
1.7  Research Approach 
 
1.7.1  Methodology and Sample Stratum 
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A case study approach was adopted to examine various performance aspects of operational 
South African PPP projects.  The research was a multi-case study design.  Each individual case 
study consisted of a ‘whole’ study, in which data were gathered from the selected PPP projects 
and conclusions drawn from this data.  A web-based questionnaire was used to capture the 
experiences and perceptions of various actors involved directly or indirectly in selected PPP 
projects.  
 
A case study approach was used, as the unit of analysis was operational South African PPP 
projects.  Each case study involved an in-depth examination of a limited number of PPPs, with the 
primary data collection, taking place over a limited period of time, between November 2006 and 
February 2007. 
 
The sample stratum consisted of PPP institutions throughout South Africa.  The study was limited 
to operational South African PPP projects registered in accordance with Treasury Regulations as 
at December 2005 and other projects that reached financial closure before the Public Finance 
Management Act of 1999 came into effect. 
 
To implement the study, the researcher engaged in the following activities: identifying 
respondents; developing a mailing list; designing and developing a research instrument;  piloting 
the questionnaire; uploading the questionnaire to the NMMU website;  distributing questionnaires; 
following up non-respondents, and editing and analysing data. 
 
The performance of operational South African PPP projects was investigated using a case study 
approach.  Case studies are appropriate when ‘how’ or ‘why’ questions are asked, or when the 
investigator has little control over events, or when the focus is on a contemporary phenomenon 
within a real life context (Yin, 2003).  
 
Furthermore, according to Yin (2003), the case study is preferred when two conditions exist: the 
events to be studied are contemporary, but the behaviours cannot be manipulated.  The 
operational South African PPP projects were investigated in their own real world setting.  A real 
world setting provides access to actual behaviours, but does not provide laboratory controls over 
behaviour as can be found in laboratory experiments. 
 
A multi-case study design was employed and a cross-case comparison presented.  Each case 
study was treated as a ‘whole’ study, following replication logic.  The operational PPPs were 
investigated for performance in different institutions and in separate geographical locations.  The 
cases investigated were selected were indicated as having reached financial closure (National 
Treasury, 2006). 
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The selection of the PPPs was based upon three criteria: the stage in the implementation 
process; the sector, and the potential willingness to participate in the study.  The study began 
after piloting the instrument in November 2006, and ended in February 2007. 
 
The multi-case study design allows for comparative analyses between cases, and provides tactics 
to address issues of validity and reliability.  As recommended by Yin (2003), validity was 
addressed by employing multiple sources of evidence to corroborate findings.  A theoretical 
framework was used to identify significant aspects of the case, as well as define boundaries for 
data collection. 
 
Data collection was achieved using the following research methods: interviews; questionnaires, 
and document analysis.  Interviews were conducted with several individuals who had direct 
responsibility for the operational activities of the PPP implementation.  A self-administered 
questionnaire, comprising questions directly related to the categories of relevant data, was used 
to collect data.  The primary sources of documentation reviewed included: reports; manuals, and 
internal documentation. 
 
Reliability was addressed through replication.  The same case study protocol was used and 
followed the analytical framework defined by theoretical propositions and corresponding 
categories of data.  The propositions and categories of relevant data are presented in the 
findings. 
 
A case study approach was used, because the emphasis was on an in-depth study of the PPP 
projects in the sample area.  The study investigated registered South African PPP projects within 
various public institutions in their natural settings. 
 
The case studies were selected using non-probabilistic methods.  The sectors addressed 
included: 
 
• Power generation, transmission, distribution, and renewable energy; 
• Transport infrastructure, sector-roads, bridges, ports, airports, and rail transport 
systems; 
• Telecommunications sector-wireless networks, and rural telephone systems; 
• Water and waste water sector-bulk water supply, water distribution, and sewerage 
treatment; 
• Urban services sector-solid waste management; 
• Social infrastructure, sector-health, education, and security; 
• Sports and recreation sector, and 
• Tourism sector-eco-tourism and nature reserves.  
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The logic was that whichever case was selected from within any of the listed categories for PPP 
projects, the findings were likely to apply both nationally and internationally. 
 
Cases were selected from the sample frame obtained from the National Treasury (2005) PPP Unit 
database.  This involved little travel, fewer expenses and was the least difficult when it came to 
gaining access to the required data, because an accessible website existed.  The assumption in 
the case selection process was that the desired number of case studies, with adequate data, 
would be available within the target study area. 
 
1.7.2  Selection of Case Studies 
 
The National Treasury PPP Unit database for 2006 contained a comprehensive and updated list 
of PPP projects.  The database was used to select the case studies to be investigated.  The unit 
of analysis was the selected PPP projects’ project managers.  The projects investigated included: 
 
• N4 Toll Road from Witbank to Maputo; 
• N3 Toll Road from Johannesburg to Durban; 
• Head Office Accommodation for Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) in Tshwane; 
• Morapeng Complex in Johannesburg; 
• Soweto Tourism Information Centre; 
• Prison contracts in South Africa; 
• Fleet management in Northern Cape; 
• Inkosi Albert Luthuli Hospital in KwaZulu–Natal; 
• Chapman’s Peak Drive Toll Road in Western Cape; 
• State Vaccine Institute; 
• Humansdorp District Hospital in Eastern Cape; 
• Universities and Pelonomi Hospitals co-location in Free State; 
• Social Grant Payment System in the Department of Social Development in the Free 
State; 
• Water and Sanitation at Ilembe District; 
• Queenstown Water Concession; 
• Nelspruit Water Concession; 
• Umgeni Water Concession, and 
• SanPark  Tourism Concessions. 
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1.8  Rationale and Significance 
 
1.8.1  Rationale 
 
Most governments in both developed and developing countries are faced with difficult economic 
and political choices with regard to the provision of much-needed physical, social and economic 
infrastructure to their citizens.  PPPs provide a mechanism of leveraging much needed finance 
and skills from the private sector for development. Such partnering principles also provide a major 
opportunity in improving project performance (Gerard & Robert, 2005). 
 
PPPs are a fairly new concept of procurement in South Africa and to date there has been little 
serious investigation into such projects.  This is despite the fact that significant amounts of money 
have been invested in such projects and despite the fact that there have been a number of poor 
performances by certain recent PPP projects.  A thorough literature review revealed that there 
have been no recorded studies of South African PPP projects up to the present time.  Hence, the 
PPP model of investment is a fairly new concept and little research, if any, has been conducted to 
gain a deeper understanding of the subject area.  At the moment, no recorded studies have been 
conducted in order to establish key principles concerning PPP development and application in 
South Africa.  There has only been isolated research through government institutions such as the 
National Treasury in South Africa.  However, no systematic research has been undertaken to 
develop theories concerning PPP projects. 
 
There has been a growing public interest in finding alternative solutions to infrastructure 
development and service delivery through partnerships with the private sector.  However, this 
requires a more scientific approach in order to identify key issues of concern and then in turn to 
recommend research-based solutions.  The investigation of South African PPP projects led to: 
 
• Deeper insights regarding PPPs in practice; 
• Recommendations for PPP best practice; 
• Recommendations regarding PPP policy, and 
• The development of a systemic model for PPP. 
 
1.8.2  Significance 
 
The findings of the study are likely to result in an enhanced understanding of the issues 
associated with PPP projects in South Africa, which in turn could result in the following: 
 
• Increased implementation of PPP projects; 
• Enhanced capacity for service delivery; 
• Increased efficiency in the management of PPP projects; 
  
13 
• Accelerated infrastructure development; 
• Provision of improved social services; 
• Improvement in the quality of infrastructure services; 
• Development of a comprehensive database of PPP projects; 
• Development of clear guidelines for PPPs; 
• Increased funding / finance from the private sector; 
• Knowledge transfer to South Africa from neighbouring, African and developing 
countries; 
• Contributions to the related body of knowledge; 
• Enhanced value-for-money for PPPs, and 
• Generation of more business opportunities for South African businesses. 
 
1.9   Limitations and Assumptions 
 
1.9.1 Limitations of the Study 
 
• The investigation only covered operational limited case studies; 
• Existing data, more especially archived data was not easily accessible; 
• Due to the level of PPP development in South Africa, responses were only possible 
from PPP and non-PPP actors representing operational PPPs; 
• The PPP model of procurement is a fairly new concept in South Africa thus limiting 
the amount and variety of data that was available, and 
• The study covered only non-monetary aspects of PPPs. 
 
The factors that determine whether a project delivers value-for-money varies by type of project 
and by sector.  A study carried out in the by the UK Department of Environment (2000) indicated 
that value-for-money assessment comprised of two key elements: 
 
• Monetary comparison, and 
• Non-monetary comparison. 
 
Monetary comparison represents a comparison of the cost of the preferred PPP tender with the 
cost of traditional public sector procurement and expressed in terms of discounted cash flows, 
over the life of the contract.  Non-monetary comparison involves all the factors that are difficult to 
quantify in monetary terms, but which are considered valuable to the state and to the general 
public.  Some examples of non-monetary comparisons include: 
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• Speed of service delivery; 
• Quality of service; 
• Reliability; 
• Risk transfer; 
• Duration of contracts; 
• Competition, and 
• Private sector management skills. 
 
1.9.2   Assumptions of the Study 
 
• PPP projects are undertaken in South Africa and Africa; 
• Data would easily be available, and 
• Response rates would be high. 
 
1.10   Delimitation of the Study 
 
The research was conducted in South Africa, the southernmost country in Africa.  It is 
bordered on the north by Namibia, Botswana, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, and Swaziland.  On 
the east and southern coasts it is bordered by the Indian Ocean and on the west by the 
Atlantic Ocean.  
 
1.11   References and Appendices 
 
An alphabetical list of references has been provided.  The references are in accordance with the 
Harvard referencing convention. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
2. REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE 
 
2.1   Introduction 
 
This chapter contains a comprehensive review of the literature pertaining to PPPs.  The literature 
was obtained from various sources in the field of construction management.  There is a focus on 
the broad theme of physical infrastructure development that uses PPPs as a vehicle for 
investment and method for service delivery.  A summary of the review is provided at the end of 
the chapter.  This chapter contains a review of related literature regarding: 
 
• PPP concepts; 
• The need for accelerated infrastructure development; 
• Constitutional, legislative, and institutional frameworks; 
• The development of a PPP; 
• Experiences of international and local PPPs; 
• Funding and support of PPP programmes; 
• Traditional procurement systems and standard forms of contract; 
• The future and sustainability of PPPs, and 
• Recent trends in PPP investments in developing countries. 
 
The study was a wide-ranging case study of PPP projects in developed and developing countries, 
with specific focus on the development of a PPP model of procurement, in a South African 
context.  Emerging and operational PPP projects were also reviewed to provide more insights.  
The review covered the historical context of PPPs and the successes realized for various projects 
in different countries that used PPP techniques.  It looked at how the PPP has been used as an 
investment vehicle and a method for providing public services that were traditionally provided by 
the public sector and which governments were now unable to fund from constrained capital 
resources. 
 
The review of related literature was based on the case study approach Mouton (2000). This was 
done in order to focus and conduct an in-depth study of selected projects.  The following 
categories of literature were accessed during the survey of the literature: 
 
• Scholarly journals; 
• Conference papers; 
• Textbooks; 
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• Government documents; 
• Theses and dissertations, and 
• Magazines. 
 
PPP literature falls into three broad categories: engineering practitioner material, academic 
literature, and government policy documents (Grimsey & Lewis, 2004). 
 
The Internet was also used as a means to access online sources, but not as a source in itself, 
because of the unreliability of the information posted on it.  However, when a source posted on 
the Internet included authentic author details, this material was cited in order to report on recent 
developments relevant to PPPs and in the context of the wider world. Appropriate 
acknowledgement of sources has been done through a comprehensive reference list provided at 
the end of the thesis.  
 
2.2   Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) in Infrastructure 
 
2.2.1   Overview 
 
Partnership projects bring public and private parties together for long-term mutual benefit.  
Partnerships focus on ensuring improved services to the community through the provision of 
better infrastructure.  According to a recent study in Greece, PPPs should not only be about 
financing of capital investments, but should include technology transfer and a broad range of 
private sector expertise (Roumboutsos, 2007). 
 
2.2.2   What is a PPP? 
 
According to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), PPPs refer 
to any form of agreement or partnership between public and private parties (OECD, 2000).  They 
should not be confused with privatisation, where the management and the ownership of 
infrastructure are transferred to the private sector. 
 
A PPP can also be described as collaboration between public and private sectors, in order to 
provide significant public infrastructure, or other facilities and services.  However, risk allocation is 
ceded to the party, either government or private sector, which is best able to manage it.  PPPs 
are a critical aspect of a nation’s innovation and strategy system (Link, 2006).  Figure 1 presents 
a generic structure for PPPs. 
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Figure 1: Generic Structure for PPPs 
 
Source: South African National Treasury 
 
PPPs bring together public and private sector institutions on the one hand and development 
agencies such as the New Partnership For Africa’s Development (NEPAD),  OECD, United States 
Agency for International Development (USAID), on the other hand.  All parties, including society in 
general, share the success of a PPP partnership project.  Table 2 presents the main types of 
private sector participation in infrastructure development. 
 
A PPP provides opportunities for development corporations to harness private enterprise as a 
means towards economic and social development of their host countries.  A PPP ideally 
integrates the public sector, the private sectors and all community stakeholders.  In this way they 
can all benefit by pooling their resources and sharing responsibilities.  This is done in order to 
develop and implement a project that is technically sound, financially viable, environmentally 
acceptable and affordable to all users. 
 
Certain elements common to PPP parties are: 
• The belief that a partnership will be more effective than a stand alone approach; 
• A joint definition of the problem and a shared solution; 
• The commitment of resources by all partners, and 
• Shared risks and rewards. 
Government 
PPP Agreement 
Private party 
(SPV) Shares Equity Loans Debt 
Construction Operator 
Sub-contracts 
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A wide range of approaches for involving the private sector in improving the performance of 
various infrastructure systems exists.  Some options keep the operations and ownership in public 
hands, but involve the private sector in the design and construction of the infrastructure.  Other 
options involve private actors in the management, operation and / or the financing of assets.  
Osborne (2000) explores some theoretical and policy issues concerning PPP options.  PPPs 
involve different degrees of private and public sector responsibilities for service delivery.  The 
photo below represents a model of the largest PPP project ever to be undertaken in Africa.  The 
Gautrain PPP project reached financial closure in May, 2006 and the first parts of the system are 
scheduled for completion in June 2010, in readiness for the World Cup 2010 (National Treasury, 
2006). 
 
Figure 2: Gautrain Model Photo 
 Source: National Treasury, 2006, South Africa. 
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Table 2: Main types of PPPs and their use 
Design & 
Construction 
Financing Operation & 
Maintenance 
Customer 
Relationship 
Ownership  
Of assets 
Usual name Duration 
(years) 
Type of 
payment 
Private Public Public Public Public D & B contracts - Fixed price 
Public Public Private Public Public O & M contracts 5 - 10 Lump sum or 
cost plus 
Public Public Private Private Public Leasing contracts 10-20 User charges 
Private Public Private Public Public DB & O contracts 15-20 Performance 
based 
Private Private Public Public Public DB & F contracts 15 Annuities 
Private Private Private Public Public BOT or DBFO contracts 
without commercial risks 
20-30 Performance 
based  
Private Private Private Private Public Concessions with 
commercial risks 
30-50 
Up to 80 
User charges 
Shadow tolls 
Private Private Private Public Private 
(temporary) 
BOOT & BOO 20-30 Performance 
based 
Public / Private Public / Private Private Private Public / 
Private 
Concession of specialized 
facilities 
15-25 User charges 
Public / Private Public / Private Public / Private Public / Private Public / 
Private 
Joint-venture Perpetuity User charges 
Private Private Private Private Private 
(temporary) 
BOOT with commercial 
risks. Privatization. 
20-30 
Perpetuity 
User charges 
Source: Gruber (2003) and OECD Secretariat (2003) 
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However, in all the various options, the public authority remains responsible for overseeing the 
development processes and ultimately ensuring that public needs are met (Thomson, 2005).  
Governments have the final say with regards to the setting up and enforcing of performance 
standards.  Some of the infrastructure and services, which are subject to PPPs, are critical to the 
growth of an economy.  This means that strong regulatory roles and mechanisms need to be put 
in place in order to ensure that performance standards are met and that the interests of the public 
are safeguarded.  The subject of PPP options is dealt with in greater detail in subsequent sections 
of the thesis. 
 
2.2.3  Brief History of PPPs 
 
PPPs in sectors such as water management have existed for more than a century in some 
countries.  The private sector has long provided goods and services to the public sector (Webb & 
Pulle, 2002). PPPs, though relatively new in South Africa, have a long history dating back to the  
time of concessions which were used in the nineteenth century to finance infrastructure such as 
railways and highways in Europe, America, Asia, and Africa. 
 
One of the best-known infrastructure projects in terms of waterworks is the Suez Canal, which 
according to Hamilton (1996), was a financial success until it was nationalized in the mid-1950s.  
Unfortunately, during the same period, many other large infrastructure projects failed elsewhere in 
the world, resulting in huge financial losses. 
 
Toll roads were established in the United States, where between 1789 and 1900 there were more 
than 2 000 private corporations operating turnpikes in Pennsylvania, New York, Ohio, Michigan 
and elsewhere, because of the government’s inability to provide adequate highways. 
 
Italy opened the world’s first modern tolled motorway between Milan and the Lakes in 1924.  The 
first modern motorways in France and Italy were constructed in the 1950s and 1960s. 
 
Spain embarked on its motorway program in the mid-1960s as the national budget was 
considered inadequate to meet the demands of a booming tourist industry.  The solution adopted 
was to use the private sector financing.  The new Spanish motorway companies were all private 
entities, although they were subjected to a high degree of state monitoring and control. 
 
The energy crisis of the 1970s led to the collapse of most PPP companies in Italy, Spain, and 
France. In France, the state had to intervene and take over some of the companies and 
assimilate them into the public system of infrastructure. 
 
A similar development in Spain in 1983 led to the collapse of three companies representing about 
15% of the motorway sector.  Changed economic conditions saw the reverse process in the 
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1980s.  Today, PPP projects in Italy and Spain are profitable, with some of them traded and 
quoted on the local stock exchanges. 
 
2.2.4 Rationale for PPPs 
 
Most governments in both developed and developing countries are faced with difficult economic 
and political choices with regard to the provision of much-needed physical, social and economic 
infrastructure to their citizens.  PPPs provide a mechanism of leveraging much needed finance 
and skills from the private sector for development. 
 
2.2.5 Benefits of PPPs 
 
The development of PPPs is part of a general worldwide trend towards increased private sector 
participation and the structured integration of private sector investment into public infrastructure 
development (Harris, 2003). 
 
There are a number of benefits associated with PPPs.  These include: 
 
• Value-for-money; 
• Potential for delivery, particularly suitable for large scale projects; 
• Gains from innovation, due to the creativity of the private sector; 
• PPPs provide a platform for sector-wide cooperation; 
• Financing from the private sector; 
• PPPs do not affect government responsibility; 
• Capacity building and creation of synergy; 
• PPPs can increase the volume of business; 
• PPPs attain high efficiency and quality; 
• PPPs promote ‘competitiveness and fair competition’; 
• Better risk allocation; 
• Whole-of-life costing; 
• Innovation, and 
• Greater asset utilisation. 
 
PPPs operate at the boundary of the public and private sectors, being neither nationalized nor 
privatised.  Thus, politically, they represent a third way in which governments may deliver certain 
public services. 
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All stakeholders should be considered when assessing the potential contribution of PPPs towards 
social and economic development.  These include the following: 
 
• National government institutions; 
• Local government departments; 
• Local private sectors; 
• International donour and lending agencies; 
• (Inter) national commercial lenders; 
• (Inter) national project investors; 
• Project end-users, and 
• Trade unions. 
 
PPPs are often considered a ‘solution for all problems’ by some government institutions.  This is a 
mistaken belief.  There must be a sound balance between project finance, risk-taking, and 
additional cost recovery.  PPPs are not for free.  Somebody has to pay - either governments or 
end-users (Anderson, 2003). 
 
The underlying rationale for PPPs is that they may offer value-for-money.  According to the, 
National Treasury (2002) amended regulations, ’value-for-money’ means that the use of an 
institution, or of state property by a private party, in terms of the PPP agreement, results in ’a net 
benefit’ to the institution in terms of cost, price, quality, quantity, risk transfer, or a combination 
thereof. 
 
The forms that value-for-money can take include: 
• Lower construction costs; 
• Lower operating costs, and 
• Greater efficiency gains. 
 
PPPs often involve a private sector partner, providing a ‘bundle’ of services, such as the design 
and construction of a road.  Bundling differs from traditional contracting out of services, whereby 
separate contracts are drawn up to provide value-for-money that cannot be obtained by 
contracting out services separately.  The integration of design, operation and maintenance over 
the life of an asset, within a single-project finance package, improves performance and reduces 
whole-of-life costs (OECD, 2000). 
 
2.2.6  Advantages and Disadvantages of PPPs 
 
2.2.6.1  Advantages 
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• PPPs are more effective than a standalone approach; 
• Collective definition of a problem and a shared solution; 
• Commitment of resources by all partners, and 
• Shared risks and rewards. 
 
2.2.6.2  Disadvantages 
 
• PPPs have high capital costs; 
• Mostly financed with debts over long periods; 
• Long pay-back periods; 
• Require secure revenue streams, and 
• Sensitive to level of risk. 
 
2.2.7  Models of PPPs in Infrastructure Development 
 
In PPPs, the public and private sectors join forces to design, finance, build, manage or maintain 
infrastructure projects.  According to Thomson (2005) and Savas (2000) such partnerships can 
take many forms, depending upon the exact allocation of risks and responsibilities.  These 
include: 
 
2.2.7.1  Service contracts  
 
The private sector provides a package of specific services to a public institution, but the public 
sector retains the overall operational responsibility.  Service contracts can in practice, take many 
forms, but two of the most common ones are: 
 
• Management support.  The private operator supplies the public institution with human and 
technical resources for a fee.  It provides logistical, operational, and financial support for 
the institution, and 
• Operation and management (O&M).  The private operator is in charge of the daily 
maintenance of the facilities.  It is paid for its services by the public authority according to 
specific and qualified performance criteria.  Unlike management support, the private 
operator may in some cases take on the responsibility for operating the facilities.  
 
2.2.7.2  Delegated management contracts 
 
In this type of contract, the public sector retains overall ownership of the assets, but delegates the 
responsibility for the operation of the assets to a private operator, for a definite period of time.  
Two common models are: 
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• Lease agreement.  The private operator manages the facilities for a period usually 
between 5 and 15 years, and is responsible for maintaining and reviewing the facilities 
according to the terms of the contract.  In this capacity, it takes charge of all personnel 
and existing assets, but is not responsible for financing new facilities.  The public authority 
remains responsible for all new investment and compliance to existing norms.  The 
private sector operator invoices the end-users directly, and 
• Concession.  The public authority fully entrusts the private operator with the management 
of services and all necessary investment for a period of 20 years or more.  The private 
operator invoices the end-users directly, with the public authority retaining strict control 
over service terms, as well as all key decisions related to applicable rates and targets.  
 
2.2.7.3  Construction support. 
 
This is the most wide-ranging form of PPP contract, where the private operator is involved in the 
design and construction phases of new infrastructure, and carries at least some of the associated 
risks.  Some of the most common forms of construction support have been: 
 
• Lease Build Operate (LBO):  A private firm is given a long-term lease to develop and 
operate an expanded facility using its own funds.  It recovers its investment, plus a 
reasonable return over the term of lease and pays a rental fee.  The facility remains 
publicly owned, therefore this arrangement avoids the possible legal problems associated 
with the private ownership of a facility that was originally publicly financed.  The largest 
public private airport partnership in the USA is that of Stewart Airport, a huge 
underdeveloped facility located eighty-five miles north of New York City.  It is being 
leased by the state to a British Company for a period of ninety-nine years; 
• Design Build Operate (DBO):  The public authority entrusts the private sector with the 
design, construction and operation of new facilities, for a fixed period of time, however, 
they remain the property of the public authority.  The private operator takes responsibility 
for the risks linked to the design and management of the facility.  It is paid a fee by the 
public authority and commits to an overall cost for the facility’s construction and operation; 
• Build Transfer Operate (BTO):  A private developer designs, finances, and builds the 
infrastructure.  Once completed, legal ownership is transferred to the sponsoring 
government agency.  The agency then leases the facility back to the developer under a 
long-term lease.  During this time the developer operates the facility and has the 
opportunity to recover his investment, and earn a reasonable return from user charges 
and commercial activities; 
• Build Operate Transfer (BOT):  A private developer is awarded a franchise in the form of 
a concession, to finance, build, own, and operate a facility. Hence, this is sometimes 
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referred to as build, own, operate, and transfer.  The developer collects the user fees for a 
specified period, after which ownership of the facility reverts back to the public sector.  
This arrangement is similar to BTO, but may encounter legal, regulatory, and liability 
issues during the long period of private ownership before the transfer.  Nevertheless, this 
is perhaps the most common form of PPP for building new infrastructure.  In contrast to a 
sale or permanent concession, government retains strategic control over the project; 
• Built Own Operate (BOO):  A private developer finances, builds, owns, and operates a 
facility in perpetuity under a franchise, but is subject to regulatory constraints on pricing 
and operations.  The long-term property rights provide a significant financial incentive for 
capital investment in the facility.  Some examples of this model are the private toll roads 
in Virginia and California; the toll road in China connecting Hong Kong and Macao with 
Guangzhou; the new terminal at New York’s JFK Airport; and the ‘Chunnel’ under the 
English Channel.  Numerous power projects and ports in the Philippines and Indonesia, 
are also under public partnerships; 
• Buy Build Operate (BBO):  An existing public facility is sold to a private partner who 
renovates or expands it and operates it in perpetuity under a franchise.  This is equivalent 
to divesting a company, which then operates under a franchise.  As in the other franchise 
models, during the negotiations prior to the sale, the public owner can use the franchise 
agreement to exercise public control over pricing, access, noise, safety, quality and future 
capacity and expansion; 
• Wraparound Addition (WA):  A private developer finances and constructs an addition to 
an existing public facility and then operates the combined facility either for a fixed period, 
or until costs are recovered and a reasonable return on the invested capital is realized.  
The developer may own the addition.  The objective of this arrangement is to expand the 
facility, despite the government’s lack of resources or expertise, and 
• Rehabilitate Operate Transfer (ROT):  A private sector developer finances, rehabilitates, 
maintains and operates a facility for a given period of time, before transferring the facility 
back to the public entity at no cost.  An example of this is the North Luzon Toll Way 
project in the Philippines.  
 
Thomson (2005) presents the following as possible modes of entry for private sector participation 
in infrastructure development: 
 
• Joint ventures:  The public and private sectors jointly finance, own and operate a project 
to provide infrastructure.  Risks and responsibilities are shared according to the division of 
ownership between the investors and depending on any contractual agreements between 
or among partners; 
• Greenfield projects:  These involve new projects, usually built and operated by a private 
operator, which takes on the commercial risk.  Political and exchange rate risk can 
sometimes be shared with the public sector.  Such projects can take many forms, but the 
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most common are BOT and BOO.  Others include Built-Own-Operate-Transfer (BOOT), 
Design-Build-Finance-Operate (DBFO), and Built-Lease-Transfer (BLT), and 
• Divestiture or asset sale:  State assets are privatised either through public offerings of 
shares, or through the direct sale of the assets themselves.  The state retains 
responsibilities as the regulator and sometimes as the customer.  It might subsidize 
certain activities, which are socially desirable, but unprofitable for a private company to 
undertake, such as the provision of services to the poorest segments of society, or to 
remote regions.  Forms of private participation, where the state entirely dissociates itself 
from a utility, cannot be properly described as PPPs. 
 
These models and their variants can be used to develop new infrastructure, to rehabilitate or 
expand existing infrastructure, or to improve the performance of existing infrastructure.  
 
2.2.8   Current Infrastructure and the Need for Accelerated Development in South Africa 
 
2.2.8.1 Background 
 
The need for infrastructure development and accelerated service delivery are clearly articulated in 
the ANC (1994) policy framework, as articulated in the White Paper (Republic of South Africa,  
1994) The policy document provides clear guidelines on priority areas of reconstruction and 
development so as to address core issues relating to the imbalances of development. 
 
Infrastructure development and service delivery in South Africa is critical for the following reasons: 
 
• It is a catalyst for economic growth; 
• It creates an enabling environment for investment; 
• It creates employment opportunities; 
• It promotes industrial development, and 
• It provides much needed social services. 
 
The apartheid era saw selective and discriminative development of infrastructure, limited to 
certain geographical areas of the old South Africa.  Many townships and informal settlements 
were neglected, because the needs of industry and areas allocated exclusively to whites were the 
government’s priority.  The huge gap, due to the historical past, demands corrective action in 
terms of new, appropriate, and better infrastructure development. 
 
2.2.8.2   The White Paper of 1994 
 
The White Paper (Republic of South Africa, 1994) set out clear policy guidelines on the 
importance of meeting basic needs and building infrastructure in South Africa.  This paper saw 
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the birth of the Reconstruction and Redevelopment Programme (RDP).  The RDP was based on 
the notion that reconstruction and development was part of an integrated process.  The 
programme broadly addressed major issues such as: 
 
• Reconstruction; 
• Redistribution, and 
• Reconciliation. 
 
According to the policy paper, the infrastructure programme was aimed at providing access to 
modern and effective services such as: 
 
• Electricity; 
• Water; 
• Telecommunications; 
• Transport; 
• Health; 
• Education; 
• Training, and 
• Housing. 
 
The broad area of this study is in infrastructure development and service delivery, but focused 
specifically on South African PPP projects.   
 
There is an urgent need to develop infrastructure and provide social services, especially in the 
former homelands and other disadvantaged rural areas with the aim of eradicating poverty, 
through: 
 
• The elimination of social backlogs in access roads, schools, clinics, water and sanitation; 
• The leveraging of economic growth through access roads and improving the road, rail and 
air networks in the country, and 
• The promotion of labour-intensive and community-based construction methods for job 
creation. 
 
2.2.8.3   Overview of ANC Policy on Infrastructure 
 
Since 1994, the ANC (2002) has formulated policies to provide an integrated, holistic approach to 
infrastructure development and service delivery.  One of the major tasks undertaken during this 
period was the carrying out of a survey to determine infrastructure and service delivery needs in 
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South Africa.  The survey investigated the conditions of South Africa’s social and physical 
infrastructure, the maintenance thereof, and an assessment of future needs.  The study also 
addressed issues concerning implementation agencies and the role of different partners in 
development.  The findings indicated that there was a backlog of infrastructure development, 
worth about R170 billion, across all sectors.  Though efforts have been made to reduce the 
backlog, a lot of work still needs to be done.   
 
2.2.9   Housing 
 
South Africa has a rapidly increasing and urbanising society and a large housing backlog, due to 
very low rates of formal housing provision. 
 
Table 3: Projected monthly household income distribution 
No. Income Category (R) % Population (millions) 
1 0 - 800 39.7 3.30  
2 >800  ≤ 1 500 29.0 2.41  
3 >1 500  ≤2 500 11.8 0.98  
4 >2 500  ≤ 3 500 5.6 0.46  
5 > 3 500 13.9 1.15  
Data Source: New Housing Policy and Strategy for South Africa (1994) 
 
2.3   Perceptions of South Africans Regarding Service Delivery 
 
2.3.1   Introduction 
 
According to Khosa (2000), there have been significant achievements in service delivery in South 
Africa.  In 1998, a national survey targeting 2 200 adults was conducted during the months of 
February and December.  The results of the survey were compared with the situation as it was in 
1994, at the dawn of the new era of democracy.  The data from these surveys provided an overall 
perspective of service delivery at the national level.  It also attempted to provide an assessment of 
the perceptions of South Africans regarding the change in infrastructure service delivery since 
1994.  The results of the various sectors were as follows: 
 
2.3.1.1   Running Water 
Table 4 depicts the perceptions of South Africans relative to the delivery of running water. 
Table 4: Delivery of running water  
Perception February 1998 (%) December 1998 (%) 
Improvement 25.0 35.0 
Same 48.0 50.0 
Worsened 24.0 14.0 
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Uncertain 2.0 1.0 
Data Source: Empowerment through Service Delivery (2000) 
During the survey of December 1998, 35% of South Africans generally felt that the provision of 
running water had improved in their areas compared to 14% who felt that this had worsened since 
1994.  There was a 10% increase for those who perceived that there was an improvement 
between February 1998 to December 1998.  These figures suggest that the delivery had been 
extended to a substantial proportion of the population during the period February and December 
1998.  During the same period, the number of people who had indicated a decline in the delivery 
of running water reduced by 10%. 
 
This survey confirms the data obtained from Mandela (1999), which indicates that in 1994, 30% of 
all South Africans lacked access to a safe supply of running water, whereas by February 1999, 
only 20% lacked access to safe running water. 
 
2.3.1.2   Electricity 
Table 5 depicts the perceptions of South Africans relative to the delivery of electricity. 
Table 5: Electricity delivery 
Perception February 1998 (%) December 1998 (%) 
Improvement 35.0 41.0 
Same 42.0 41.0 
Worsened 22.0 16.0 
Uncertain 1.0 1.0 
Data Source: Empowerment through Service Delivery, 2000. 
 
More people perceived that there had been an improvement rather than a deterioration in the 
provision of electricity in their areas.  The number of respondents that indicated a decline in the 
service delivery of electricity reduced by 6% in absolute terms between February and December 
1998. 
 
2.3.1.3   Housing 
Table 6 depicts the perceptions of South Africans relative to the delivery of housing. 
Table 6: Housing delivery 
Perception February 1998 (%) December 1998 (%) 
Improvement 12.0 22.0 
Same 50.0 38.0 
Worsened 35.0 35.0 
Uncertain 4.0 6.0 
Data Source: Empowerment through Service Delivery, 2000. 
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Data collected from the February and December 1998 surveys indicates that the percentage of 
people who perceived that there was an improvement in access to affordable housing increased 
by 10% in absolute terms between February and December 1998. 
 
2.3.1.4   Healthcare 
Table 7 depicts the perceptions of South Africans relative to the delivery of healthcare. 
Table 7: Healthcare delivery 
Perception February 1998 (%) December 1998 (%) 
Improvement 27.0 36.0 
Same 43.0 32.0 
Worsened 28.0 30.0 
Uncertain 2.0 2.0 
Data Source: Empowerment through Service Delivery, 2000. 
 
The survey indicates that the percentage of people who perceived that the provision of healthcare 
services had improved rose by 9% between February 1998 and December 1998.  32% indicated 
the situation had remained the same, representing a decrease of 11% in absolute terms.  Those 
who felt the situation had worsened increased from 28% to 30%. 
 
2.3.1.4   Roads and Drainage 
Table 8 depicts the perceptions of South Africans relative to the delivery of roads and drainage. 
Table 8: Roads and drainage 
Perception February 1998 (%) December 1998 (%) 
Improvement 22.0 26.0 
Same 42.0 38.0 
Worsened 31.0 35.0 
Uncertain 4.0 1.0 
Data Source: Empowerment through Service Delivery, 2000. 
 
Significant numbers of respondents believed there had been a deterioration in the provision of  
roads and street drainage.  The December 1998 HSRC survey revealed that about 26% of South 
Africans indicated that they perceived an improvement in the provision of tarred roads and street 
drainage in their areas, compared with more than 35% in absolute terms who felt the situation had 
worsened.  The percentage of people who indicated that they perceived an improvement 
increased marginally from 22% in February 1998, to 26% in December 1998.  The study also 
revealed a marginal increase from 31% in February to 35% in December, for those who perceived 
the situation had worsened. 
 
2.3.1.5   Waterborne Sewerage 
Table 9 depicts the perceptions of South Africans relative to the delivery of waterborne sewerage. 
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Table 9: Delivery of waterborne sewerage 
Perception February 1998 (%) December 1998 (%) 
Improvement 14.0 22.0 
Same 51.0 53.0 
Worsened 29.0 21.0 
Uncertain 6.0 5.0 
Data Source: Empowerment through Service Delivery, 2000. 
 
When comparing the February 1998 and December 1998 data sets, the proportion of those 
indicating improvement of waterborne sewerage delivery increased from 14% to 22%, while those 
indicating the situation had worsened dropped from 29% to 21%. 
 
2.3.1.6   Public Transport 
Table 10 depicts the perceptions of South Africans relative to the delivery of public transport. 
Table 10: Delivery of public transport  
Perception February 1998 (%) December 1998 (%) 
Improvement 29.0 33.0 
Same 46.0 36.0 
Worsened 20.0 23.0 
Uncertain 5.0 7.0 
Data Source: Empowerment through Service Delivery, 2000. 
 
The results of the study indicated that 33% perceived that public transport had improved, as 
compared to 29% in February 1998. 
 
2.3.1.7   Waste Removal 
Table 11 depicts the perceptions of South Africans relative to the delivery of waste removal. 
Table 11: Delivery of waste removal 
Perception February 1998 (%) December 1998 (%) 
Improvement 19.0 27.0 
Same 50.0 45.0 
Worsened 24.0 23.0 
Uncertain 7.0 5.0 
Data Source: Empowerment through Service Delivery, 2000. 
 
Data from the December 1998 HSRC survey revealed that 21% of the people felt there had been 
a significant improvement in waste collection.  1% of the people perceived the situation had 
worsened between February 1998 and December 1998 – a small decrease. 
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2.3.1.8   Telephone services 
Table 12 depicts the perceptions of South Africans relative to the delivery of telephones. 
Table 12: Delivery of telephones  
Perception February 1998 (%) December 1998 (%) 
Improvement 21.0 21.0 
Same 53.0 44.0 
Worsened 22.0 32.0 
Uncertain 3.0 2.0 
Data Source: Empowerment through Service Delivery, 2000. 
 
The survey further revealed that 21% of the people indicated a perceived improvement in the 
delivery of local police services.  There were proportionally more people dissatisfied with the 
provision of local police services in December 1998 than in February 1998. 
 
2.4   Constitutional, Legislative and Institutional Frameworks 
 
2.4.1   Introduction 
 
According to Farrington (2000), over the past 5 years the debate relating to PPPs has focused on: 
 
• The potential contribution of various forms of PPPs to sustain social / economic progress; 
• The need to create PPP knowledge and facilities within various government 
organizations; 
• The possibility of identifying promising PPP structures and opportunities; 
• The requirements for implementing PPP structures; 
• The possibility of extending PPPs to smaller, regional and poverty-focused projects, and 
• The management of expectations concerning PPPs. 
 
However, Ramaema (1997) cited the following reasons for seeking the involvement of the private 
sector in the delivery of public services.  It would result in the: 
 
• Injection of technical / managerial expertise into the sector, and transfer of technological 
innovations; 
• Improvement in the economic efficiency of the sector, in terms of both operating, 
performance and use of capital investment; 
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• Injection of large-scale investment capital into the sector, or the creation of access to 
private capital markets; 
• Reduction in the level of public subsidies to the sector, and / or the reduction of these 
subsidies from the groups currently served to the poor and those not currently served; 
• Distancing of the public sector from short-term political intervention in the operation of a 
‘utility’ and a reduction of opportunities for intervention by powerful vested interests; 
• Public  sector that is more responsive to consumer needs and preferences, and 
• Supplementing capacity, currently not available in the public sector. 
 
Building modern infrastructure for any country requires all sectors of the economy to play a key 
role.  Governments should not presume that either the private or the public sector could deliver 
projects more efficiently or effectively than the other.  Governments, more especially in 
developing countries, have to develop suitable investment models to realize their infrastructure 
development objectives.  These models involve partnerships between the public and private 
sectors, under which decisions can be made on merit and outcomes are based on public benefits 
obtained.  According to a research initiative in the USA, a framework has been developed that 
measures the effectiveness of PPPs both at programme and project levels (Garvin, 2007). 
 
Prior to a decision to commit to major infrastructure projects, the government authority will 
normally prepare a full cost benefit analysis and business plan for the potential project.  This will 
include taking full account of the value of public land that is being committed to the project.  The 
evaluation of infrastructure proposals will also receive independent verification of financing 
arrangements and a full assessment of risk. 
 
Where there is private sector involvement in major public infrastructure projects, contractors will 
be chosen through a rigorous and transparent system of public tendering.  The public interest in 
any infrastructure development must be fully protected by ensuring that work is awarded to 
private contractors through a public tender process, under which there are clear and enforceable 
performance arrangements.  This requires public release of tender specifications and disclosure 
of financial risks accepted by the state. 
 
Governments normally allow for community inputs into infrastructure development through 
appropriate planning mechanisms.  In all infrastructure developments, the government will protect 
the public interest through strong third party rights, fair appeals processes, effective conflict 
resolution, and transparency.  
 
PPPs are focused on creating partnerships between the government and private businesses, in 
which improved value-for-money is achieved by utilising the innovation capabilities and skills of 
both parties.  This is done in order to deliver performance improvements and efficiency savings.  
PPP policies, where they exist, provide high-level frameworks.  Perez (2004) reviews current 
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trends in transport partnerships and provides detailed case studies of three recent partnership 
projects: the M1 / M15 Motorway in Western Hungary, the Vasco da Gama Bridge in Lisbon, and 
the Bangkok Mass Transit System in the capital of Thailand. 
 
2.5   Key Issues in Decision-making 
 
As mentioned earlier, PPPs refer to the collaboration between public and private entities to realize 
public projects and objectives.  These are arranged so that tasks, responsibilities and risks are 
optimally allocated among the partners.  Over the last 20 years, PPPs have been increasingly 
recognized as a viable option for realizing development objectives.  The United Nations (UN) and 
the World Bank are increasingly working with private sector organizations, including for-profit 
companies, corporations, business organizations and private foundations (Bull & McNeill, 2006).  
The International Journal of Public Private Partnerships (2006) provides more insights into PPP 
issues.  Articles authored by leading practitioners, consultants, and academics convey the latest 
thinking and findings regarding PPP practice and implementation. 
 
The following issues have often been raised: 
 
• PPPs are particularly useful for implementing large-scale projects, primarily based on 
contractual relations between public and private entities, mostly through design-build-
finance and operate / maintain - DBFO or DBFM type contracts; 
• PPPs are an instrument for generating private sector creativity, which may contribute to 
the cost coverage and thus speed up the implementation of various socially desirable 
projects; 
• PPPs are a structure in which public and private entities cooperate, preferably in a 
separate legal entity, which can be applied in various sectors of the economy, and 
• PPPs do not affect public responsibility.  Government stays responsible.  Under public 
responsibility, firms are invited to provide services either to government or directly to the 
public.  
 
When assessing the potential contribution of PPPs to social and economic development, a 
strategy is needed for the: 
 
• Policy formulation; 
• Project preparation, and 
• Project implementation. 
 
The relevant stakeholders, who must be consulted include: 
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• Sponsoring government entity (National); 
• Local government; 
• Local private sector; 
• International donors and lenders; 
• (Inter) national commercial lenders; 
• (Inter) national project investors; 
• End-users, and 
• Trade unions.  
 
2.6   Policy and Guidelines 
 
Collaborative working and partnering between the public and private sectors has been fairly 
standard practice, in some form or other, for over 100 years. Countries such as China have 
promulgated legislation to regulate participation of foreign enterprises in the Chinese construction 
industry (Lam & Chen, 2004). However, the profile of PPPs has risen comparatively recently 
(Cartlidge, 2006).  South African PPP projects are governed by two key Acts, the Public Finance 
Management Act (PFMA), and the Municipal Finance Management Act (MFMA).. 
 
2.6.1   The Public Finance Management Act, 1999 No. 1 of 1999 
 
The South African PPPs’ policy was introduced in 1999 and contains details of the framework for 
establishing partnerships to deliver public infrastructure and related services.  The South African 
National Treasury’s PPP Manual is a best practice guide for PPP practitioners.  The manual 
consists of several modules, with each module of the PPP manual being issued as a National 
Treasury PPP practice note in terms of the PFMA.  The manual should be read in conjunction 
with Standardised PPP provisions, issued as National Treasury PPP Practice, Note Number 01 of 
2004. 
 
The PPP Manual and Standardised PPP provisions are the National Treasury’s founding PPP 
guidance documents.  Building on these, the National Treasury’s PPP Unit has been developing 
specialised Sectoral Toolkits for PPPs, which will tailor the founding guidance to particular 
Sectoral conditions, based on cumulative PPP experience in South Africa (National Treasury, 
2005). 
 
2.6.1.1   Module 1: South African Regulation of PPPs 
 
This module was issued as National Treasury PPP Practice, Note Number 02 of 2004, regulation 
16 of the Public Finance Management Act, 1999 (PFMA) and is the regulation governing PPPs in 
South Africa.  This module takes the user through the components of the regulation and explains 
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how they apply to the distinct phases of the PPP project cycle, from inception to the management 
of the PPP agreement. 
 
2.6.1.2   Module 2: Code of Good Practice for BEE in PPPs 
 
The National Treasury PPP Practice Note, Number 03, of 2004 module, is an exact reproduction 
of the Code, and is the National Treasury’s official framework for black economic empowerment 
(BEE) in PPPs, which was issued in terms of the Broad-based Black Economic Empowerment 
Act, (BBBEE Act) (Republic of South Africa, 2003).  The Code is relevant in all phases of a PPP.  
It describes the policy framework, how to apply BEE policy in the typical structure of a PPP and 
how to apply PPP BEE policy in each phase of the PPP project cycle.  The Code includes the 
PPP BEE Balanced Scorecard. 
 
2.6.1.3   Module 3: PPP Inception 
 
The National Treasury PPP Practice Note, Number 04, of 2004 module, details the various stages 
of inception.  This involves the institution registering the project with the relevant treasury, the 
appointment of a project officer, the attracting of a transaction advisor, the receiving and 
evaluating of transaction advisor bids, and the finalising and signing of the contract with the 
transaction advisor.  The module outlines the procurement steps, which need to be followed and 
explains how to apply the Code of Good Practice for BEE in PPPs in procuring the transaction 
advisor. 
 
2.6.1.4   Module 4: PPP Feasibility Study 
 
This module was issued as National Treasury PPP Practice Note, Number 05, of 2004.  The 
feasibility study is the second phase of the PPP project cycle.  The feasibility study is undertaken 
to help the institution determine whether conventional public sector procurement, or a PPP, is the 
best choice for the proposed project.  The module presents and explains the core concepts of 
affordability, risk and value-for-money.  Users are taken through the following stages of the 
feasibility study process: 
 
• Needs analysis; 
• Options analysis; 
• Project due diligence; 
• Value assessment; 
• Economic valuation; 
• Procurement plan, and 
• Feasibility study report for Treasury approval. 
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2.6.1.5   Module 5: PPP Procurement 
 
This module was issued as National Treasury PPP Practice Note, Number 06, of 2004.  It covers 
the third phase of the PPP project cycle, and it details the procurement processes of a PPP, 
which include the following stages: 
 
• Pre-qualification; 
• Request for proposals (RFPs); 
• Best and final offer, where appropriate; 
• Negotiations, and 
• Financial closure. 
 
The module establishes best practice as it has been developed in National Treasury-regulated 
PPPs to date.  Users are given guidance on how to produce documentation necessary for the 
three treasury approvals. 
 
2.6.1.6   Module 6: Managing the PPP Agreement 
 
This module was issued as National Treasury PPP Practice Note, Number 07, of 2004.  The 
fourth phase of the PPP project cycle continues throughout the project term.  This module is 
intended to help the institution to put effective mechanisms in place to manage the 
implementation of the PPP agreement, once it is signed.  It is primarily aimed at the project 
officer, who is responsible for preparing and implementing the PPP management plan.  The 
module details the key aspects of PPP agreement management, which include: 
 
• The institution’s roles and responsibilities; 
• The approach to PPP agreement management; 
• Partnership management; 
• Service delivery management; 
• PPP agreement administration, and 
• Key challenges and tasks of the PPP management agreement. 
 
2.6.1.7   Module 7: Auditing PPPs 
 
This module was issued as National Treasury PPP Practice Note, Number 08, of 2004.  It 
describes the powers and functions of the Auditor-General, and the scope of financial, 
performance, and forensic audits.  It explains how this applies to PPPs, particularly in relation to 
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the management of the PPP agreement.  It also outlines the role of the institution’s internal audit 
in PPP projects. 
 
2.6.2   The Municipal Finance Management Act No.56 of 2003 
 
The Municipal Finance Management Act (Republic of South Africa, 2003) took effect on 01 July 
2004.  It aims to modernise municipalities’ budget and financial management practices and 
maximise their capacity to deliver services.  The Act focuses on outputs, outcomes, and 
measurable objectives, and includes a clear framework for municipal PPPs.  This approach is 
very similar to the emerging unified public procurement approach to PPP in Europe, which has 
resulted in many positive effects on PPP development (Widen & Olander, 2007). 
 
Municipalities in South Africa face enormous challenges in the delivery of public services and 
infrastructure (PPP Quarterly, 2004).  Despite the considerable achievements of the last 12 years, 
large backlogs still remain.  Correctly structured PPPs are necessary for addressing some of 
these service delivery needs.  The MFMA prescribes that PPPs must provide value-for-money, 
they must present an appropriate allocation of risks between the contracting parties, and they 
must be affordable in terms of current and projected budgets.  It requires that a PPP regulatory 
framework be developed and prescribed by the National Treasury.  It also requires that 
municipalities conduct feasibility studies before finalising PPP contracts, and that the National 
Treasury may assist them to do so.  A municipality’s accounting officer is specifically required to 
formally solicit the views and recommendations of the National Treasury, along with other relevant 
departments, once the feasibility study has been completed. 
 
According to the PPP Quarterly (2004), a Municipal Desk has been created in the National 
Treasury’s PPP Unit to help municipalities to meet the MFMA requirements and to ensure that the 
National Treasury fulfils its PPP MFMA obligations.  The desk is supposed to develop a clear 
policy framework and provide hands-on technical assistance in preparing feasibility studies and 
developing procurement and contract management skills, so as to ensure sustainable municipal 
partnerships.  These developments are in conformity with the research objectives of creating a 
sustainable PPP system in South Africa.  Generally, when a PPP policy is being conceived, the 
following must be addressed: 
 
•  Government support of PPPs to enhance levels of funding, or for more efficient project 
implementation.  PPPs are often considered a ‘solution for all’, whereas the most 
successful projects are based on a sound balance between project finance, risk-taking 
and additional cost recovery.  PPPs are not for free.  Either the government or the end-
user must pay, and 
• The extent to which legislation and the institutional setting is supportive of PPP 
implementation, determines government reforms on taxes, foreign investment, economic 
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ownership and labour regulations. Tables 13, 14 and 15 illustrate various investment 
incentives, investment promotion agencies (IPAs) and legal and regulatory frameworks in 
a number of African countries. 
 
Table 13: PPP Investment Incentives  
Item Country Incentives 
1 Egypt Provides 5-year corporate tax holiday 
2 Zambia Allows duty free imports of raw materials 
3 Senegal Exempts value-added tax on local goods 
5 Namibia Permits write-off of plant, machinery, and equipment in 3 years 
6 Ghana Completely waives customs duties on capital equipment 
7 Mauritius Offers high-level incentives through EPZs 
8 Mozambique Offers high-level incentives through EPZs 
Data source: African Development Bank (2003) 
 
Table 14: Investment Promotion Agencies (IPAs)  
Item Country Name of IPA 
1 Kenya Kenya Investment Promotion Centre 
2 Mozambique Mozambique Centre for Investment Promotion 
3 Namibia Namibia Investment Centre 
5 Tunisia Tunisia Foreign investment Promotion Agency 
6 Senegal Senegal National Agency For Investment 
7 Nigeria Nigeria Investment Promotion Commission 
8 South Africa Trade and Investment South Africa (TISA) 
Data source: African Development Bank (2003) 
 
Table 15: Legal and Regulatory Framework  
Item Country Name of Investment Promotion Agency 
1 Uganda Investment Code (1991) 
2 Ethiopia Revised 1992 Investment Code 
3 Namibia Foreign  Investment Act (1990) 
5 Ghana Investment Promotion Centre Act (1994) 
6 Tanzania New Investment Act 1997 
7 Tunisia Investment Incentives Code (1994) 
8 Egypt Investment Incentives and Guarantees Law (1997) 
9 Sudan Investment Act (1999) 
Data source: African Development Bank (2003) 
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• PPP legislation simplifies investment procedures and provides incentives and attractive 
conditions to foreign investors.  The legislation also guarantees the repatriation of profits 
and dividends, assures legal stability, and prohibits nationalisation and expropriation 
without compensation; 
• The extent to which central and local governments are prepared to reduce their control 
over the operational stages of the project.  PPP implementation requires governments to 
define the level of detail for project control.  Private sector agencies also need to be 
convinced that governments will honour what is agreed upon in the contract.  Ideally, if 
the government changes policy, then it should pay, but in reality, part of the cost often 
falls on the private sector; 
• The extent to which governments will adjust standard procurement procedures.  There 
must be a well-defined procurement process, where it is made clear under what 
conditions the government will close a PPP deal; 
• Local private sector buying into the concept and preparedness to invest.  During the PPP 
policy stage it may be required actively to promote: 
• Awareness; 
• Understanding, and 
• Skills among local entrepreneurs; 
• The international lending institutions and commercial banks involved in developing the 
policy concepts.  Their involvement will reassure the private sector; 
• Local consumers and trade unions buying into the concept.  Too often these are not 
included in policy formulation.  This causes unnecessary concerns and obstruction as the 
project moves to the preparation stage.  Acceptable estimates of local willingness to pay 
need to be made; 
• Whether the government is likely to develop a sustainable PPP process through, for 
example, for the development of a PPP core of expertise, culture, and spirit.  Setting up a 
specific PPP taskforce, department, or public enterprise may be considered.  These may 
involve various ministries and possibly private entities; 
• The sectors in which PPPs are most likely to occur. The emphasis is on infrastructure and 
primary services such as motorways, ports, energy, and water.  But other services such 
as universities, hospitals, and education might also be considered, and 
• Is standardization an objective in itself?  It is often argued that only when a market for 
PPPs is established do the real benefits emerge for governments and end-users.  If so, a 
long-term view and a concerned flow of projects, investments and effort are required from 
all stakeholders.  
 
2.7   Project Preparation: Turning Abstract Ideas into Projects 
 
Relevant issues to be considered may include: 
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• Will the building of a portfolio of projects in each sector increase market interest, 
strengthen the learning process and stimulate standardization? 
• How are projects prioritised?  Does the government take the initiative, or is the private 
sector invited to do so?  Experience in developing countries, shows that projects with 
significant end-user contributions, are the most likely to succeed; 
• How, and how far do political perspectives influence the prioritisation of projects?  Does 
this result in the selection of over ambitious, but under-funded projects? 
• How adequately are outputs specified?  What can be done to improve their specification? 
• What are the options for ring-fencing a project?  Although the scope of the project is at 
the core of the government’s competence, a more open interaction with international 
lending institutions and the local private sector will probably add to the project’s viability; 
• Are the public stakeholders competing or cooperating?  All too often, it is the lack of 
agreement between the various levels of government that delay or obstruct a project, 
rather than the interaction between public and private sectors; 
• To what extent do PPPs require additional measures on cost recovery?  PPPs are often 
considered a cheap source of money for realizing projects.  The necessary public 
budgetary resources, including financial compensation for the risks transferred to the 
private sector, are often underestimated.  What will be the role of user-payments? 
• Are the end-users involved in project preparation?  PPPs often lead to contractual 
agreements between government and other institutions.  Some of these institutions are 
large and project preparation often centres on the needs and wishes of a sponsoring 
government, rather than those of the end-users.  
 
2.8   Project Implementation: Getting it done 
 
The following should be considered at this stage: 
 
• A PPP deal often aims at a long-term commitment between sponsors and the winning 
consortium. To facilitate contracts as fully as possible, the most important stakeholders 
should be equipped with the requisite skills.  This is often neglected.  If stakeholders are 
in it for the duration, they benefit from each other’s professionalism; 
• Should the government aim for private participation as soon as possible in the project 
preparation stage, or to keep things moving quickly, should the government invite private 
participation only when the broad project outline has been defined? 
• Should the government rely on the procurement process, or should it focus on applying 
such instruments as the Public Sector Comparator (PSC)?  Where there is enough 
competition, it is important to use standard procurement processes, but the quality of 
consortia needs to be assessed during the pre-qualification stage, to make sure whether 
they are likely to be reliable partners;  
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• Should government aim for a complete risk transfer or retain key risk categories?  For 
example, it is frequently argued that traffic risk for toll roads should be transferred to 
private partners.  Equally, the risk transfer has recently led to various bankruptcies and 
project rescheduling.  If government goes this route, will it still have to give certain 
financial guarantees? 
• Should government participate in a project implementation entity?  In other words, should 
the government aim for typical joint ventures, or do contractual arrangements suffice?  It 
is often argued that a true partnership requires the government to participate.  On the 
other hand, government participation may increase risks for both private and public 
partners.  
 
The continuous growth of PPPs in developed and developing countries means that PPPs are 
here to stay.  However, experience shows the importance of well-balanced implementation.  
Lawther (2000) provides an in-depth case study of a successful PPP for the Orange County 
Expressway Authority’s experience in toll road operations in Florida, USA.  Donor agencies can 
make a difference in ensuring successful PPP policy making, project preparation and 
implementation. 
 
2.9   Nature of Partnership Projects 
 
Partnerships entered into under the PPP policy, where it exists, can take a wide variety of forms.  
Partnerships between the public and private sectors, to fulfil public functions are on the increase 
at every level of government in the US, with western industrialised nations having almost thirty 
years experience with public private policy frameworks (Rosenau, 2000).  However, PPP projects 
generally have a number of common features: 
 
• Outputs are clearly defined including measurable performance standards; 
• The government only makes payments upon delivery of the specified services, to the 
required standards; 
• A relatively long-term commitment, with the term depending upon the nature of the 
project; 
• One or more private parties, fully accountable to the government for the delivery of the 
specified services; 
• Risk allocation between the parties being clear and enforceable, with consequential 
financial outcomes; 
• Clear articulation of the government’s responsibilities with respect to the monitoring of 
outcomes, and 
• Inclusion of mechanisms for delivering ongoing value-for-money services throughout the 
life of the project.  
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The clear specification of required outputs, allows bidders to compete in devising creative means 
of delivering those outputs, with a view to reducing costs.  Thus, government will limit detailed 
specification of inputs, such as the design of infrastructure, or of the means by which outputs are 
to be generated.  
 
Likewise, the government will be open to solutions by which proponents may derive other 
additional benefit or revenue from the infrastructure, subject to value-for-money and public 
interest tests.  
 
2.9.1   Objectives 
 
According to the European Commission (2003), and Walzer and  Jacobs (1998) a government will 
develop a PPP under a defined policy framework with the following objectives in mind: 
• To maximize the level of infrastructure spending though a responsible use of the 
resources of both the public and private sectors;  
• To ensure that infrastructure and related ancillary services are provided in accordance 
with best practice, and where appropriate, to relevant international standards; 
• To promote growth and creation of employment opportunities; 
• To deliver significantly improved services to the community; 
• To encourage innovation in the provision of infrastructure and related ancillary services; 
• To maximise the social and economic returns from government expenditure; 
• To pass on the benefits of PPPs to customers, businesses and end-users; 
• To clearly articulate accountabilities for outcomes, and 
• To promote industry development, investment, recruitment, skills development, and 
technology transfer. 
  
2.9.2   Principles 
 
Ghobadian, Gallear, O’Regan, and Viney (2004) review several core issues behind the debate on 
principles governing PPPs.  In designing PPPs with the above objectives in mind, the following 
principles should guide government’s approach:  
 
• Projects should focus on the specification of the end result rather than the means of 
delivery; 
• Projects to be delivered within the PPP policy framework must, prior to the formal 
involvement of the private sectors, have the government’s approval; 
• The allocation of risk and the commercial framework of the partnership model utilised, 
should deliver the best outcomes for the government; 
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• Performance measures should be established to ensure that the quality of services 
delivered meet the needs of the community and that the outcomes of the project are 
transparent; 
• Private participation is to be subject to competitive tendering processes, consistent with 
the government’s general goods and services procurement policies; 
• There should be an emphasis on transparency and disclosure of the processes and 
outcomes, acknowledging the need to protect commercial confidentiality, where 
appropriate; 
• The conduct of the public sector should always be such that confidence in the probity of 
the partnership model and the way in which it is implemented, is able to be maintained at 
all times; 
• Standardized approaches should be used wherever possible, to minimize transaction time 
and cost, and 
• Where appropriate, incentives for all parties should be provided to encourage high level 
performance. 
 
2.10   Public Interest 
 
Governments should be committed to ensuring that each PPP project is assessed against public 
interest.  The assessment should include the impact of the project on: 
 
• Effectiveness:  Is the project effective in meeting the government objectives? 
• Accountability and transparency:  Do the partnership arrangements ensure that the 
community will be well informed about the obligations of the government and the private 
sector partner, and that these can be overseen by other independent auditing agencies? 
• Affected individuals and communities:  Have those affected been able to contribute 
effectively at the planning stages, and are their rights protected through fair appeals 
processes and other conflict resolution mechanisms? 
• Equity:  Are there adequate arrangements to ensure that disadvantaged groups can 
effectively use the infrastructure? 
• Public access:  Are there safeguards that ensure ongoing public access to essential 
infrastructure? 
• Consumer rights:  Does the project provide sufficient safeguards for consumers, 
particularly those for whom the government has a high level of duty of care, and / or are 
most vulnerable population groups? 
• Security:  Does the project provide assurance that community health and safety will be 
secured? 
• Privacy:  Does the project provide adequate protection of users’ rights to privacy? 
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2.11   Value-for-money 
 
PPP policy should be vigorously pursued where it is likely to deliver better value-for-money than 
traditional delivery methods.  A Public Sector Comparator, which estimates the cost of the most 
efficient form of public sector delivery, should be constructed to test for value-for-money.  
 
PPPs have a real potential to deliver value-for-money where: 
 
• A government need has been defined in measurable output terms; 
• The project is structured to optimise risk allocation, in order to generate the incentives for 
cost-effective, high quality services; 
• There is an identifiable market in the form of bidders prepared to compete for the opportunity 
to undertake the project; 
• There is scope for private sector parties to demonstrate particular skills and / or innovative 
capacity, and 
• The project size justifies the transaction costs and ongoing management costs. 
 
While value-for-money varies between projects, partnership terms should be long enough to 
enable value-for-money savings to be generated, while not being so long that competitive 
pressures are reduced.  In a recent study (Minato & Charoenpornpattana, 2007) argue that a 
revenue sharing – scheme must be provided in order to safeguard public interest. 
 
2.12   Risk Identification, Allocation and Management 
 
The principle governing risk transfer is that risk will be allocated to whoever is best able to 
manage it at the lowest cost, taking into account public interest considerations.  This does not 
mean that all risk is transferred.  Beck, Hardcastle and Akintoye (2003) show how current risk 
management methods can help the complex process of managing procurement through 
partnerships. 
 
The ability to secure risk transfer on worthwhile terms requires the scope of the project to be 
drawn up in sufficient detail.  There will always be a wide variety of risks associated with potential 
projects, therefore the structure of a PPP project needs to take into account which party is best 
able to take responsibility for managing such risks.  Risks such as: 
 
• Design and construction risk - to cost, quality and time; 
• Commissioning and operating risk; 
• Service under-performance risk; 
• Industrial relations risk; 
• Maintenance risk; 
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• Technology transfer risk; 
• Regulation an legal change risk; 
• Planning risk; 
• Price risk; 
• Taxation risk; 
• Residual value risk, and 
• Demand, or volume / usage risk. 
 
The general principles guiding risk transfer and management are: 
 
• Whoever is allocated risk must have the freedom to choose how to handle and minimize 
the risk, and 
• Materiality must be considered 
 
2.13   Market Interest 
 
No responsible government agency should waste public or private resources on fruitless bidding 
rounds.  Hence, bids should be invited only when it is clear that there is scope for a private 
proponent to add value. 
 
Therefore, government departments and agencies should ascertain likely market interest.  This 
can be done by various means, including holding preliminary discussions with an appropriate 
sample of industry practitioners.  Pint (2001) reports on the proceedings of a joint USA – UK 
conference on privatising military installation assets, operations, and services.  The papers 
presented provided an overview of UK privatisation and outsourcing initiatives, and compared UK 
and US practises. 
 
2.14   Support Structures and Accountability 
 
Government accountability and support structures, such as approval processes, procurement 
teams and financing mechanisms should be implemented.  The issue of funding support 
programmes is discussed in subsequent sections.  
 
2.15   How to Develop a PPP: South African Context 
 
2.15.1   Introduction 
 
The following major steps provide a basic generic guideline as to how an institution can approach 
developing a PPP.  However, there may be circumstances where a public entity may decide to 
develop a PPP project through a different route.  In such cases, it is important to ensure that all 
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interested parties, particularly bidders, are made aware of the variety of possible PPP approaches 
and that the varied process is clearly communicated and maintained.  According to Grimsey and 
Lewis (2004), the major stages in a PPP contract are: 
 
• Define service need; 
• Appraisal; 
• Business case; 
• Project development; 
• Bidding process; 
• Project finalization; 
• Final negotiation, and 
• Contract management. 
 
2.15.2   Project Inception (Service needs) 
 
2.15.2.1   Objectives, Outputs and Outcomes 
 
The process of developing a potential PPP project flows from a normal consideration of the needs 
of a department, or agency in delivering the outputs required by government.  A department, such 
as a municipal council, is responsible for delivering particular outputs in pursuit of outcomes 
required by government to meet the service needs of the community it serves.  For example, in 
the next three years, the South African government plans to provide the necessary infrastructure 
in land servicing, such as: roads, water, sewers, hospitals and schools, and other social 
infrastructure in various municipalities and related ancillary services. 
 
The proper identification of outputs necessary for achieving particular outcomes is of fundamental 
importance (Payne, 1999).  In addition, the proper specification of those objectives of the project 
that will deliver the outputs is also of great importance.  Project objectives must be defined in 
precise terms, which nevertheless are sufficiently broad to accommodate any changes to 
definitions of service needs, as they may be refined during the development of the project. 
 
2.15.2.2   Focus on Outputs 
 
Identifying service needs is part of a normal planning process.  However, at this stage the 
potential to deliver through a PPP structure and the benefits that may accrue should be 
considered.  Until recently, municipalities in developing countries formulated and implemented 
infrastructure and service projects, utilising budgets handed down from higher levels of 
government (Plummer, 2002).  The PPP approach adds value by focusing on outputs only and 
not on a prescriptive solution, or defined inputs and so allows a bidder to devise innovative 
solutions. 
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To achieve this objective, it is advisable to involve people in the analysis who are accustomed to 
achieving outputs through service contracts.  There is also value in involving private sector parties 
at an early stage, to identify innovative and cost-effective means of providing outputs.  For 
example, an annual business forum that is setting out a department’s strategic objectives and 
infrastructure challenges may generate alternative ways of defining project objectives. 
 
2.15.2.3   Aggregate needs 
 
With the focus of moving from the procurement of infrastructure to include the procurement of 
services, options may arise for the packaging of service needs to achieve greater value-for-
money in one contract.  Hence, there should be consideration of any potential to aggregate 
service needs that may, for example, be similar to various locations, or differing at one location.  
This approach also prompts consideration of and planning for, future service needs, and provides 
a flexible means of expanding, contracting or enhancing service delivery over time. 
 
2.16   Feasibility Study  
 
2.16.1   Option Identification 
 
The first step is to consider available options for meeting the service needs.  The PPP approach 
has a range of options for delivering requirements, and has some advantages over more 
traditional delivery methods.  However, it does not suit all needs and other options should be 
properly considered before a preferred delivery mechanism is accepted.  Delivery options 
available include: 
 
• Existing asset solutions: Consideration must be taken whether the existing infrastructure 
that is held by the department or agency, or by another government body, might be used.  
This may involve an upgrade or refurbishment to elevate the infrastructure to the required 
standard, and may result in an expense in the form of revenue foregone, if the asset 
might otherwise be sold; 
• Non-asset solutions: Service needs may be met without creating additional assets, 
through reconfiguring the means of service delivery, developing initiatives to manage 
demand more effectively, or increasing the use of existing assets by extending the hours 
of operation, and 
• New asset-based solutions: New infrastructure may be developed.  For example, a new 
school may be required to meet the increased demand due to high student enrolment, or 
for other reasons PPPs are typically more suited to asset-based projects, including major 
refurbishments. 
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2.16.2   PPP as an Option 
 
Once a PPP has been identified as the best procurement route and before a detailed analysis of a 
potential PPP delivery mechanism can be made, the following criteria should be considered, in 
order to assess the potential for it to deliver value-for-money services: 
 
• Scale of the project: PPP policy guidelines should provide threshold values for projects, 
below which the PPP approach is unlikely to provide value-for-money.  Therefore, below 
a defined threshold, the likely level of transaction and other costs for both the public and 
the private parties may make it difficult to achieve value-for-money outputs.  However, it 
may be possible to bundle or aggregate a number of related projects to achieve this 
threshold; 
• Outputs capable of clear specification: It must be possible to define the required outputs 
in clear and measurable terms, around which a payment mechanism can be structured; 
• Opportunities for risk transfer: Allocation of risk to a private party is a primary driver of 
value-for-money outputs.  Where opportunities for risk allocation to the private party are 
limited, the potential to deliver value-for-money, compared with a publicly owned asset 
approach is reduced, and 
• Market capability and appetite: The project must be a potentially viable commercial 
venture and a there must be a certain level of market interest in the project.  Assessment 
of each of these matters may require preliminary market sounding, including discussions 
with potential bidders, financiers and advisers.  In planning such discussions, measures 
should be taken to ensure that no potential bidder is disadvantaged and that no improper 
use is made of the intellectual property of others.  All market-sounding activities should be 
documented in records, to be made available to a probity auditor, if a project is 
implemented.  
 
2.16.3   Reporting on Evaluation Options 
 
The next step is to develop a detailed options report covering the most viable delivery options 
available to meet the identified needs.  The purpose of the report is to identify the advantages and 
disadvantages of each option and to critically examine the risks and benefits to government.  This 
analysis should be consistent with any infrastructure investment and policy guidelines that apply 
at the time of the evaluation. 
 
The key issues to be addressed in each PPP option should include: 
 
• Project overview:  It is necessary to define the project objectives and the outputs being 
sought.  There should be a strong alignment between service need, output specifications, 
project objectives and the strategic plan of the sponsoring department or agency; 
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• Financial impacts:  It is important to include in the options analysis a preliminary view on 
the cash and accounting impacts of each option.  For example, an analysis of a public 
sector delivery option would show the initial capital expenditure, life cycle maintenance 
and refurbishment costs and the costs of operation.  A PPP option analysis would include 
a well-informed discussion about the potential level of annual charge to the government 
by the private party.  This analysis of financial impacts will provide a preliminary basis for 
the development of the Public Sector Comparator (PSC) and assist in identifying the 
reference project for that; 
• Risk analysis:  It is necessary to discuss the risks to the government in relation to each of 
the options.  The discussion should specifically identify the risks that may be passed to a 
private party.  According to Jin and Doloi (2007), appropriate understanding and 
quantification of risks is key to decision-making by the PPP project managers; 
• Public interest:  There is a need to set out a preliminary view or policy of the impact of 
each option, from the point of view of the public.  A full public interest test is performed 
when more reliable data is assembled during the construction of a business case; 
• Affordability:  It is important to consider the ability of the sponsoring department, or 
agency to fund the project, or to gain additional funding through the state budget 
development process.  This requires at least some preliminary consideration of the 
annual cost to the government of a PPP solution, and 
• Service delivery impacts:  There is a need to discuss the service delivery issues 
associated with each option, and include any transitional management issues.  For 
example, if a major redevelopment project is being considered along with refurbishment, 
or an upgrade project, management issues during the capital works should be addressed.  
 
The options analysis should be supported by a recommendation as to which project and delivery 
option(s) should be pursued.  The outputs that would be delivered under the PPP contract may be 
described at this time.  The description should identify the full range of outputs that would be 
delivered over the period of the contract.  
 
The options analysis is undertaken by a department or agency, which may also seek technical 
assistance from the treasury in appraising the options. A recent study by Orr and Brown (2006), 
explains how China is exploring the potential of using PPPs in the provision of affordable housing.  
 
2.17   Business Case 
 
Developing a business case is the key step in the decision-making process.  This is where the 
project is fully scoped and risks and costs are identified to develop a cost-benefit analysis and test 
the net benefit of the proposal.  An analysis of market capability and appetite provides evidence of 
the potential for the private sector to add value.  Assessment of related impacts allows for the 
implementation of the Public Interest test and the identification of other issues, of which 
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government should be aware.  The business case provides an opportunity for government to form 
a view on the particular PPP approach, before significant resources are spent on developing the 
detailed elements of the project.  
 
2.17.1   Function of the Business Case 
 
The main functions of the business case are: 
 
• To scope the project from an output and cost perspective; 
• To confirm the contribution of the project to portfolio and government policy objectives; 
• To examine the financial impacts of the project to the government; 
• To analyse the costs and benefits associated with the project and demonstrate that it has 
net benefit; 
• To develop an overview of the structure of the proposed arrangements; 
• To research and consider the likely level of market interest for the project and whether it 
represents a commercially viable business opportunity, and 
• To demonstrate that the public interest is protected.  
 
2.17.2   Content of the Business Case 
 
The development and contents of a business case are drawn significantly from data gathered and 
work already done.  The generic contents are: 
 
• Project objective:  The objective of the project and its alignment with the department or 
agency’s strategic plan should be re-affirmed.  This consists of a review of the project 
scope in relation to portfolio policy, wider government policy and future strategic direction.  
The service need is most likely to have been identified through the strategic planning 
process, so confirmation of project objectives is often a relatively simple task.  However, 
considerable time may have passed since the project was initiated, and social, economic 
and political conditions may have changed.  Therefore it should be reviewed in the wider 
social and economic context.  The objective and scope should be re-examined at each 
significant milestone throughout the project development process; 
• Outputs to be delivered:  A description of all elements of the service must be provided.  
The full range of service outputs and support service outputs that may be included in the 
project can enhance its value-for-money and should be carefully considered.  PPP project 
managers, with sound experience in the delivery of the outputs required, may assist in 
identifying all the services necessary to produce those outputs; 
• Project structure:  The project structure may not have been developed in detail at this 
point; 
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• Risk analysis:  The business case should identify all material risks associated with the 
project, specifying the external and project development risks for the government, and the 
project risks to be allocated to the private party.  It should also include any project 
transition risks, such as the interest rate or planning risks that may be borne by the 
government until it is allocated to the private party once contracts are in operation.  This is 
a key area of the business case, as optimal risk allocation is a fundamental driver of 
value-for-money.  The business case needs to explain why government is considered 
better able to manage, or mitigate the risks allocated to it.  It should also include at least a 
preliminary view regarding the cost to government as a result of the risks, which are to be 
built into the Public Sector Comparator; 
• Indicative costs and preliminary PSC:  A preliminary net cost-analysis of the capital, 
maintenance, ancillary services and residual value must be conducted.  This will 
determine the likely funding requirements and will form the basis of the PSC used later, to 
provide a benchmark for assessing bids.  Data gathered and cash flows estimated during 
the construction of a preliminary PSC, will also help to determine whether the project 
constitutes a commercially viable business opportunity for a private party; 
• Government commitment required:  Details of the extent of necessary government 
commitment to the project should be set out.  This may vary from full financial and 
contractual support, to government taking only the role of facilitator or regulator; 
• Cost-benefit analysis:  A full cost-benefit analysis of the potential project should be 
prepared before making a decision to commit to a major infrastructure project; 
• Market capability and appetite:  The government requires reliable data to determine 
whether to offer a project to the market as a PPP project, or to deliver it by traditional 
means.  This decision, which is based on practical grounds, necessitates an examination 
of the following issues: 
• Whether private parties have the capability to deliver the project, and 
• Whether they have the appetite, or motivation, to do so; 
• Proposed performance measurement and payment mechanisms:  There needs to be an 
outline of outputs to be purchased and the key performance indicators, which will 
measure performance; 
• Stakeholders:  It is necessary to identify key stakeholders, including other government 
departments, third parties and the general public.  A consultation plan should be included; 
• Employment and local content impacts:  The business case must include an analysis of 
any relevant employment-related issues and should advise how the PPP policy should be 
implemented; 
• Public interest:  It is important to test the proposed project against the public interest.  
This will ensure that public interest issues are properly documented for consideration in 
the project approval process; 
• Site issues:  Where a physical site is involved, the business case should indicate whether 
the government intends to specify a preferred site, nominate a definite site, for example 
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where a service is required by a given local community, or to leave the question of 
location open to the bidders; 
• Environmental and planning impacts:  There should be an analysis of the impacts on the 
environment.  This should include any potential constraints, management of planning 
issues and any specific impacts on development, in the area surrounding the preferred or 
available sites, and 
• Project timetable and resourcing:  An indicative project timetable should show each of the 
key stages in the process and the estimated time that service delivery should commence.  
Resources required to deliver a project should also be included.  
 
The business case is prepared and submitted in order to obtain a government endorsement of the 
project and for funding approval. 
 
 2.18   Procurement  
 
Following endorsement and funding approval, the project should be further developed, which 
requires the assembling of resources and the development of project structures, in preparation for 
making the project available to bidders in the formal market. 
 
 2.18.1   Assembling Resources – The Project Team 
 
While some resources will have been devoted to developing the business case, a full team is not 
assembled until the government has endorsed the proposal.  Once government approval is 
achieved, a procurement team is needed to develop and deliver the project.  A generic project 
management structure is as shown in Figure 3. 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: PPP Project Management Structure 
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The specialist expertise required for the project includes: 
• Financial; 
• Technical; 
• Operational, and 
• Legal skills. 
 
The exact skills and experience required vary with the type of project.  Internal resources may fill 
some specialist roles, depending on the availability of the relevant skills and experience within the 
department, or agency.  However, these may be outsourced, including legal and other skills that 
may also be required.  The project director remains responsible for delivering all critical elements 
of the project.  
 
The specialist roles to be filled include: 
 
• Steering committee:  This committee is established to direct the development of the 
project and deal with key issues, including the content of key documentation and the 
selection of the preferred bidder.  The composition of this steering committee is chosen at 
the discretion of the department or agency.  However, the department may consult the 
National Treasury to contribute knowledge to the handling of commercial, financial and 
process issues for PPP projects, and to facilitate government approvals.  All PPP projects 
must be developed according to current government objectives and knowledge of the 
economic environment and social context; 
• Project director:  The role of the project director is critical to the success of the project.  
This should be a full-time dedicated role, with the overall responsibility for the delivery of 
the project and management of all members of the procurement team, including external 
advisers and consultants.  The skills of the individual should include project management, 
well developed commercial skills that are applicable to developing and negotiating 
contractual arrangements, and knowledge of government processes; 
• Probity auditor:  Bid management demands the use of best practice principles, particularly 
in government, as the use of public funds should be open to the scrutiny of citizens and 
parliament.  A probity auditor is therefore expected to ensure that a transparent and 
robust process is followed; 
• Procurement team: 
• Business and contract management. It is critical that the project development 
phase is completed with considerable input from the senior management of the 
department, or agency and from other government experts; 
• Legal. PPP arrangements involve complex contractual arrangements between 
government and private providers.  For this reason, it is important that the 
procurement team includes legal expertise.  The advisers should have proven 
experience and a demonstrated track record with PPP projects.  The legal 
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advisers play a key role in: developing the risk allocation matrix; preparing a 
contract for release with the project brief; structuring the project; analysing 
departures from the project brief; contracting; and documenting the final 
contractual requirements; 
• Financial. The procurement team is likely to require the support from a financial 
and commercial adviser, to assist with the development of the PSC, the proposed 
commercial arrangements, risk allocation, bid evaluation, and contract 
negotiations.  The adviser will also be expected to provide continuing advice on 
likely market support for the project and to consult with industry parties as 
necessary.  The person appointed should have a demonstrated track record in 
working with government on projects of a similar nature; 
• Planning. A planning adviser may be required if a preferred site for development 
has been acquired or identified.  An early appointment may help to identify 
planning policies and other controls that may apply to the infrastructure proposal, 
as well as any council planning permits that will be required; 
• Technical. The procurement team will inevitably require technical specialists, due 
to the need for various kinds of infrastructure development.  The skills required 
depend upon the nature of the project and are likely to include at least design, 
construction, quantity surveying, and engineering skills.  Where other technology 
is involved, specialist experts may also be included in the team, and 
• Other specialist advice.  Depending on the nature of the project, specialist advice 
may be needed in areas such as industrial relations and communications.  
 
2.18.2   The Project Plan 
 
One of the key initial tasks for the procurement team is to develop a detailed project plan and 
timetable.  This plan needs to take into account all key steps in the process, including 
consultation, market testing, and the government approval process.  Each project requires 
separate consideration of the timetable appropriate to the transaction.  The success of any project 
requires good upfront planning and working to the plan.  
 
2.18.3   Public Sector Comparator  
 
The PSC is developed to a preliminary stage in the business case phase.  It is then developed in 
detail in the project development phase and should be finalised prior to release of the project 
brief. 
 
The PSC plays a key role in the PPP process and sufficient resources should be allocated to its 
development to ensure a quality analysis of cash flows and risks.  The PSC is the quantitative 
benchmark against which the value-for-money delivered by private bids is compared.  
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2.18.4   Consultation Process 
 
It is useful to include private sector consultation during the project development phase.  Key 
advisers, associations, or specific organizations may be contacted to address prime issues such a 
checking the availability of certain sets of skills in the industry, or organizing a forum of interested 
parties to provide public input on certain issues.  
 
2.18.5   Bidding Process 
 
This stage involves developing the bid documents, formally engaging the market and identifying 
preferred bidders.  Within this stage, government approval is required before issuing an invitation 
for expression of interest (EoI) and issuing of the project brief.  Key tasks include: 
 
• Preparing EoI invitations; 
• Seeking approval to issue EoI; 
• Evaluating responses and developing a shortlist; 
• Developing a project brief and contract; 
• Seeking an approval to issue a project brief; 
• Conducting a clarification of sessions, and 
• Evaluating bids. 
 
2.18.6   PPP Agreements 
 
There are various formats of contractual documents associated with each project.  The contract is 
a comprehensive document, which clearly defines the obligations and rights of the various parties 
to the contract. 
 
The structure of PPP contracts differ substantially from standard procurement contracts, because 
it is not a traditional product supplier / buyer relationship.  Under PPP contracts, the parties 
allocate risks between them and work together in an ongoing relationship, to meet project 
objectives and are usually more complex than a standard procurement contract.  
 
2.18.7   Contract Management 
 
The construction and implementation phases, when the private party is making its major 
investment, are critical to the success of the project.  While the bidding process is very important, 
it is the conversion of the contract into the delivery of outputs that is essential to meeting the 
overall project objectives.  Contract management requires particular skills, which need to be 
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procured before the contract is executed.  Timing is important, as both the public and the 
government are anticipating the delivery of service outputs from the new infrastructure.  
 
2.19   PPP Funding and Programmes of Support 
 
2.19.1 Introduction 
 
Investing in a country’s physical infrastructure can contribute to economic growth, improve human 
welfare and has considerable potential for directly reducing poverty.  Yet current investment in the 
poorer developing countries, whether sourced internally or externally, is insufficient to fund 
infrastructure needs, leaving hundreds of millions without access to basic services.  
 
Although it appears that in most developing countries the public sector will remain the major 
provider of infrastructure services, for the foreseeable future.  However, an increasing number of 
these countries are now considering other ways of attracting increased private sector investment.  
However, the implication of such a change is inhibiting the development of the PPP concept.  
Even where such private investment is forthcoming, it tends to be biased towards the better-off 
areas for attraction of increased private sector investment in infrastructure. Public finance has 
funded most of the infrastructure procured in the UK and several other countries in the last fifty 
years.  The use of private finance instead of public finance is only justified if it provides a more 
cost effective solution (Smith, 1995). 
  
2.19.2   Sources of Project Finance 
 
Project finance is often provided by a lender in the form of one or more of the following: 
 
• Commercial bank; 
• Pension fund; 
• Insurance company; 
• Institutional investors; 
• Large corporations; 
• Investment banks; 
• Developers; 
• Utility subsidiaries; 
• Vendors, and 
• Contractors.  
 
According to Smith (1995), the Euro Tunnel project consisted of both debt and equity in the ratio 
of 80:20, which was raised from commercial banks, contractors and public investors. 
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2.19.3   PPP Project Finance 
 
2.19.3.1   Definition 
 
Project finance may be defined as the financing of a particular project on the basis of the 
projected cash flows and revenue streams of the project.  These operate as the source of funds 
for repayment of the loan (Smith, 1995). 
 
Project finance provides no recourse and if project funds are insufficient to cover debt service, 
lenders have no claim against the owner beyond the assets of the project.  The project is 
supposed to be self-funding and self-liquidating in terms of financing.  
 
2.19.3.2   Types of PPP Finance 
 
The loan structure of a PPP finance package may be in the form of debt arising from loans and 
debentures, and, or equity finance: 
 
• Debt Finance: The conditions of loan finance depend on the criteria of the lender and the 
risk level of the project under consideration.  The main features that normally have to be 
agreed upon are the repayment method, the interest rate and the security, and 
• Equity Finance: This is usually an injection of risk capital into a company, project or 
venture.  Providers of equity are compensated with dividends from profits, if the company 
or venture is successful, but no returns if the venture is loss making.  Equity investors are 
often committed to the success of a project.  Providers of equity fall into two categories, 
those with an interest in the project, namely contractors, vendors, and operators, and 
pure equity investors in the form of shareholders.  Sources of equity include: 
 
• Public share issue; 
• Financial institutions such as pension funds; 
• Companies and individuals; 
• Contractors; 
• Suppliers; 
• Operators; 
• Vendors and Government, and 
• International agencies such as the IFC, or European Investment Bank. 
 
2.19.4   PPP Investment Constraints 
 
According to Anderson (2003), major constraints to PPP investment in poorer developing 
countries include: 
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• An inappropriate enabling environment; 
• High up-front costs of project development; 
• A shortage of long-term debt, both in hard and local currencies; 
• High and uninsurable country risks; 
• The need for subsidies if many projects targeted on the poor are to be financially viable at 
the outset i.e. affordable, and 
• The need to strengthen public capacity to negotiate and implement private infrastructure 
projects. 
 
Allen (2001) identifies the following issues as being impediments to PPP development: 
• High bidding cost; 
• Refinancing; 
• Value-for-money; 
• Design; 
• Contractual relationships, and 
• Concession agreements. 
 
2.20 Programmes Designed to Overcome PPP Development 
 
The Department for International Development (DFID), in partnership with other like-minded 
donors, has taken the lead in tackling the above issues through various programmes of support 
(DFID, 2002). 
 
2.20.1   Public Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility (PPIAF) 
 
PPIAF is a multi-donour facility that works with governments of developing countries at central 
and municipal levels, to improve the enabling environment for private sector involvement in 
infrastructure services.  PPIAF currently has 14 contributing donours and undertakes a broad 
range of activities, including the development of legislation and regulatory systems, sector reform 
strategies, training of regulators and assistance with facilitating transactions.  DFID has 
committed ₤15.3 million to PPIAF, for the period 2003 to 2006.  
 
2.20.2. Public Private Partnership for the Urban Environment (PPPUE) 
 
In 1994, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) initiated the PPPUE.  This facility 
provides technical assistance and advisory support for the establishment of partnerships between 
government, business and civil society organizations, at the municipal level, for the delivery of 
basic infrastructure services to the urban poor.  DFID has committed ₤3.15 million to this facility.  
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2.20.3   Global Partnership of Output-Based Aid (GPOBA) 
 
If the poor are to receive infrastructure services, and service providers are to receive economic 
rates for the services provided, it will often be appropriate for services to be subsidized, at least in 
the early years.  Such subsidies should be transparent and accountable.  There are many 
advantages to providing such subsidies at the point of delivery, rather than as a subsidy at the 
point of supply end.  To address these issues, the World Bank, together with DFID support, is 
implementing a programme to develop, demonstrate and disseminate output-based approaches, 
so as to support the sustainable delivery of basic infrastructure services.  In order to facilitate the 
scaling-up of the approaches developed, the GPOBA has recently been expanded to include a 
‘Challenge Fund’, which is open for applications on a competitive basis, for the funding of specific 
subsidy programmes.  This will enable private sector suppliers to provide infrastructure services 
to the poor.  
 
2.20.4   Community-Led Infrastructure Financing Facility (CLIFF) 
 
Launched in 2000, CLIFF is a facility providing loans, guarantees, bridge finance and technical 
assistance, to encourage and support private sector investment in community-led urban 
regeneration projects.  In India, Homeless International is implementing CLIFF under the Cities 
Alliance programme, initially as a development and demonstration pilot project.  DFID has 
contributed ₤6.8 million to the pilot programme.  The Swedish International Development Agency 
(SIDA) has provided the country with in-support, and the United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID) has made available their International Guarantees Programme (IGP).  
 
2.20.5   Slum Upgrading facility (SUF) 
 
Urban poverty in developing countries is increasing at an alarming rate.  Municipalities, 
particularly in small and medium towns, are ill-equipped to meet growing infrastructure service 
and housing needs.  There is an urgent need for both private sector and donor grant support for 
these needs.  The SUF, which is managed by UN-Habitat, was designed to help municipalities 
deliver financially viable infrastructure services and housing projects.  They could then access 
support for these projects from both the public and private sectors.  DFID and SIDA have jointly 
agreed to partner UN-Habitat in developing the facility, by providing US$0.9 million each for the 
design phase.  They have both agreed in principle, to provide US$10 million each, through the 
Cities Alliance, towards developing and piloting SUF, with a view to the establishment of a more 
substantial longer-term facility.  
 
2.20.6   Private Infrastructure Development Group (PIDG) 
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Switzerland, Sweden and The Netherlands have collaborated in establishing PIDG.  The aim of 
the group is to facilitate and support the mobilization of private sector investment, and 
engagement in the provision of infrastructure and basic services that support growth and the 
elimination of poverty.  The first project funded through the PIDG Trust, was the Emerging Africa 
Infrastructure Fund (EAIF) and it was launched in January 2002.  .  DFID has committed ₤0.388 
million towards the operation of the PIDG for the period 2003 to 2006.  This was in addition to 
support committed to individual programmes funded through the PIDG.  
 
2.21   Public Private Partnerships: Global Synthesis 
 
2.21.1   Overview 
 
This section contains the results of a literature survey and a synthesis of a comprehensive 
database of infrastructure projects, from around the world that were financed, or delivered through 
some form of PPP model. 
 
The data used for this study emanated from projects that involved the construction, or 
development of roads, bridges, tunnels, railroads, airports, seaports, water / wastewater facilities, 
and buildings.  The data concerning these projects was derived from various sources, such as the 
2004 International Public Works Financing Projects database, published by Public Works 
Financing.  The publication lists almost 2 100 public use infrastructure projects from around the 
world.  These have been proposed or developed over the past 20 years, using private financing, 
or delivery as part of a PPP.  These financing houses are: 
 
• The Asian Development Bank (ADB); 
• The African Development Bank (AfDB); 
• European Investment Bank (EIB), and 
• The World Bank. 
 
This review lists the principle types of PPP project and their contracting approaches that are used 
by different regions and countries around the world.  The case studies examined are some of the 
PPP projects planned and / or implemented in developed and developing countries over the last 
twenty years.  These explore some of the key issues raised by PPPs in various sectors including:  
 
• Energy; 
• Transport; 
• Housing; 
• Health; 
• Schools; 
• Sports; 
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• Telecommunications; 
• Water, and 
• Sanitation. 
 
The results provide a valuable reference tool for those interested in developing PPP projects.  
They demonstrate what other nations have done, or are doing, in the field of PPP development.  
Table 16 indicates the costs involved with PPP projects that have been planned and funded 
worldwide between 1985 and 2000. 
 
Table 16: Planned and Funded PPP Projects by Geographical Area. 
Projects Cost Geographical Area 
No. % US$B % 
North America 396 18.9 93 10.3 
Latin America 474 22.6 125 13.8 
Europe 371 17.7 216 23.8  
Africa and Mid-East 125 6.0 40 4.4 
Asia and Far East 732 34.9 433 47.7 
Worldwide 2 098 100.0 907 100.0 
Data source: KPMG LLP, Canadian Forum on Public Procurement, 2001. 
 
The table shows that PPPs are widely used all over the world, with over 30% of the PPP projects 
located in Asia and the far East and a mere 6% in Africa. 
 
Table 17: Planned and Funded PPP Projects by Sector. 
Projects   Cost  
 Sector 
No. US$ B % 
Roads and Rail 699 443 33.3 
Airports and Sea Ports 280 103 13.4 
Water and Wastewater 422 58 20.1 
Power 697 303 33.2 
Total 2098 907 100.0 
Data source: KPMG LLP, Canadian Forum on Public Procurement, 2001. 
 
The statistics presented in Table 17 indicate that over 46% of the world’s PPP projects were 
relative to with the transportation sector, compared to 33% relative to the power sector, and 20% 
relative to the water sector. 
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2.21.2   PPPs in North America 
 
2.21.2.1   Canada 
 
In Canada, after a lengthy developmental period, in which a variety of obstacles slowed the 
progress of PPPs, as a form of alternative public sector asset procurement, the situation 
improved.  By mid-March 2005, financial closure was reached on hospital PPPs in the province of 
British Columbia and Ontario.  To date, the majority of projects under PPP consideration are 
primarily focused on transportation and health care.  Geographically, Alberta, Ontario, and British 
Columbia have been strong proponents of PPP procurement.  British Columbia has established 
‘Partnerships BC’, which is similar to ‘Partnerships UK’, in order to assist with the evaluation of 
potential projects, including whether or not PPPs offer value-for-money to taxpayers.  
 
2.21.3   PPP in Europe 
 
There has been a marked increase in cooperation between public and private sectors within the 
European Union (EU) with regards to the development and operation of public infrastructure 
(European Commission, 2003).  Such PPP arrangements have been driven by national budgetary 
constraints, the need for value-for-money, operational efficiencies and greater monetary discipline 
in infrastructure development.  The following overview provides a picture of PPP experiences 
within a selection of EU countries (Gaurav & Craig, 2005).  
 
2.21.3.1  . United Kingdom 
 
The British Government launched its PPP development policy in 1992, under the ‘Private Finance 
Initiative’.  Since then, the technique has been applied systematically to virtually every area of 
significant government capital spending in the UK.  ‘Partnerships UK’ was established in 2000, to 
promote PPP / PPI initiatives.  The UK continues to be at the centre of global PPP development 
(Gaurav & Craig, 2005).  Other countries have also adopted the UK’s PPP methodologies, with 
local variations.  Commonwealth countries such as Australia and Canada have developed a local 
framework by drawing on the experiences of PPP in the UK.  
 
 
2.21.3.2 Bulgaria 
 
Bulgaria has established a national infrastructure plan that focuses on concession contracts and 
involves integrating the national railway infrastructure of Bulgaria into the EU inter-modal 
transport.  The Sofia Water and Wastewater Concession Project is the major municipal 
infrastructure concession in Bulgaria and one of the first water concessions to be financed on a 
limited recourse basis in Eastern Europe, through a special purpose vehicle. International Water 
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is the majority shareholder and private sector operator.  This 15-year project reached financial 
closure in the year 2000.  
 
2.21.3.3 Croatia 
 
The Croatian Government has initiated a policy that favours the use of BOT schemes for 
transport, energy, and water projects.  Three of these major schemes are: the Istrian Toll Road, 
the Lukovo Sugarje power project, and the wastewater treatment plant for Zagreb.  New 
legislation has been designed to facilitate concessions.  
 
2.21.3.4   Czech Republic 
 
After extensive policy consultations, the Czech Republic has established PPP Centrum, a task 
force to support the public sector.  The new PPP Act will amend the current procurement legal 
framework and will help to facilitate the PPP process.  
 
2.21.3.5   Slovakia 
 
Joint ventures have taken place between public institutions and private parties in the energy, 
telecommunications, water, and wastewater treatment sectors, mainly as a result of privatisation.  
The Slovakian government has conducted a feasibility study for its PPP programme, which 
identified eight motorway sections for possible PPPs.  The study has recommended the use of the 
DBFO model to procure roads.  
 
2.21.3.6   Finland 
 
The Helsink-Lahti motorway conceived in 1995 and began in 1997, is the first and largest PPP in 
Finland, involving equity from the UK, Sweden and other local entities.  
 
2.21.3.7   France 
 
France has a long-established tradition of public-private cooperation, using the concession 
structure.  The Prado-carrenage tunnel in Marseille was toll-financed.  Three major road projects 
have been launched under PPPs since 2000: the Millau Viaduct, A19 and A20, cross border 
projects such as the Perpignon-Figueras high speed link and the Lyon-Turin high speed link.  
New legislation was introduced for PPP-type projects in France, to promote and support an 
increase in private sector funding of infrastructure projects (Alexandre et al., 2005).  Some degree 
of political resistance still remains against the PPP concept in general.  Therefore, it could take 
some time before a large demand for PPP transactions emerges.  
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2.21.3.8   Germany 
 
Germany has no formal PPP programme, although in the past it has involved private sector 
contractors in road projects such as the Warnow Tunnel in Rostock.  Some of the project involved 
risk transfer to the private sector under a concession framework.  A BOT law has been passed in 
Germany, but specific taxation issues complicate the procurement process.  The country is 
experiencing some problems with its Toll Collect Project, which introduced a national system for 
truck tolling.  According to Standard and Poors (2005), the system is not providing the revenues 
as expected, due to evasion and people not paying.  
 
2.21.3.9   Greece 
 
Projects completed include Spata Airport and the Athens ring road.  The government launched a 
PPP programme in 2000, as well as a central PPP Unit.  Nevertheless, some legal issues still 
need to be resolved.  
 
2.21.3.10   Hungary 
 
Some transport projects have been developed through the implementation of PPPs, inter alia, the 
M5 BOT project.  However, other transport projects have not been realized, or have been 
transferred to the National Highway Agency, for example the M1 highway.  In December 2004, 
the M6 project, a €470 million concession-based PPP motorway, linking Budapest with the 
southern part of the country, reached financial closure.  There is no government authority 
specifically assigned to deal with PPPs.  However, the government has recently passed a bill 
allowing the state company that is in charge of road maintenance and toll charging, to act as a 
public agency for construction contracts for motorways.  
 
2.21.3.11   Ireland 
 
In 1998, a pilot PPP road programme, including three roads and a light rail system, was initiated.  
The M4 PPP Toll Motorway Project agreement, which was signed in March 2003, is part of a 
group of 11 projects to be finished during the 2004-2007 period.  Toll bridges, government offices 
and prisons have been designed, built, financed and operated by the private sector.  There is a 
strong commitment to the formal PPP programme.  A clear legislative framework is in place, a 
dedicated PPP unit has been set up and central committees facilitate PPPs.  
 
2.21.3.12   Italy 
 
The Merloni Bill of 1994 and 1998 set the framework for using private sector contractors and later 
a special PPP task force, UFP, was created and its powers reinforced in 2001.  There have been 
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projects in the water and power sectors, in particular, which involve the private sector on a 
concession-style basis.  However, new PPP projects are discouraged, perhaps due to the 
administrative complexity associated with the civil code.  
 
Private participation in the financing of public infrastructure projects has been used in Italy for 
some time now, but the overhaul of the legal framework for PPPs in Italy in 2002 has prompted 
further development of PPPs.  Key development areas are still the traditional road and rail 
infrastructure.  There has been much financing of health care projects and other assets such as 
parking lots and sporting complexes.  
 
2.21.3.13   Netherlands 
 
Kennis-centrum PPPs were set up in 1999 and a major pilot project, in the form of a high-speed 
railway line was started.  Subsequent projects include road, railway, harbour, and water projects.  
The Delfland waste-water treatment plant project was signed in October 2002.  Since then, only a 
few other PPPs have followed.  The slow progress has been a result of the critical political 
environment and lengthy discussions about value-for-money (Gaurav & Craig, 2005). 
 
2.21.3.14   Poland 
 
The A4 Katowice-Krakow is the first toll highway in Poland.  The government is anxious to 
facilitate PPPs, and two bridges were identified as PPP projects.  The legal, accounting and 
taxation systems of Poland hinder the implementation of PPPs.  
 
2.21.3.15   Portugal  
 
The Portuguese government passed a PPP Law in August 2003, aimed primarily at ensuring 
better coordination of PPPs.  Portugal started a road programme of 17 concessions in the form of 
shadow toll roads 10 years ago, which was its first initiative of private financing in public 
infrastructure.  Under the SCUT programme, three toll roads have reached financial closure and 
one syndicated.  Around a dozen other road projects are being implemented, six of which involve 
shadow tolls.  Motorways, railways and museums involving PPPs are also under consideration, 
although union resistance and constraints on issuing of project bonds hinder implementation.  
However, there are plans to shift from the shadow toll programme to User-Paid-Tolls (Standard & 
Poors, 2004). 
 
2.21.3.16   Romania 
 
Concession-based financing techniques are favoured in Romania.  In 2000, the French utility 
company Vivendi was awarded a 25-year concession to provide water and pipeline rehabilitation 
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services to Bucharest.  This was in the form of a new treatment system and modernizing the 
existing water system.  Commercialisation of road maintenance activities are being investigated 
and PPPs are being promoted for infrastructure development as part of Romania’s preparation for 
accession to the EU.  
 
2.21.3.17   Slovenia 
 
An EBRD-assisted PPP is investigating private investment in the maintenance of the national 
road network.  Development of a private finance concession-based highway maintenance scheme 
is a planned pilot project for PPPs.  
 
2.21.3.18  Spain 
 
PPPs have a long history in Spain, mainly in the toll road sector.  New concession legislation was 
introduced in 2003, which allows for the delivery of a broader type of public-infrastructure service 
through PPPs.  The government has a road programme using the shadow toll structure.  Private 
sector involvement is been sought in three new railway lines and other initiatives.  PPP projects 
are also planned in the health and waste management sector.  However, the legal framework is 
not supportive, and there is no law to cover concessions.  
 
2.21.3.19  Scotland 
 
The three former water authorities: East of Scotland Water; West of Scotland Water and North of 
Scotland Water merged in 2002 to form the Scottish Water Authority (SWA).  The three water 
authorities used PPPs and PFIs to finance their large-scale investment projects.  The water 
authorities entered into contracts worth more than £600 million.  Scotland has developed a 
Private Finance Unit, which acts as a one-stop source of advice and data on PPPs.  The PPP unit 
also publishes regular updates on progress and issues related to PPP projects in Scotland.  
 
2.21.4   PPPs in Australia 
 
Australian PPPs are progressing well.  The birthplace of PPPs in Australia was the state of 
Victoria, which closely followed both variants of the UK model for PPPs.  Thus far, A$9 billion 
worth of PPPs have been contracted.  The states of Victoria and New South Wales lead the way.  
Sound PPP legislation has been developed for the state of Victoria, which could be a model for 
other states.  
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2.21.5  PPPs in Asia 
 
According to the Indo-German Export Promotion Project (IGEP), in 2002 a joint trade promotion 
programme of the Indian and German Governments entered its second phase of PPP 
development. 
 
By 2002, there were 236 projects in 60 countries worldwide.  Asia tops the list with 74 projects, 
followed by 58 in Africa, 43 in Latin America, 41 in Eastern Europe and the Balkans, and 20 in the 
rest of the world.  The Asian PPP departments had spent more than €68 million on all these 
projects.  Table 18 presents an overview of some of the projects undertaken in Asia and is 
followed by a brief profile of the projects listed.  
 
Table 18: Examples of PPP projects in Asia  
Project Name Sector Country Duration 
(Years) 
Value 
(US$m) 
PPP 
type 
North Luzon Toll way  Transport(Roads) Philippines 25 371  ROT 
Kelanitissa Power  Energy (Hydro) Sri   Lanka 20 57  BOOT 
Chengdu Water Supply  Water China  107.6  BOT 
Colombo Port 
Development 
Transport (Ports) Colombo  175.0  BOT 
Grameen 
Telecommunications 
Communications Bangladesh 11 163   
Phu My Energy(Gas) Viet Nam 20 480  BOT 
Tsinghua Water Water (Integrated)   20   
Central UP Gas Energy India  68   
GMS NAM THEUN 2 Energy LAO  1 450   
Roshan Cellular Communications Afghanistan  35   
Data Source: Asian Development Bank 
 
2.21.5.1 Sri Lanka - Colombo Port Development Project 
 
The Colombo Port Expansion Project is Sri Lanka’s first transport initiative packaged under a BOT 
scheme.  This project was designed to establish Colombo as a premier transhipment port in Asia, 
with the capacity to handle one million twenty-foot equivalent units (TEU) by the second half of 
2003, from an initial capacity of only 285 000 TEU.  This is a critical project given the tremendous 
rise in trade volumes from Asia, to Europe and the United States.  More importantly, it lends 
support to the growing export industry of Sri Lanka, which generated roughly US$4.1 billion in 
revenues in 2001. 
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Situated along the main shipping highway between Europe and Southeast Asia, Colombo Port is 
one of the few deep-sea ports on the Indian sub-continent, and is Sri Lanka’s largest and one of 
South Asia’s most active.  In 1996, Colombo Port ranked twenty-sixth in the world, in terms of 
container traffic.  Being the only transhipment port in South Asia, it derives much of its 
transhipments cargo from the Indian subcontinent, with volumes increasing rapidly despite the 
presence of more efficient alternative hub ports like Singapore and Dubai. 
 
The Colombo Port Expansion Project marked the first investment of the Asian Development Bank 
(ADB) in a private sector infrastructure project.  The investment is in line with the ADB’s country 
development strategy for Sri Lanka, which is to promote economic growth and reduce poverty by 
way of policy and institutional reforms that would, among other intentions, encourage private 
sector participation, particularly in vital infrastructure projects. 
 
At the outset, the ADB had identified the need for credit guarantees to mobilize commercial 
financing.  Thus, in addition to its direct investment, ADB committed itself to playing the role of 
catalyst, by way of attracting other international investors and assisting in the structuring of the 
transaction. 
 
The port expansion project is expected to result in a windfall of benefits not only for Sri Lanka, but 
also for the entire South Asia region.  Foremost is the expected increase in jobs and economic 
activity in Sri Lanka, as well as additional substantial revenues for the government to spend on 
social services.  For importers and exporters in the entire region, the improved port facilities will 
result in the reduction of overall transport and logistics costs, as timely and more reliable 
operations are achieved.  Overall, the economy of the entire Indian sub-continent will benefit from 
expanded and improved transhipment services.  
 
2.21.5.2   Sri Lanka - Kelanitissa Power Project 
 
The Kelanitissa Power Project was conceived in the face of sluggish economic growth arising 
from widespread power shortages due to prolonged drought and an overstretched power 
generation system.  The new plant, which is diesel-powered, will reduce the power sector’s heavy 
reliance on hydropower, which is dependent on Sri Lanka’s seasonal rainfall.  When completed, it 
will be Sri-Lanka’s largest power plant funded by the private sector.   
 
To help finance the required capital for the project, the ADB extended a US$26 million loan 
without government guarantee, as well as US $31 million in political risk guarantees.  Packaged 
as a BOT scheme and bid out on a least-cost generation basis, the power project was awarded to 
a joint venture of the AES Corporation, a global independent power developer, and Hayleys 
Limited, a diversified Sri Lankan conglomerate.  The joint venture company will construct and 
operate the plant for twenty years, after which it will hand over its ownership to the government.  
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The project is a direct offshoot of a power reform programme initiated by the Sri Lankan 
government to attract private investments in energy generation through BOT and BOOT 
schemes.  The reform allows private developers to build and operate new thermal and mini-hydro 
power plants, as government maintains control over large hydro plants.  Under the programme, 
the generation, transmission and distribution functions of the government in the energy sector, 
were decentralized and an independent regulatory agency was formed to oversee the power 
sector’s activities.  
 
Besides increasing power supply through private sector participation, the reform will help 
eliminate operating inefficiencies in the sector, thereby resulting in lower costs and more reliable 
services for the consumer.  The scheme will also help free up government funds that can then be 
used to fund basic social services.  
 
Sri Lanka’s energy demand is forecast to grow at an average of 7-8% per year between 2001 and 
2014.  Presently, less than 60% of the population has access to electricity.  The project was 
projected to help increase accessibility to 80% by 2005.  
 
2.21.5.3   Philippines - North Luzon Toll way Project 
 
The upgrading of the Philippines North Luzon Expressway into a modern toll way system marks a 
significant phase in the country’s national road development programme.  The project will be the 
country’s first expressway to be rehabilitated, operated, and maintained by the private sector.   
 
The expressway links Metro Manila, the national capital, to the central and northern provinces of 
Luzon, the country’s largest island.  As such, it is one of the Philippines’s main road arteries.  
Expansion and improvement of the road to world standards, is a means to spur on development 
in other regions and also to decentralize economic activities from congested Metro Manila.  
 
Targeted for completion in 2005, the Manila North Toll Way will be the first toll road in the 
Philippines that will be constructed employing world-class contractors like Leighton Contractors 
Asia Limited of Australia, for the civil works, and Egis Projects SA of France, for toll operation 
equipment and systems.  It will be the first toll road in the country to have operational amenities 
comparable with the best in the world.  These include a choice of electronic and manual toll 
message signs concerning road conditions, overhead monitoring cameras, emergency call boxes 
every one or two kilometres, emergency parking areas every one to three kilometres, rest areas, 
24-hour traffic management, and prompt motorist assistance.  
 
The project is structured under a rehabilitate-operate-transfer (ROT) scheme wherein the toll way 
will be maintained and operated for a 25-year period and then transferred to the government at no 
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cost.  The Manila North Toll Ways Corporation (MNTC) is tasked to maintain and operate the 
project until 2030.  MNTC is a limited liability company jointly owned by the First Philippine 
Infrastructure Development Corporation, a major private infrastructure development firm, Egis 
Projects, a unit of the largest French toll way operator, and the Philippine National Construction 
Corporation, a government-controlled company that held the original franchise to construct and 
operate the expressway.  
 
The total cost to upgrade the North Luzon Expressway is estimated at US$371 and will be the first 
toll road undertaking that will be financed without government guarantee.  The ADB acted as the 
lead coordinating bank in structuring the debt package for the project.  Aside from extending a 
loan for US$45 million from its own resources, ADB acted as the lender-of-record on a US$25 
million facility, funded by international commercial banks.  This financing scheme was cited in 
2001 as being the Asia–Pacific Transport deal of the Year by the Project Finance Corporation.  
The International Finance Legal Review also named it the Asian Legal Deal of the Year for 
Project Finance.  
 
2.21.5.4   China - Chengdu Water Supply Project 
 
The Chengdu Water Supply Project in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is a BOT scheme 
designed to provide the treated water needs of Chengdu, the capital of Sichuan Province.  The 
project entails the construction of a treatment plant and the laying of a 27-kilometre transmission 
pipeline to deliver the treated water to the city’s homes and industries.  
 
With a population of more than 10 million, Chengdu is one of the PRC’s most important industrial 
and scientific research bases in the southwest.  Its industries include electronics, mechanical 
engineering, metallurgy, chemicals, textiles, aeronautics and space, and nuclear.  
 
The ADB extended a direct loan of US$26.5 million and was instrumental in structuring the 
finance for the US$107.6 million project.  Through complementary financing, ADB also made 
possible, commercial debt funding of US$21.5 million.  
 
Traditionally funded by the provincial or the central government on a grant basis, water supply 
projects were opened up to private investment, because of the large investments needed.  As the 
first BOT water supply project in the PRC, the project demonstrated that BOT schemes could be 
successfully implemented at the municipal level and externally funded without any central 
government guarantee.  
 
The project is a good example of a PPP.  ADB’s involvement ensured that transparent 
competitive bidding was observed, the lowest possible tariff was obtained, and project 
fundamentals were in place. The project won three international awards in recognition for its 
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innovative and superior financing structure, which enabled international lenders to take long-term 
municipal risk in the PRC for the first time.  
 
2.21.5.5   Bangladesh - Grameenphone Telecommunications Project 
 
The Grameenphone Telecommunication Project was the first significant private investment in 
telecommunications in Bangladesh.  The project was constructed at the time when the country’s 
telecommunication penetration was among the lowest in the world, with only one in 300 persons 
having access to a phone unit.  The Grameenphone project dramatically changed the industry 
with the construction and operation of a nationwide cellular telephone network using GSM 
technology.  The backbone of the proposed system is 1 800 kilometres of state-of-the-art fibre-
optic transmission systems. 
 
The key innovative feature of the project is the inclusion of village pay telephones (VPT), which 
provides telecommunication services to the rural poor in Bangladesh, for the first time.  This 
project immediately empowered the rural villagers, particularly women, as they were given access 
to trade and economic opportunities as well as vital social services, not previously available to 
them. 
 
An impact study, conducted by the University of Bonn, concluded that: ‘telephones in rural areas 
trickle tremendous socio-economic benefits to the villagers, and more so the poor ones (Asian 
Development Bank, 2004).  Among the study’s findings were: each village pay telephone unit 
served 1 500-2 000 people; 15% of the phone users were poor and they accounted for 25% of the 
phone calls made through VPT; 10% of the calls were for seeking health services, while 35% 
were for family and personal needs.  A major result of the project was the use of VPTs to increase 
transparency, and consequently real income, via productivity increases and the fair pricing of 
commodities supplied by villagers.  
 
The project was conferred the Community Award, at the 2002 GSM World Congress in Cannes, 
France.  The Grameenphone project has become an outstanding model of private sector 
investment, contributing to poverty alleviation and improving the lives of countless people in the 
rural communities of Bangladesh.  The project’s success is expected to encourage further private 
sector participation, both in telecommunications and other physical infrastructure projects.  
 
The ADB played a critical role in providing debt and equity financing, at the time when commercial 
lending was not available, owing to the perceived risk of the project.  
 
2.21.5.6   Vietnam - Phu My 2.2 Power Project 
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The Phu My 2.2 Power Project is a 715-megawatt gas–fired combined cycle power plant, to be 
constructed as part of the Phu My 2.2 Power Generation Complex, in Va Ria Vung Tau Province 
in southern Vietnam.  It is Vietnam’s first privately sponsored power project and it was awarded 
on a transparent international competitive bidding basis and is largest power project to receive 
financing to date.  
 
The project represents an environmentally friendly solution to the power supply problem in 
Vietnam and makes competitively priced power available within a short period of time.  The 
project is a key component of Vietnam’s drive to develop its own natural gas reserves for power 
generation.  It aims to reduce the country’s dependence on hydropower, which has proven to be 
unstable, particularly during the dry season.  The project will be fuelled from the gas reserves of 
Nam Con Son Basin and will service the Ho Chi Minh City region.  This will enable the areas 
served by the project to attract investments, which could stimulate economic growth and help 
reduce poverty.  Phu My 2.2 is also a critical component of the government’s efforts to provide 
power to 85 percent of Vietnamese households by 2005.  The project is a logical continuation of 
the strategic objectives of the ADB and the Vietnamese government regarding the power sector, 
which relies increasingly on market forces and private sector participation to finance its 
investment requirements.  
 
Developed under the country’s first BOT scheme, the project will be handed over to the 
government of Vietnam at no cost, at the end of the 20-year contract period.  The scheme also 
included a 20-year take-or-pay Power Purchase Agreement, whereby Electricity of Vietnam will 
purchase the output of the project during the term of the contract.  Moreover, the supply of natural 
gas is assured under a Gas Sales Agreement signed with the Vietnam Oil and Gas Corporation.  
 
The project is owned by Mekong Energy Company Limited, a joint venture between international 
developers with strong and proven track records worldwide.  These include Electricite de France 
International, Sumitomo Corporation, and Tokyo Electric Power Company International BV.  
 
Completed in an exceptionally short timeframe, this project’s multi-tranche financing structure, 
creatively and effectively used credit enhancements to achieve the volume and tenors needed by 
the project.  The structure included a US$140 million equity investment, provided by the sponsors 
and loans equalling US$240 million from multi-lateral and bi-lateral institutions with commercial 
lenders benefiting from political and partial risk guarantees.  Besides extending a direct loan of up 
to US$50 million, ADB negotiated up to US$25 million of long-term debt for Vietnam, from 
international commercial lenders.  This was achieved through its application of political risk 
guarantee, where ADB was to serve as guarantor-of-record and would not retain any portion of 
the risks covered, but passed on all risks to a private insurer.  The International Development 
Association (IDA) of the World Bank (WB) also provided a partial risk guarantee, to mobilize 
commercial debt of up to US$75 million.  Current market conditions and the lack of a track record 
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for project finance in Vietnam would not permit commercial debt to be raised on an uncovered 
basis.  
 
Following financial closing, the project won the Project Finance Deal of the Year Award for 2002 
from five international publications.  The project was recognized for its innovative financing 
structure, sound credit, and its strong support from the Vietnamese government.  The Phu My 2.2 
financing approach has set a clear precedent for other projects to follow.  
 
2.21.5.7   China - Tsinghua Water Project 
 
The main investor, through joint ventures with various partners, including water supply and / or 
sewerage utility companies, from various municipalities, will build, rehabilitate, expand, upgrade, 
privatise and / or operate medium-small-scale water infrastructure facilities.  There will be a strong 
focus on wastewater treatment projects, in various cities of the PRC.  
 
The project will arrange for private sector capital and give municipalities’ access to financing in 
order to expand their wastewater treatment facilities, so as to meet increasing demand for water 
pollution control, and support the government’s development plan with priority being given to the 
resolution of problems related to water pollution and scarcity of water resources.  The project will 
catalyse medium-small-scale water supply and sewage treatment projects that require substantial 
investments, but which, on their own, lack the economies of scale necessary to make them 
attractive for private sector financing.  Expansion of these facilities will improve the quality of 
urban life and public health conditions, arrest environmental degradation, and sustain acceptable 
levels of economic growth.  
 
2.21.5.8   India - Central Uttar Pradesh Gas Ltd. Project 
 
This project involves the construction of city gas distribution networks in Kanpur, India, to deliver 
compressed natural gas (CNG) to vehicles and piped natural gas (PNG) to commercial, industrial 
and residential users.  The project comprises two main components: construction of a limited 
natural gas distribution network within the city and subsequent customer connections, and 
establishing of CNG ‘mother’ filling stations and online filling stations to service cars, buses, taxis 
and 2-and 3-wheelers, which have been converted to CNG use. 
 
The project will help India meet the demand for energy in thickly populated cities, by diversifying 
the energy base away from coal and imported oil, through the supply of gaseous fuel.  The project 
would support the government’s policy to develop the gas transmission and distribution networks 
for the supply of environmentally-friendly clean fuel.  
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The proposed investment in the supply of natural gas to urban areas will contribute directly to two 
strategies that will achieve the ultimate objective of poverty reduction in India.  The project 
contributes to the first strategy of enhancing economic growth by developing adequate 
infrastructure development.  Where natural gas is provided to small-scale industries, at a cost less 
than the alternative fuels, this may have an immediate impact on job creation by increasing 
production and / or attracting energy-intensive industries to the area.  The second strategy 
contributes to human and social development by reducing health-related risks, caused by the use 
of inferior fuels and air pollution, both within and outside homes.  Low-income populations are 
particularly exposed to transport pollution, due to the proximity of low-income housing and slums 
to transportation routes.  It is also anticipated that a certain amount of skilled and unskilled local 
labour will be employed during the construction phase.  
 
2.21.5.9   Laos - GMS Theun 2 Hydro project  
 
Nam Theun 2, a 1,070 MW hydroelectric power project, will be built on the Nam Theun River, a 
tributary of the Mekong River in central Laos.  The project is considered a key component of the 
ADB’s efforts to support the government of Laos’s poverty alleviation programme.  It will generate 
foreign revenue for the government from the export of electricity to Thailand and will expand the 
availability of low-cost electricity within Laos.  At the same time, the project will supply Thailand 
with long-term and competitively priced power, while reducing its dependence on natural gas and 
oil for its power generation needs.  Up to 95% of the electrical energy will be sold to Electricite du 
Laos, on a take-or-pay basis, under a PPP Agreement.  The government will guarantee the 
performance obligations under a Concession Agreement.  At the end of the concession period, 
the Nam Theun 2 Power Company (NTPC) will transfer the project to the government free-of-
charge.  The project will be owned and operated by NTPC.  NTSC’s shareholders comprise 
Electricite de France International, the Electricity Generating Public Company of Thailand, the 
Italian-Thai Development Public Company, and the government of Laos. 
 
The ADB chose to support the project, because it wished to back the government of Laos’s 
poverty alleviation efforts.  It could do this by generating income of about $1.7 billion over the life 
of the project and thus indirectly support the government’s poverty reduction programme.  It also 
supports Laos’s energy policy, of developing hydropower resources in order to generate foreign 
revenue from the exportation of power.  The project will also help the ADB to implement its 
Private Sector Operational Strategy and Country Strategy and its Programme for Laos, which 
promote the private sector to provide competitively priced power and to strengthen its security of 
supply.  The project also promotes regional cooperation, because the project is part of the GMS 
Master Plan for power generation.  Lastly, ADB’s involvement in the project ensures that 
environmental and social issues are adequately addressed.  
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2.21.5.10   Afghanistan - Roshan Cellular Project 
 
This project will extend a newly established telephone system in Afghanistan, using global 
systems for mobile communication (GSM) cellular, satellite and radio wave transmission 
technologies.  The system provides common cellular and public call office (PCO) services.  The 
project company also plans to expand roaming agreements with a number of countries and to 
extend provision of Internet services beyond Kabul.  It already has active commercial roaming 
agreements in place with over 35 countries.  
 
The project will help to: expand the communications infrastructure in Afghanistan in the context of 
a country where, after 23 years of conflict, there is no functioning fixed line telecommunication 
service and a barely functioning postal service, poor roads, and the lowest literacy rate in the 
world, and where families are large and often separated;  expand the role of small and medium-
sized enterprise service providers, who are subcontractors of Roshan; facilitate the expansion of 
low-margin PCOs to benefit most sectors of the economy and government, all of which are 
currently handicapped by barely operational, very expensive modes of communication such as 
satellite phones, or no means communication whatsoever; benefit agriculture, merchandising, 
manufacturing, and financial services, as well as health care, education, and security;  assist in 
the process of service expansion and regulatory reform, through sound competition, and foster 
confidence among potential lenders and investors in private infrastructure and industry financing 
in Afghanistan.  
 
2.21.6   Public-Private Partnerships in Africa 
 
The table below shows some examples of PPP projects undertaken in Africa.  The table is 
followed by a series of brief profiles of the projects listed. 
 
Table 19: Examples of PPP projects in Africa  
Project Name Sector Country Duration 
(Years) 
Value 
(US$) 
PPP 
type 
Ecobank (ETI) Finance Togo  20 m  
Moma Mining Mozambique 25 50 m  
Tunisie Leasing Financial services Tunisia   8 m  
CFC Bank   Financial services Kenya  7 m  
Djibouti Bulk Terminal Infrastructure Djibouti 30 7.5 m BOOT 
Data Source: African Development Bank (2003) 
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2.21.6.1   Toga - EcoBank (ETI) Project 
 
This project involves the extension of a regional letter of credit (LOC) of US$20 million to 
EcoBank Transnational Incorporation (ETI).  The funds will be loaned to ETI’s 12 subsidiaries in 
the West and Central African sub-regions.  The subsidiaries will, in turn, lend the funds to their 
corporate clients and bankable small and medium enterprises (SMEs) with a(n):  
 
• Export income stream; 
• Export potential, and 
• Strong profitability track record. 
 
Funding will be allocated to SMEs in the local currency, in the manufacturing, agro-business, 
mining, energy transport, telecommunications, leasing, non-traditional exports, tourism, and 
services sectors.  The proceeds of the LOC will be used to provide medium-to-long term project 
finance.  It will also be used to finance capital equipment, including permanent working capital 
required to create new production capacities and to increase the capacity utilisation of existing 
facilities.  
 
Some of the economic benefits likely to accrue from the sub-projects to be financed by the ETI 
Group include:  
• An estimated 8 500 new jobs in the construction, manufacturing, transportation, 
mining and agro / food processing industries; 
• Job opportunities in associated informal sectors in both the rural and urban areas 
of the sub-regions; 
• An estimated US$95 million in foreign exchange earnings by export oriented 
enterprises and savings from import substitution enterprises in the sub-regions; 
• Transfers of technology, development of local entrepreneurship and technical 
skills; 
• Likely use of raw materials by some of the sub-projects, for example, those in the 
agro / food processing, manufacturing and construction industries produced in the 
rural areas and resultant alleviation of poverty in the sub-regions, and 
• The sub-projects will contribute to the estimated US$114 million in revenues, in 
the form of value-added tax, income and corporation taxes for the governments of 
the region.  
 
2.21.6.2   Mozambique - Moma Mining Project 
 
The project involves dredge mining of titanium-bearing sands, the production of heavy minerals 
concentrate (HMC) in a floating concentrator plant, and the separation of final products in a 
separation plant.  The annual production rate is estimated at about 612 000 tons of ilmenite with 
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three different grades, along with approximately 12 500 and 24 000 TPA respectively, of zircon 
and rutile.  The titanium oxide comprised of ilmenite and rutile, is mainly used in the pigment, 
plastic and paper industries, while zircon is mainly used for ceramic production.  The project is 
located in the northeast of Nampula Province in northern Mozambique, some 600 kilometres from 
Maputo, the capital city.  
 
The project will provide a strong economic impetus and at the same time stimulate industrial 
growth in Mozambique and will provide significant economic benefits for the country.  It will 
generate export revenues of about US$75 million per annum, or US$1.5 billion over the life of the 
project and will contribute up to 2.4 percent of the annual GDP of Mozambique.  
 
The economic and social benefits are primarily a result of increased employment opportunities 
during the construction period through contractors, subcontractors and suppliers.  During the 
construction and operation phases, the project will create 1 200 and 436 direct jobs, respectively.  
Moreover, it is estimated that about 1 500 jobs will be created outside the mining area, due to 
ancillary and support services required by the project.  It will contribute to the expansion of the 
skills base and the extension of services to one of the poorest districts of the country.  Potential 
socio-economic impacts include local, provincial and national economic benefits as well as the 
expansion of the national tax base and higher tax revenues for the Mozambican government.  
 
The project is located in a remote and underdeveloped province and will therefore have major 
social and economic impacts on the local economy.  Therefore, the construction of essential 
infrastructure such as roads, power and water supplies, telecommunications, clinics, schools, an 
airstrip, a jetty, as well as additional services, will improve the living standards of the people in the 
vicinity of the project and beyond.  The project will also contribute to the transfer of technology 
and expertise through the training of Mozambicans both on and off the job.  
 
A project of this scope and magnitude will improve the standing of Mozambique as a destination 
of private foreign investment.  The Moma project will demonstrate the effectiveness of the 
industrial financing strategy in attracting further investment. 
 
2.21.6.3   Tunisia - Tunisie Leasing Project 
 
In this project, the proposed line of credit is aimed at financing small enterprises through small-
scale leases of TD20 000 to TD300 000 maximum.  It supports the government’s SME promotion 
policy, which seeks to create 2 500 new enterprises per annum, in the period 2001-2006.  Tunisie 
Leasing (TL) will use the line of credit to finance the procurement of equipment and immovable 
assets for leasing to SMEs that are operating in the commercial, industrial, agricultural, fishing 
and service sectors.  TL will sign fixed-term contracts with the lessees, in return for a lease 
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payment.  At the end of the lease contract, the lessees will have the option to buy all or part of the 
leased assets, at an agreed price.  
 
The line of credit taken by TL is a contribution towards the deepening of financial intermediation to 
benefit small enterprises.  These continue to be confronted with the problem of trying to access 
financial support, owing to constraints of collateral requirements and insufficient equity 
contributions.  In Tunisia, TL’s intervention in the financial sector aims to strengthen financial 
intermediation and to diversify the available services, in order to improve SMEs access to finance.  
 
2.21.6.4   Kenya - CFC Bank Project 
 
This project involves the provision of a Line of Credit (LOC) to CFC Bank Ltd of Kenya, for lending 
to its corporate clients.  The facility will be mainly used to finance operations structured in the form 
of term loans and hire purchasing schemes that will be used by its clients, mainly SMEs.  CFC 
Bank funds will be utilised to assist in increasing the productive capacities and the export potential 
of the sub-borrowers, in various sectors, including manufacturing, agribusiness, tourism, energy, 
and telecommunication sectors.  Hire purchase is a source of medium-term credit, used for the 
purchase of equipment.  Initially, a hire purchase company buys the required equipment and while 
keeping title to such equipment, makes it available for use by the loanee.  Once the loanee has 
made a series of regularly scheduled payments, he becomes the owner of the equipment.  
 
The proposal is in line with CFC Bank’s private sector strategy of intervention in Kenya and with 
its continent-wide strategy, to promote SME development through its support to local financial 
intermediaries.  During its more than 40 years of existence, CFC has accumulated substantial 
expertise in financing SMEs.  The provision of this LOC should facilitate SME access to longer-
term financing, which is currently scarce in Kenya.  CFC has presented a strong pipeline of SME 
projects with expansion plans in sectors such as manufacturing, agribusiness, transport and 
tourism.  
 
The facility will help to maintain, or create over 1 500 jobs in traditionally labour-intensive sectors, 
such as floriculture.  It is estimated that the projects financed with this LOC will generate foreign 
exchange of over US$150 million.  The financing of the sub-projects will further enhance the 
capacity building skills of Kenyans engaged in various sectors of the economy.  
 
2.21.6.5   Ethiopia - Djibouti Bulk Terminal Project 
 
This project involves the development, design, construction, ownership, operation and 
maintenance of Bulk Terminal Facilities for Cereals and Fertilizers (Facilities).  It is used for 
storing and processing cereals and fertilizers in bulk, for Ethiopia and the surrounding region.  
The project includes a concession that grants the right to finance, build, own and operate FBOO, 
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a Bulk Terminal Project, on an area of 42 000 square meters behind quay 14 and 15, in the Port 
Autonome International de Djibouti (PAID).  The concession lasts for a period of 30 years and at 
the end of the concession term, the Bulk Terminal is transferred to PAID.  
 
The project has important developmental impacts, as it: adds value to the service sector, the main 
economic sector; contributes to improving the living conditions of the region;  will target local and 
indigenous companies and subcontractors for the supply of certain components of goods and 
services valued at US$5 million; creates business opportunities for about 270 people and 
increases the vessels turnaround time due to the mechanization of the operation, and provides a 
reasonable rate of return for its shareholders.  
 
The project has social significance in terms of poverty alleviation.  It will result in substantial 
benefits for the local economy.  This will be through the creation of direct and indirect 
employment, associated with the project’s activities, namely: 100 jobs during the construction 
phase and 270 jobs during operations, in three shifts.  The project will provide opportunity of 
appropriate training and skills development for staff and construction workers.  The local 
communities will benefit from a number of development programmes as far as employment, 
education and economic / infrastructure development is concerned.  The project has also set an 
example for other countries in the region, which also wish to follow Djibouti’s example.  Some of 
these countries have started planning similar projects in order to develop their capabilities.  A 
recent study by Minato and Charoenporpattana (2007) provides details on various forms of option 
analysis that are required before making investment decisions in PPPs.  
 
2.21.7   South African Public-Private Partnership Projects 
 
Table 20 provides an example of PPP projects undertaken in South Africa before the enactment 
of the Public Finance Management Act of 1999.  Brief project profiles are provided to enhance 
understanding of the case studies.  The selected case studies cover the following sectors: 
 
• Transportation; 
• Health; 
• Water; 
• Tourism; 
• Telecommunications; 
• Housing; 
• Schools; 
• Energy; 
• Urban services; 
• Correctional facilities, and 
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• Sports. 
 
Table 20: Examples of PPP projects in South Africa  
Project Name Sector Country 
IDC Financial services South Africa 
SASOL Natural Gas Oil & Gas South Africa & Mozambique 
Maputo Port Transport Mozambique 
N4 Toll Road Transport South Africa 
Prison Contracts Prisons South Africa 
Dolphin Coast Water Water South Africa 
Eco-tourism in Kruger Eco-tourism South Africa 
Nelspruit Concession Water South Africa 
Data Source: African Development Bank and South African Institute of International Affairs (2005) 
 
2.21.7.1   Independent Development Corporation (IDC) 
 
The objective of this programme is to provide the IDC with a commercially and competitively 
priced LOC.  This will encourage and provide a window of opportunity to other public sector 
financial institutions and private sector banks in South Africa, and in the sub-region to access 
hard currency loans at affordable interest rates.  By endorsing the credit-worthiness of the IDC, 
the banks are able to play a catalytic role in strengthening the IDC’s capability to raise capital 
from international capital markets, at competitive rates, as well as to foster and encourage the 
orderly and efficient development of the capital market, regional integration, and a vibrant private 
sector.  
 
Economic benefits that are likely to accrue from the sub-projects to be financed by the IDC, 
include an estimated 2 000 new job opportunities in the construction, manufacturing, 
transportation, mining and agro / food processing industries.  Job opportunities in the associated 
informal sectors in both rural and urban areas in the sub-region are also expected.  An estimated 
US$90 million in foreign exchange earnings by export-oriented enterprises and savings made 
from import substitution enterprises are expected.  Furthermore, the transfer of technology, 
development of local entrepreneurship and technical skills are other expected benefits.  The 
impact of the LOC in reducing poverty in the sub-region is expected to have direct results.  An 
estimated 60% of the facility will be used by the IDC to provide financial support to its corporate 
clients and SMEs, with substantial minority participation by historically disadvantaged persons 
(HDPs), who are resident in the poorest municipalities of South Africa and the SADC sub-region.  
About 40% of the LOC would be used to finance cross-border industrial development projects in 
such sectors as manufacturing, construction, agro-business, transport, and communications, 
electricity, gas, hotels and restaurants.  Some of the beneficiaries will be well-established 
enterprises with significant minority ownership by HDPs.  Part of the LOC would also be utilised 
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for the expansion of the operations of existing enterprises and for acquisition of shareholdings in 
other enterprises, as well as enterprises scheduled for privatisation over the period of 2004 to 
2007.  
 
2.21.7.2   SASOL Natural Gas Project 
 
This project involves the development and production of Temane and Pande gasfields, which are 
located in the north-eastern region of Mozambique.  It also involves the construction of a central 
processing facility and the construction of 860 kilometres of gas pipeline.  In addition to this, it will 
undertake the conversion of Sasol’s existing petrochemical plants from coal to natural gas and 
develop its gas distribution network.  The pipeline is designed to deliver 122 MGJ per annum 
(MGJ/a) without initial compression, of which 120 MGJ/a will be transported to South Africa under 
gas sales and transportation agreements and about 2 MGJ/a to Mozambique.  Funding from the 
lenders, including banks is sought only for the central processing facility (CPF) and the pipeline 
components.  Sasol will finance the downstream components from its own resources.  
 
The project will provide a strong economic impetus for both countries and contribute to regional 
economic integration and attainment of NEPAD’s goals.  The company is strongly committed to 
investing in Southern Africa in order to achieve further growth.  It has embarked on the 
commercialisation of Mozambican natural gas, construction of new chemical plants and the 
expansion and / or optimisation of existing production facilities in South Africa.  Economic benefits 
will accrue to the countries in the form of revenues, direct and indirect employment creation, and 
many other socio-economic benefits.  
 
The increased economic activities resulting from the gas project will create direct and indirect job 
opportunities in both countries.  During construction, 1 208 temporary jobs will be created - 689 
for the gas fields and CPF, and 519 for the pipeline, most of these in Mozambique.  In addition, 
new growth is expected from industrial areas where gas will be available and where more jobs will 
be created.  
 
Capital investment in the gas project will contribute to higher economic growth for both countries, 
especially for Mozambique.  The government of Mozambique will benefit from higher tax revenue 
earned by companies involved in the gas project, in addition to royalties paid directly to the 
government.  The gas project will contribute substantially to the country’s infrastructure, in the 
form of access roads to pipelines and ancillary infrastructure.  This will come in the form of roads 
to gas fields, potable water supply and the de-mining of the project area, including the pipeline 
route, and increased exploration activity.  
 
The government will be a direct shareholder of the gas field development and the gas pipeline 
and hence, will benefit from technology transfer and dividend payments.  During the project’s 
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expected 25-year life span, Mozambique is likely to earn about US$2.1 billion in taxes and 
royalties, thus increasing the country’s GDP by an estimated 10%.  
 
The project has set up a Social Development Fund of US$6 million, which is designed to provide 
development assistance to communities within areas in Mozambique that are potentially affected 
by the project’s infrastructure.  The fund will be primarily used for the provision of boreholes and 
clean water, clinics, schools, agriculture gas and electricity supply, and roads for local 
communities.  In addition to these provisions, there will be an allocation of ownership in the 
project to BEEs.  
 
The project will also have significant economic benefits for South Africa, in the form of increased 
revenues, the development and diversification of the South African energy network, opportunities 
for black empowerment and a strategic substitute for coal, which is a bonus for the environment.  
South Africa is expected to earn about US$3.2 billion through taxes during the project life.  With 
respect to social development, ZAR10 million of natural gas revenues will be earmarked for the 
uplifting of South African communities for the years 2002 and 2003.  This is in addition to the 
ZAR75 million that Sasol invests every year, in social and human development projects in South 
African communities, mostly in the fields of education and training, job creation, culture, 
healthcare, welfare, and the environment.  
 
2.21.7.3   Port of Maputo in Mozambique 
 
Based on the lessons learned from the implementation of the N4 Toll Road from Witbank to 
Maputo, the Mozambican national ports and rails authority formed a joint venture with a private 
consortium, led by the British Mersey Docks and Harbour Company.  The purpose of this project, 
for the 15-year concession, was to finance, rehabilitate, operate and upgrade the Port of Maputo.  
The private consortium took control of the port, which consists of the Maputo cargo terminals and 
the Matola bulk terminals, on April 2003.  
 
The consortium, which owns 51% of the Maputo Port Development Company (MPDC), includes 
Skanska, a Swedish construction company, Lisont, a Portuguese terminals operator and 
Gestores, their Mozambican partner. The Mozambican government and CFM own the other 49% 
of the MPDC.  
 
Financiers for the project include Standard Corporate and Merchant Bank, the Development Bank 
of Southern Africa, development finance companies of the Netherlands and Sweden, as well as 
the Nordic Development Fund and Finland’s Finnfund.  
 
Farlam (2005), identified two major lessons learned from this project: a definition of investment 
obligations for the consortium provided clarity for the public and private partners, and knowledge 
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of the intricacies and requirements of project finance transactions, which are being applied to the 
port and rail deal, was gained by the Mozambican government.  
 
2.21.7.4   N4 Toll Road from South Africa to Mozambique 
 
In 1996 the governments of South Africa and Mozambique signed a 30-year concession for a 
private consortium, Trans African Concessions (TRAC), to build and operate the N4 Toll Road 
from Witbank, South Africa to Maputo, Mozambique.  After the 30-year period, control and 
management of the road reverts to the governments of South Africa and Mozambique.  The value 
of the contract was R3 billion at 1996 estimates.  
 
The N4 Toll Road was financed from 20% equity and 80% debt.  The three construction 
companies that are the sponsors of the project have contributed R331 million worth of equity, with 
the rest of the capital being provided by the SA Infrastructure Fund, Rand Merchant Bank Asset 
Management and five other investors.  The debt investors include South Africa’s four major 
banks: ABSA, Nedcor, Standard Bank and First National Bank, together with the Development 
Bank of Southern Africa, and the Mine Employees and Officials Pension Fund.  The governments 
of South Africa and Mozambique jointly guarantee the debt of TRAC, and under certain 
conditions, guarantee the equity as well.  
 
This project, which was the biggest project finance deal of the time, has been faced with a 
number of challenges.  These included lower traffic volumes (initially) than anticipated and user 
payment risk in Mozambique, as the poorer communities were unable and unwilling to pay high 
toll fees.  
 
A number of lessons have been learned from the project.  It was learnt that user payment risk was 
reduced through the sharing of risk between a range of partners and through the use of cross-
subsidisation and the provision of substantial discounts for regular Mozambican users.  It was 
also learnt that the road spurred further private sector investment in Mozambique, which in turn 
raised traffic volumes.  
 
2.21.7.5   Prison Contracts in South Africa 
 
The South African government Departments of Correctional Services and Public Works, faced 
with a shortage of prison space, adopted the UK model of prisons that are privately built and 
operated.  Bids were invited from the private sector for the design and construction of 11 
maximum-security prisons.  
 
In the course of the procurement, the Department of Correctional Services realized it had vastly 
underestimated the costs involved and reduced the number of prisons down to two (Farlam, 
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2005).  The South African government eventually signed two 25-year concessions for maximum-
security prisons in Bloemfontein and Louis Trichardt in 2000.  The two winning consortia were 
responsible for designing, building, financing, operating, and transferring the prisons.  
 
According to the PPP Quarterly (2002), the case of private prisons provides the following good 
lessons: there is a need for conducting a thorough feasibility study; experienced private sector 
operators can provide a better quality service at comparable rates to the public sector; overly high 
specifications at the planning stage have cost implications, and high base interest rates can be 
avoided in favour of floating rates, or Consumer Price Index (CPI)-linked interest rates. 
 
2.21.7.6   Ilembe Water Concession 
 
This is a water project in South Africa’s KwaZulu-Natal province.  The Borough of Dolphin Coast 
(BODC) signed a 30-year concession contract in 1999, with Siza Water Company (SIZA). of 
which French multinational SAUR Services has a majority shareholding.  Other partners include 
Metropolitan Life and three local BEE partners as minority shareholders.  The contract stipulated 
that Siza would oversee, manage and implement the provision of water and sanitation services 
within the then Dolphin Coast municipal boundary.  
 
Due to the recent restructuring of municipal boundaries by local government, the BODC has 
subsequently been absorbed into a much wider structure, the Ilembe District Municipality, which 
has a population of approximately 560 000 people.  The project area has a population of 
approximately 45 000 people.   
 
By 2005, when the concession entered its sixth year of operation, it was faced with several 
challenges in meeting its objectives.  This was mainly due to an increased scope of services.  
Furthermore, Farlam (2005) reports that (SIZA) could not pay its concession fees in 2001.  This 
was partly due to a 20% increase in the cost of water, charged by the bulk supplier, Umgeni 
Water. 
 
Several lessons can be learned from this case study.  There is the need for: 
 
• Capacity building for better performance of PPPs; 
• Comprehensive feasibility studies; 
• Clear policy guidelines and regulatory frameworks; 
• Greater transparency; 
• Technology transfer, and 
• Control of scope creep.  
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2.21.7.7   Eco-tourism Concessions in South Africa’s Kruger National Park 
 
In 2001, South Africa National Parks (SANParks) signed a build-operate-transfer (BOT) 
concession with the Nature Group consortium, for a period of ten years.  The consortium, which is 
comprised of a technical partner, a financial partner and an empowerment partner, has the right to 
operate the facilities.  This includes the right to use, design and construct according to SANPark 
specifications.  In return, Nature Group pays a monthly concession fee equivalent of 
approximately 13% of its annual turnover.  
 
The projects covered under this concession, which are at various stages, include PPPs in 
Madikwe in the North West Province, Manyeleti in Limpompo Province, and the Cradle of 
Humankind Interpretation Centre Complex in Gauteng Province.  
 
Lessons learned from this project included:  
 
• Successful PPPs require sound transaction skills on the part of the public sector partner, 
as well as an experienced service provider from the private sector;  
• The projects were attractive to the private sector, since they represented a good business 
opportunity;  
• Improved quality of service and proper skills assessment of the staff prior to the contract 
provides better understanding of operational risks, and  
• Strong commitment from SANParks, in the form of an intervention plan, saved the 
concession from potential failure.  
 
2.22   The Future and Sustainability of PPPs: Challenges and Issues 
 
The following summarised points are considered to be the key elements that inhibited the proper 
implementation of PPPs over the past twenty years (BIAC, 2004).  According to Business and 
Industry Advisory Committee, the major inhibiting factor was the inadequacy of systems to protect 
lenders and investors from the risks of investing in developing countries.  Subramanian and 
Haider (2004) have examined the landscape and benchmarks of the use of HIV and AIDS PPP 
programmes.  
 
2.22.1   Politics 
 
Political will is fundamental to a successful partnership programme.  PPPs represent a significant 
change to the traditional procurement approach, and therefore governments need to build political 
support to facilitate PPP development and sustainability.  
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2.22.2   Conflicts 
 
Conflicts are normal during project implementation.  Formal dispute resolution procedures should 
be put in place as an alternative to legal procedures and for an efficient and cost effective means 
of resolving issues that may arise during the contract.  
 
2.22.3   Policies and Legislative Frameworks 
 
PPP success and sustainability requires the right business environment.  The lack of a 
transparent legal framework, at all levels, or legal uncertainty, due to non-existent and partial legal 
frameworks, can impede successful project implementation, as the private operator’s ability to 
operate freely and efficiently is denied.  This leads to stalled projects, delays in implementation 
and sub-optimal results, which ultimately deters future investors.  Toolkits promote growth of 
PPPs (Public-Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility, 2003). 
 
2.22.4   Pricing and Cost Recovery 
 
Before PPP tenders are issued, the relevant PPP unit needs to determine, or refine the project’s 
budget.  In many cases, this is done by determining what the project would cost if it were built 
strictly by the public sector.  This is done, so as to determine if the PPP will actually save money 
for the public, realize a significant improvement in service, or cost savings and cost recovery.  
 
2.22.5   Technical and Management Capacity 
 
Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) could facilitate Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), by 
helping developing countries to control and protect the outcomes of FDI investments in their 
countries.  In terms of PPPs, ODA could be used to improve the local skills base in order to meet 
the demands of foreign investors, by educating and training civil servants in risk mitigation and 
efficient project monitoring.  PPPs are becoming increasingly important in local economic 
development efforts of many cities (Walzer & Jacobs, 1998). 
 
2.22.6   Financing 
 
The financing landscape for private investment in developing countries has changed markedly 
over the years (Grimsey & Lewis, 2004).  Structured project financing provides a vehicle for 
mobilising equity and debt in infrastructure projects.  This is achieved by fashioning the finance 
needs to the specific project, with risks appropriately apportioned amongst different types of 
investors - equity holders and debt providers.  Governments have many mechanisms for 
providing public goods and services.  Many of these mechanisms involve partnerships with the 
private or non-profit sector (Forrer et al., 2002). 
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2.22.7   Risk Management 
 
A key principle of PPPs is that risk should be allocated to the party best able to manage it.  The 
effective allocation of risk has a direct financial impact on the project, as it will result in lower 
overall project costs and will therefore provide enhanced value-for-money when compared to 
traditional procurement methods.  The allocation of risk should reflect the specific characteristics 
of the project and the strengths of each party.  
 
2.22.8   Corruption and Lack of Transparency 
 
The more important the project and the more local and international communities involved, the 
easier it is for corrupt practices to go unnoticed.  The escalation of such practices can jeopardize 
the long-term financial feasibility of the project. Reich (2002) explains how relationships of trust 
are fostered and sustained in the face of the inevitable conflicts, uncertainties, and risks within a 
partnership. 
 
2.22.9   Range of PPP Options 
 
There is a broad range of options for involving the private sector in the financing, physical 
development, and operation of various projects.  Traditionally, this has been the domain of the 
public sector.  Many forms of PPPs exist and are continuously being developed to suit project 
characteristics.  The main defining feature is the degree of private control over and involvement in 
financing.  There appears to be no unique model.  Each project should define what the most 
suitable and appropriate requirements are for it.  Dewulf and Spiering (2006) provide an overview 
of developments in PPPs in different countries and address the various characteristics and 
approaches to PPPs. 
 
2.22.10 Local Empowerment Programmes 
 
Local government empowerment programmes such as the BEE programme need to be properly 
structured into PPPs.  South Africa offers an integrated technical assistance-financing package to 
black partners in the bidding consortia, who seek to raise funds for the purchase of equity in the 
private party (PPP Quarterly, 2004). 
 
2.22.11   Affordability 
 
High PPP transaction costs have been identified as a major constraint in the development of 
PPPs (PPP Quarterly, 2004).  Agencies such as the Project Development Facility have intervened 
to support PPP initiation in various sectors in South Africa.  
   
   
89 
 
2.22.12   Unclear Objectives 
 
A good PPP project should have clearly conceptualised objectives, which must be reviewed as a 
continuous function of the project management team.  This will ensure that any threat to them is 
properly addressed.  In order to work successfully with the private sector, public bodies need to 
be clear about the fundamental principles and objectives behind PPPs.  
 
2.22.13   Misperceptions 
 
The misperceptions that PPPs are a ‘cure for all’ should be addressed adequately.  PPP is not the 
only method to deliver project financing and realization.  It does not provide a ‘miracle’ solution, or 
a quick fix, and should only be used where appropriate and where it is able to deliver clear 
advantages and benefits.  
 
2.22.14   Lack of Information and Poor Communication 
 
Lack of information and poor communication is a key obstacle to PPP growth in most countries.  
Vast amounts of government information should be made available through electronic networks.  
Governments should upgrade their ICT infrastructure and tools, and train personnel to promote 
electronic information dissemination between the public and private sectors.  
 
Extensive use should be made of the worldwide web and online information databases.  The 
provision of all necessary information to all stakeholders will promote transparency and 
accountability.  Government agencies should also make available PPP user manuals through CD 
ROMS and via toll-free 0800 telephone numbers.  Other approaches should include establishing 
dedicated PPP units and / or centres to promote and manage the PPP process.  
 
2.22.15   Competition 
 
Competition creates an environment that encourages bidders to be innovative in their design 
solution and efficient in their service delivery.  Governments should work with relevant PPP 
implementing agencies to reform existing laws, so as to remove legal and regulatory impediments 
to competition, while still safeguarding public interest.  
 
2.22.16   Labour Movement Resistance 
 
Most attempts to finance the building of new East European transport infrastructure by means of 
toll revenues have been abandoned, or put on hold (Von Hirschhausen, 2002).  The legacy of free 
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infrastructure under state planning has made it difficult to jump immediately to private project 
financing based on user charges.  
 
The issue of the implementation of the Nelspruit Water Concession project is a good example, 
whereby the local municipal authorities had to engage in long protracted negotiations with 
representatives of South African Municipal Workers Union (SAMWU) before eventually 
undertaking the project.  For many years, the Confederation of South African Trade Unions 
(COSATU) was strongly opposed to municipal service privatisation.  In the past, SAMWU said 
that it rejected PPPs, because it regarded them as a form of privatisation and it was opposed to 
the idea of public services being delivered for a profit (Niekerk, 1998).  
 
2.22.17 Public Acceptance 
 
A broad public consensus regarding the involvement of the private sector in infrastructure is 
needed.  This applies especially to the implementation of project financing models based on user 
charges.  
 
2.22.18   Value-for-money 
 
Factors determining value-for-money will obviously vary from project to project and between 
sectors.  Generally, however, PPPs will generate value for improvements in a number of areas, 
including: reduced life cycle costs; better allocation of risks; faster implementation; improved 
service quality, and the generation of additional revenue.  
 
2.22.19 Transaction Costs 
 
Packaging and modelling of infrastructure projects involve high transaction and bidding costs.  In 
a review of transaction costs in infrastructure, Klein, So and Shin (1996) contend that these costs 
amount to between 5% and 10% of total costs.  This is a prohibitive factor, since the burdens of 
these costs are transferred down to the taxpayer.  Table 16 below shows projects funded by the 
Project Development Facility in South Africa (PPP Quarterly, 2004). 
 
Table 21:  PPP Projects Supported by PPIAF funding by March 2004. 
Project Value (R ) 
Northern Cape Office Accommodation 717 060 
Free State Department of Health - Trompsburg & Ladybrand Hospitals 1 861 912 
KZN Department of Transport - Vukuzakhe Plant Depot 1 081 011 
Eastern Cape Department of Health - Pharmaceuticals 3 146 696 
Eastern Cape Department of Health – Settlers and Port Alfred Hospitals 496 060 
Western Cape Department of Health – Rehabilitation Centre 2 925 000 
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Total 10 227 739 
Data Source: PPP Quarterly, 2004. 
 
2.22.20   Accounting for PPPs 
 
Determining the appropriate accounting treatment of PPPs has proven to be a complicated and 
controversial issue (Grimsey & Lewis, 2002b).  The main problem is: In whose books should the 
assets covered by a given agreement be reported?  
 
2.22.21   Budgetary Constraints 
 
In infrastructure projects, both capital and operating costs must be considered in developing a 
benchmark cost.  Before a tender is issued, the agency responsible for the PPP needs to 
determine, or refine the project’s budget.  In many cases this is done by determining what the 
project would cost if it were built strictly by the public sector.  
 
2.22.22 Taxation 
 
A sound appreciation of the taxation ramifications is needed in any dealings with private sector 
entities.  There is a need to introduce new tax incentives to spur PPP growth.  Measures can 
include tax holidays, for specified periods, for the private sector investors.  
 
2.22.23  Lack of Incentives 
 
Determining the private sector’s willingness to participate depends on whether the risks and 
rewards inherent in providing the required outputs create a genuine business opportunity for the 
likely participants.  It also depends on whether the banks and financial markets will support the 
proposal.  Given that the responsibility for the design, construction and project management is 
allocated to the private party, an incentive is needed to keep the project on track and to prevent 
construction delays and cost overruns.  
 
2.22.24   Consensus Building 
 
Political will is fundamental to a successful partnership programme.  PPPs represent a significant 
change to traditional public procurement and a government needs to build political support before 
introducing a PPP programme.  
 
2.22.25  Lack of International PPP Standards 
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There is no international standard framework for PPP investments and similarly, no regionally 
harmonized framework for PPP in many countries.  The absence of an overarching policy 
framework on investment initiatives in developing countries has led to the development of a 
multitude of overlapping legislative frameworks.  These have been arranged on an ad hoc basis 
and are often of questionable credibility.  As a result, investments are unprotected, as no existing 
framework has legitimacy over any other.  
 
2.22.26   Lack of Cooperation and Coordination of PPPs 
 
There tends to be a lack of cooperation and coordination of work and responsibilities between 
investors and local communities.  Besides government and other civil organizations, developing 
countries have many informal practices, such as the black market and informal employment that 
impact on the way things are undertaken in them.  For a project to be successful in such an 
environment, the private sector must have a clear understanding of the informal frameworks in 
which it will be operating and how these frameworks will be affected by, and possibly affect the 
implementation of the project.  Informal practices are difficult to document and change, and thus 
the private operator must cooperate with local entities that are knowledgeable of, and have 
contacts within the system, to ensure project feasibility.  In many cases, these realities have been 
overlooked and projects have been stalled and even cancelled in the first stages of the 
concession.  
 
2.22.27   Insufficiency of Judicial Systems  
 
Judicial systems in developing countries are often poorly equipped to handle disputes between 
foreign investors and host country governments.  This is a major impediment to the leveraging of 
private investment.  Capacity building action is essential to help establish clear, stable and 
reliable judicial systems that can provide security for foreign and local private investments.  
 
2.22.28   Limited Number of PPP Operators 
 
PPPs are a fairly new concept in most developing countries, which means there is a limited 
number of experienced operators who are in a position to operate the PPP service more cheaply 
and efficiently.  
 
2.22.29   Inappropriateness of Existing Procurement Systems 
 
The continuing search for maximum value-for-money in construction work has led to focused 
attention upon the procurement process (Smith et al., 2006).  Traditional methods of procurement 
generally involve employers, or their agents designing the work required, prior to competitive 
tenders.  The success of this approach depends mainly on the ability of the employer to 
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adequately specify the project requirements. Inaccurate representation of requirements to the 
tendering contractors, usually leads to disputes.  Other factors affecting the procurement process 
are: the lack of involvement of the contractors in the project design; poor contractor capabilities; 
lack of ownership by the contractor; inadequate risk-sharing; poor management, and the lack of 
flexibility to meet changing project circumstances.  
 
2.22.30   Roles of Different Parties 
 
The role and responsibilities of PPP parties change with increased private sector involvement.  
The most important of these is the transformation of the public sector role from operations to a 
management and regulatory function.  This requires both the development of effective regulatory 
systems and monitoring practices.  The government retains a permanent interest in the delivery of 
an asset or service.  It is ultimately responsible for determining the objectives, seeing that 
outcomes are delivered to the required standards, providing an enabling environment and 
ensuring that public interest is safeguarded.  The execution of many elements of service delivery 
is transferred to the private sector. Today, a significant land acquisition is rarely accomplished 
without at least one private and one public participant (Endicott, 1993). 
 
2.22.31 PPP Knowledge and Dissemination 
 
PPPs require skills that are typically in short supply in public sector organizations in emerging 
markets.  These are skills such as proficiency in writing output specifications, experience in 
negotiating contracts that underpin a project finance deal, and familiarity with the wide range of 
financing models used by investment institutions. The restructuring movement, as it unfolds, 
represents an attempt to reinvent schooling through PPP (Madsen, 1996). 
 
2.22.32   Lack of PPP Institutional Frameworks and Facilities 
 
In many countries there is no legal framework for PPPs.  A robust system of commercial laws 
needs to be in place.  Private sector interests have to be protected under existing laws.  PPP 
implementing agencies have to facilitate the involvement of the private sector in infrastructure 
projects or public utilities.  Restrictions on public procurement may adversely affect the 
implementation of PPPs.  Special approval is required for large public procurement contracts 
(American Chamber of Commerce, 2002). 
 
2.22.33  Safety and Environmental Issues 
 
Safety and environmental issues play a vital role in the successful implementation of PPPs.  They 
often play an essential role in terms of acceptability of PPP projects and therefore need to be 
carefully addressed by the relevant authorities during public inquiries (Boeuf, 2003). 
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2.22.34 Management of PPP Projects and Contracts 
 
The capacity and skills of public administrations have to be broadened to manage and negotiate 
successful PPP projects.  Given the lack of project management competence in the development 
and control of private project financing, the public and private sectors should pool resources.  The 
United Nations (2002) suggested that for PPPs to be promoted and used in the reconstruction of 
areas such as South East Europe, international government units and departments should be 
involved in a regional network.  This will help to improve the capacity of these governments to 
facilitate projects.  
 
2.22.35 Inadequate PPP Awareness and Training 
 
The diffusion of PPP policy takes time, with the learning curve varying from sector to sector.  It is, 
therefore, important to conduct a PPP awareness campaign and to train people to implement PPP 
projects across the various sectors.  In South Africa, this awareness takes different forms, ranging 
from PPP foundation training, to workshops, to internship programmes for transaction advisors.  
 
2.22.36 Poor PPP Project Conceptualisations 
 
The range of risks that could possibly jeopardise a project’s feasibility is amplified when investing 
in developing countries. This is due to the uncertainty linked to unpredictable political, economic 
and environmental shocks.  In all too many cases, investors refuse to get involved, realizing the 
tremendous risk and the time and effort needed to get legislation changed during the preparation 
of a given project.  Furthermore, the problem of poor project conceptualisation is aggravated by 
inadequate risk assessments and poor feasibility studies.  
 
2.22.37 Poor PPP Project Implementation 
 
Poor PPP project implementation can result from an inappropriate use of project management 
methodology over the course of the PPP life cycle.  It can also be a result of slow deal flow, lack 
of transparency, poorly drafted PPP agreements, and inexperienced PPP Project Officers.  
 
2.23   Traditional Procurement Systems and  
Standard Forms of Conditions of Contract 
 
2.23.1 Overview 
 
Traditional methods of procurement generally involve employers, or their agents designing or 
specifying in detail, the work required prior to competitive tenders being invited (Morledge et al., 
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2006).  The employer subsequently chooses those tenders that appear to represent the best 
value-for-money, and then enter into some kind of contract for the construction work.   
 
The contractual relationship that results from this traditional process is essentially that of supplier 
and customer.  The employer decides in detail what he / she wants and the contractor simply 
constructs the work as designed.  To be successful, the method depends upon the employers 
being able to specify their requirements in sufficient detail for the contractor to accurately price the 
work.  
 
2.23.2 Standard Forms of Conditions of Contract 
 
Certain industries and major engineering and building institutions, such as the International 
Federation of Consulting Engineers (FIDIC) and the Construction Industry Development Board 
(CIDB) have developed standard conditions of contract.  Use of these standard conditions gives 
greater certainty in operation and gives a reasonable balance of risk between the parties (Twort & 
Rees, 1995). Table 22 shows a simple comparison of the generic processes for the two 
approaches. 
 
Table 22: Traditional Procurement versus Public Private Partnerships 
Public Procurement Public Private Partnership (PPP) 
Establish alternatives Undertake policy study 
Appraise options Appraise options 
Draft terms of reference Public policy document 
Conduct feasibility study Prepare terms of reference 
Undertake safety study Draft performance specifications 
Arrange EIA study Commission feasibility study 
Project recommendations Issue consultation document 
Client decision Public & stakeholders consultations 
Create project team Risk management  & cost plans  
Planning approvals Second consultation document 
Raise the finance Decision document  
Prepare detailed design Approvals 
Appoint contractors Conduct pre-qualification of bidders 
Supervise construction Prepare shortlist and ask for bids 
Commission works Evaluate bids 
Begin Operations Select preferred bidder 
 Further consultations 
 Select private party for final designs 
 Negotiations 
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 Detailed designs 
 Environmental & Safety approvals 
 Implement agreement 
 Audit & manage contract 
Data Source: Grimsey and Lewis (2004) 
Table 22 depicts the various aspects of procurement relative to the traditional and PPP approach. 
In this table, procurement by means of a PPP is compared with that by conventional means in 
terms of the steps involved. The processes depict a lot of similarities relative to the policy, 
planning and construction phase. However the approach relative to the transaction and 
concession phase shows dramatic differences. Most projects procured through the traditional 
approach are design and construction, whereas those procured through the PPP approach are for 
design, construction, operation and maintenance. 
 
2.24 Limitations & Problems 
 
Hodgson (1995) puts the blame on the traditional form of procurement, for the poor record of 
design and construction of capital works, due to the attitudes and culture of the public sector.  
These result in the regular occurrence of time delays and cost overruns.  Other problems 
frequently associated with traditional procurement include: 
 
• Inadequacy of the business case and feasibility; 
• Environmental impact issues; 
• Disputes and claims incurred; 
• Economic influences; 
• Late contractor involvement in design; 
• Complexity of the contract structure; 
• Legislative and regulatory changes; 
• Lack of innovation; 
• Poor contractor capabilities; 
• Poor project management teams, and 
• Poor project intelligence. 
 
2.25 Other Issues of Concern 
 
2.25.1 Rising Demand for Services 
 
According to Currie (2005), the South African government is facing a rising demand for 
acceleration of infrastructure development, due to the social and economic transformation 
process. 
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The government is facing a skills crisis, mainly at the provincial and municipal council level.  Such 
capacity constraints mean that a lot of funding meant for development remains unlocked or 
unutilised.  It was proposed that the PPP model be utilised for procurement, in 2006, in order to 
avail much needed project financing and resource support.  
 
The use of PPPs will stimulate growth in the construction sector and will also promote BEE, 
create employment, provide mandatory skills-training, curb the spread of informal settlements and 
reduce crime and poverty.  
 
Furthermore, Currie (2005) provided thrust to the research process, which is to investigate South 
African PPP projects, in order to gain a deeper understanding of the problems, opportunities and 
benefits associated with utilising the PPP approach in infrastructure development and 
maintenance.  
 
2.25.2 Making PPPs Work 
 
PPPs have emerged as a more preferable, acceptable and beneficial alternative to privatisation 
for infrastructure development in developing countries (Anvuur & Kumaraswamy, 2006).  
However, the implementation of PPPs is faced with a number of challenges, which if not properly 
addressed may undermine their purpose.  The challenges and issues include exclusion of local 
and small-scale construction firms, bundling of small projects to bigger packages and the level of 
funding which limits the type of participant.  
 
2.25.3 Infrastructure Maintenance 
 
According to a study by Ng and Wong (2006), the maintenance of infrastructure facilities is a 
demanding and costly task.  It can be a financial burden with a high workload that can become 
unmanageable for governments with limited resources.  Government institutions are now using 
the PPP approach for infrastructure maintenance.  
 
2.25.4 Risk Mitigation 
 
Alencar and Filha (2006) conducted a study to establish the mechanisms for risk mitigation in 
PPP projects.  The findings of their research indicate that market risk mitigation is not enough to 
accomplish private investments.  The argument is that investment can only be mobilised if there is 
fair allocation of risks in the partnership.  
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2.25.5 Procurement Reforms 
 
According to Male, Anvuur and Kumaraswamy (2006), the construction industry in Ghana has 
undergone major reforms in the recent past.  This was necessitated by huge amounts of 
unsustainable foreign debt, excessive budget deficits, enormous contractual payment arrears, 
poor construction performance, corruption and pressures from international financial institutions.  
This has forced the government to commit to a reform of public procurement procedures, which 
culminated in the passing of the Public Procurement Act (Republic of South Africa, 2003).  
 
2.25.6 PPPs in Developing & Developed Countries 
 
Akintoye et al. (2006) maintain PPPs provide an avenue for the funding of major public sector 
capital projects.  Further, they address the extent to which the PPP approach has been adopted 
in developing countries compared with developed countries, and highlight the enabling 
environment needed by developing economies in order to attract funding. 
 
2.25.7 Advantages of a PPP Approach 
 
According to Savas (2000), in most countries in the past, roads, water systems and other 
infrastructure development have hitherto been financed, owned, and operated by government 
agencies, with the notable exception of the telephone system and most electric utilities in the 
USA.  It was argued that infrastructure development required high levels of investment and risks, 
and the private sector could not be entrusted with it. 
 
The above argument is not tenable anymore.  Governments, more especially in developing 
countries such as South Africa, are not able to sustain financing and resource requirements.  It is 
necessary that developing countries look beyond their conventional resources and mainstream 
the private sector into their planning, financing and development of infrastructure.  
 
PPPs that engage in infrastructure development, take many forms such as: public authority 
contracts; service contracts; operations and maintenance contracts; cooperatives; lease build 
operate (LBOs) contracts; build transfer operate (BTOs) contracts; build operate transfer (BOT) 
contracts, and build own operate (BOO) contracts.  
 
2.26   Recent Trends in PPP Investments in Developing Countries 
 
2.26.1 Overview 
 
According to BIAC (2004), there has been some growth in PPP projects in developing countries, 
mostly in Latin America and East Asia.  Investment in infrastructure projects averaged US$60 
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billion between 1990 and 2001, with a peak of US$130 billion in 1997.  By 1997, the flow of 
investments to developing countries, in particular to sub-Saharan Africa had approached zero.  
Harris (2003) supports the view that the period 1990 to 2001 saw a rapid growth in PPPs, with 
widespread moves by governments around the world, to involve the private sector in the provision 
and financing of infrastructure.  Almost all developing countries have used PPPs to develop 
infrastructure since 1990.  Table 23 shows the top 25 countries in terms of the use of PPPs in 
developing countries, for the period 1990 – 2003.  The eighth UN Millennium Development Goal 
expressly aims to promote partnership between governments, non-governmental organizations, 
civil society and the private sector (UN Commission Report, 2006). 
 
2.26.2 International investments in PPPs 
 
Table 23: Top 25 countries for PPPs during the period 1990–2003  
Country US$m Percent 
Brazil 157 098 19.7 
Argentina 72 858 9.1 
China 61 170 7.7 
Mexico 59 753 7.5 
Malaysia 36 695 4.6 
India 33 108 4.2 
Philippines 31 017 3.9 
Indonesia 29 210 3.7 
Thailand 23 662 3.0 
Chile 22 003 2.8 
Poland 18 025 2.3 
Turkey 17 719 2.2 
Hungary 17 415 2.2 
Czech Republic 16 388 2.1 
South Africa 15 959 2.0 
Russia 14 784 1.9 
Colombia 13 779 1.7 
Peru 13 762 1.7 
Morocco 12 812 1.6 
Venezuela 11 858 1.5 
Pakistan 7 487 0.9 
Slovak Republic 5 837 0.7 
Egypt 5 689 0.7 
Romania 5 321 0.7 
Bolivia 4 848 0.6 
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Total Top 25 708 257 88.9 
Data Source: World Bank PPP database, 2003. 
 
Almost all developing countries have undertaken some form of private investment in infrastructure 
since 1990.  However, private investors have tended to focus on relatively large and fast growing 
markets (Thomsen, 2005).  Table 23 presents the top 25 countries for investment in PPPs in 
infrastructure in developing and transition economies.  Combined these countries account for 
almost 90% of total PPP investment in the developing world.  The 64 countries located at the 
bottom half of the list account for only 1% of total investment in PPPs in developing and transition 
economies since 1990. 
 
2.27   Summary 
 
In this chapter the main functions of the literature review were explained as providing an up-to 
date account of what is known about PPPs, to provide a conceptual and theoretical context of the 
subject area. The literature review did assist the researcher in obtaining clues about the 
methodology and instrumentation, and furthermore refined the study to retain focus on relevant 
issues. 
This chapter presents a comprehensive review of literature relative to PPPs, from various 
sources.  The review of he literature addresses the broad theme of physical infrastructure 
development using PPPs as a vehicle for investment and service delivery: PPP concepts; the 
need for accelerated infrastructure development; constitutional, legislative, and institutional 
frameworks; how to develop a PPP; international and local PPP lessons from experience; funding 
of and support for programmes of PPPs; traditional procurement systems and standard forms of 
contract; the future and sustainability of PPPs, and recent trends in PPP investment, in 
developing countries. 
 
The review of the literature contains case studies of a wide variety of PPP projects in the 
developed and developing world.  There is a specific focus on the development of a PPP model of 
procurement in the South African context.  Emerging and operational PPP projects were also 
reviewed to provide more insights.  The review covers the historical context of PPP successes 
realized for various projects in different countries.  There is also a focus on PPP techniques as an 
investment tool for providing public services, which were traditionally provided by the public sector 
and which governments are now unable to fund, because of constrained capital resources. 
 
The review of the literature was based on the case study approach (Mouton, 2000).  This was 
done so as to focus and conduct an in-depth study of the selected PPP projects.  PPP literature 
falls into three broad categories: engineering practitioner material, academic, and government 
policy documents (Grimsey & Lewis, 2004).  The following categories of literature were accessed 
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during the survey of the literature: academic journals; conference proceedings; textbooks; 
government documents; theses and dissertations, and contemporary magazines.  
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CHAPTER 3 
 
3. RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1  Introduction 
 
The main purpose of this study was to assess the performance of operational South African PPP 
projects.  This chapter includes sections describing: population and sample stratum; research 
design; instrumentation; procedures for data collection, and procedures for data analysis. 
 
Multi-case empirical research was conducted to examine various performance aspects of 
operational South African PPPs.  A web-based survey using questionnaires was used to capture 
the experiences and perceptions of various actors involved directly or indirectly in selected PPP 
projects.  The advantages and disadvantages of choosing the given approach have been 
provided.  
 
A case study approach was used, because the focus was on a particular group of subjects, 
namely operational South African PPPs contained in the National Treasury (2005) PPP Unit 
database.  The case studies involved an in-depth examination of a limited number of PPPs with 
primary data collection over a limited period of time between November 2006 and February 2007. 
 
The population for the survey consisted of operational South African PPP projects registered 
under regulation 16 of the Public Finance Management Act (Republic of South Africa,1999).  The 
study included the following activities: 
 
• Identifying institutions engaged in PPP projects in South Africa using the National 
Treasury PPP database; 
• Accessing the identified PPP database to obtain a list of specifics about names of 
projects and project participants, contact addresses in the form of postal and e-mail 
addresses, facsimile and telephone numbers; 
• Designing and developing a questionnaire; 
• Revising the questionnaire to incorporate promoter comments; 
• Uploading the questionnaire to the university website; 
• Conducting an exploratory questionnaire with three potential respondents to test its 
suitability; 
• Distributing the web-based questionnaire using e-mail, along with a cover letter explaining 
the purpose of the study and requesting the respondents to participate in the PPP survey; 
• Following up non-respondents by e-mail and telephone after two weeks from the date 
when they should have received the questionnaire; 
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• Compiling and analysing the questionnaire results, and 
• Providing feedback to the respondents based on the questionnaire results. 
 
The methodology section of the study describes the research design and the procedures that 
were followed in conducting the study.  In this chapter the researcher discusses the sample 
stratum1, samples, sampling procedure, data collection and data analysis procedures. 
 
3.2 Purpose of the Study 
 
The study was designed to assess the performance of operational South African PPP projects.  It 
aimed to contribute towards the existing body of knowledge relative to PPPs and to develop a 
systemic model for the planning and implementation of a sustainable PPP system in South Africa 
and other parts of Africa. 
 
The performance issues examined included project management competency, affordability, level 
of investment, contract type and duration, transfer of responsibilities, risk management, policy and 
guidelines, and PPP awareness and training. 
 
3.3 Scope and Objectives of the Study 
 
3.3.1 Scope 
The primary objective of this study focussed on: 
 
• Experiences and perceptions of PPP actors, and 
• Operational South African PPP projects 
 
3.3.2 Objective 
 
The main objective of the study was to investigate the performance of operational South African 
PPP projects. 
 
3.4 Setting 
 
The research was conducted in South Africa, the southernmost country in Africa.  It is bordered 
on the north by Namibia, Botswana, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, and Swaziland.  On the east and 
southern coasts it is bordered by the Indian Ocean and on the west by the Atlantic Ocean.  
 
According to Lemon et al. (2004) South Africa is divided into nine administrative provinces: 
                                                
1
 The sample stratum is the  list of  PPP projects in the National Treasury database as at December, 2005 
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• Gauteng; 
• Limpopo; 
• Mpumalanga; 
• North-West; 
• Free State; 
• Eastern Cape; 
• Northern Cape; 
• Western Cape, and 
• KwaZulu Natal. 
 
South Africa has three capitals:  
 
• Cape Town, the legislative capital; 
• Pretoria, the executive capital, and 
• Bloemfontein, the judicial capital. 
 
The administrative, research management support and supervision for this study was provided by 
the Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University (NMMU), which is located in the coastal city of Port 
Elizabeth.  It is situated on the southeast coast of South Africa, in the Eastern Cape, the third 
largest province.  Port Elizabeth is a port city with a strong industrial sector and well-developed 
infrastructure. 
 
3.5 Research Design 
 
Philliber et al cited in Yin (2003), describe a research design as a roadmap for conducting 
research.  The research design deals with at least four problems: what questions to study; what 
data are relevant; what data to collect; and how to analyse the results.  Yin (2003), further defines 
research design as a logical sequence that links empirical data collection to initial research 
questions and eventually to its conclusions.  Mouton (2001) confirms research design as a plan, 
or blue print of how to conduct research.  This research study can be considered to be a multi-site 
programme effect case study, designed to examine the performance of operational PPP projects.   
 
A case study approach was used in this thesis, because the emphasis was on a holistic, in-depth 
investigation of the PPP projects in the sample area.  The study examined eighteen selected 
operational South African PPP projects, within various public institutions, in their natural setting.  
The components of the case study design followed the recommendation of Yin (2003) and 
included the following: 
 
• The study’s questions; 
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• The propositions; 
• The unit of analysis; 
• The logic linking the data to the proposition, and 
• The criteria for interpreting the findings. 
 
According to Yin (2003), there are six sources of evidence for data collection in the case study 
protocol: 
 
• Documentation; 
• Archival records; 
• Interviews; 
• Direct observation; 
• Participant observation, and 
• Physical artefacts. 
 
Not all these sources need be used in every case study (Yin, 2003).  In this study, the last three 
types of sources were not relevant, since they are related to direct sociological investigation, and 
were not used.  The researcher used the first three methods for data collection for this multi-case 
study. 
 
3.5.1 Advantages of the Case Study Approach 
 
The case study approach has the following advantages: 
 
• It fosters the use of multiple sources of data, which in turn facilitates validation; 
• It is appropriate since the researcher has no control over events within the proposed 
organizations or projects; 
• The research was small scale and mainly for academic purposes only, which involved 
eighteen case studies, and effort was focussed on selected cases only (National 
Treasury, 2006); 
• The approach enabled use of a variety of research methods for data collection, and 
• It entailed holistic, detailed and particular focus on the subjects of the study - the PPP 
projects (Denscombe, 2003). 
 
3.5.2 Disadvantages of the Case Study Approach 
 
According to Denscombe (2003), the disadvantages of the case study approach are:  
 
• It is vulnerable to criticisms in relation to credibility of generalisations; 
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• It is perceived as being suitable for qualitative research and focuses on processes rather 
than measurable end products; 
• Some case study boundaries might be difficult to define, and 
• Negotiating access to case study settings can be a demanding part of research, which 
can seriously affect the study. 
 
3.6 Selection of Case Studies 
 
3.6.1 Population 
 
The target population for the study consisted of all the operational South African PPP projects 
registered by the National Treasury PPP Unit as of December 2005.  Projects were selected from 
the National Treasury PPP Unit database as being representative of those successful, 
problematic and unsuccessful cases in South African (National Treasury, 2006).  Valuable 
lessons were drawn from this pool of cases, based on experiences learned during the planning, 
implementation and management of the PPP projects.   
 
3.6.2 Sample Stratum 
 
A sample of eighteen operational PPP projects was drawn from the National Treasury PPP Unit 
database.  This sample consisted of twelve PPP projects registered as per Treasury Regulation 
16, as of December 2005.  In addition, six other operational PPP projects were selected, which 
came into operation before the enactment of the Public Finance Management Act, 1999.  The 
latter category of projects were included, because many PPP projects had been in operation for 
more than five years and therefore presented a rich source of data in terms of the various PPP 
aspects under investigation. 
 
According to the National Treasury (2005) PPP Unit, there is a comprehensive PPP projects 
database, which is updated regularly.  The database was used to select cases for investigation 
using the following reasons: 
 
• It involved little travel; 
• The costs involved were fairly low; 
• Less time was needed to spent on fieldwork, and 
• The data was easily accessible, since a website exists, which was easily accessible to the 
researcher. 
 
The database also contained a whole spectrum of all the registered and operational PPP projects 
in South Africa.  The PPP unit, which maintains the database, is the sole regulatory agency for 
PPPs and therefore presented a more authentic source of information on PPP projects in South 
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Africa, than any other source known to the researcher.  Integrative cases were preferable, since 
the findings were more likely to reach a wider audience and immediate application.  The units of 
analysis were the selected PPP projects.   
 
The operational PPP projects investigated included: 
 
• The N4 Toll road from Witbank to Maputo; 
• The N3 Toll road from Johannesburg to Durban; 
• Head Office Accommodation for the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) in Tshwane; 
• The Cradle of Humankind - Morapeng Complex in Johannesburg; 
• Eco-tourism, Manyeleti - three sites in Limpopo; 
• Correctional facilities in South Africa; 
• Fleet management in the Northern Cape; 
• The Inkosi Albert Luthuli Hospital in KwaZulu–Natal; 
• The Chapman’s Peak Drive toll road in Western Cape; 
• The State Vaccine Institute; 
• The Humansdorp District Hospital in Eastern Cape; 
• The Universitas and Pelonomi Hospitals co-location in Free State; 
• The Social Grant Payment System for the Department of Social Development in the Free  
State; 
• Water and sanitation projects at Ilembe District; 
• Information Systems Project  for the Department of Labour; 
• The Nelspruit Water Concession; 
• The Queenstown Water Concession, and 
• The Amanzu Abantu Water Project in the Eastern Cape. 
 
3.6.3 Unit of Analysis 
 
The selected projects formed the units of analysis from the defined population, namely South 
African PPPs.  The individual projects were the most basic units on which data was collected.  
The questionnaires were sent to PPP project officers and other PPP and non-PPP actors who 
were directly or indirectly involved in the projects.  Secondary data on the projects were collected 
through a literature study. 
 
3.6.4 Sampling Approach 
 
Non-probability sampling was used, because the focus of this study was on in-depth information 
and not on making inferences or generalisations.  The projects were selected, because they were 
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considered informative, or rather they possessed the required characteristics. The cases 
selected, offered in-depth information that were considered relevant to the study. 
 
3.6.5 Sample Adequacy 
 
This was achieved through the systematic evaluation of some aspects of the selected samples.  
Some of the items used in the checklist, included descriptions of the population and the sample, 
and whether a probabilistic sampling method was used.  A sample checklist is presented in Table 
24. 
 
Table 24: Evaluation Checklist 
ID Evaluation Criteria Yes No 
1 Population and sample description Yes  
2 Probabilistic sampling method   No 
 
The number of selected case studies was obviously small, compared to the actual number of PPP 
projects registered, or in the PPP production pipeline.  It was necessary to only study cases that 
had been registered with the PPP Unit.  Those that were waiting for approval before being 
implemented were excluded, because little information, if any, was available on them.  It is 
important to recognise that due to the limited number of cases available and their newness, 
elaborate statistical representation was not possible.   
 
The research data was obtained from a survey of public and private sector contract managers of 
PPP projects in South Africa that were in operation at the end of 2005.  Questionnaires were sent 
to different authorities who were responsible for live PPP projects and to other PPP actors linked 
directly or indirectly to them, and to the PPP sector in general.  A full list of operational PPP 
projects that were included in the survey is provided in Appendix 6. 
 
The research was conducted over a ten-week period, from November 2006 to February 2007.  It 
covered a wide range of topics such as: costs; affordability; budgets; risks; training; project 
management; roles and responsibilities; policy, and regulatory frameworks.  These covered 
various sectors where there were operational PPP projects in South Africa. 
 
Cases were selected to demonstrate certain structures, issues and problems, which were 
commonly encountered.  Solutions were then suggested.  An attempt was made to demonstrate 
the positive and negative impacts of private sector participation.  Many of the cases selected 
represented on-going PPP projects, which will continue to evolve over time.  It was necessary, in 
certain cases, to apply a time limit so as to have a common benchmark to compare issues 
relating to the PPP process. 
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To allow a common analysis, eight key criteria were used: 
 
• Project management competency - the competency of key players in the PPP delivery 
process; 
• Affordability - the budgetary constraints on PPP implementing institutions or agencies; 
• Level of investment - the amount of capital investment in the PPP project exclusive of the 
income streams or operational costs; 
• Contract type and duration - the type of PPP model used; 
• Transfer of responsibilities - the degree to which each party is involved; 
• Risk management - the risk allocation and management strategy; 
• Policy and guidelines - the legal framework to catalyse and guide PPP projects, and 
• PPP awareness and training - PPP mainstreaming into the various institutions and 
training for staff. 
 
3.6.6 Justification  
 
The projects were selected using non-probabilistic methods (Brink, 2006).  Hence, it was decided 
that whichever case was selected in any of the listed categories for PPP projects, was 
representative of other typical PPP projects.  The suitability of the case studies chosen were 
based on the following grounds:  
 
• They represented a broad spectrum of sectors - health, transportation, water, housing, 
power, and information technology; 
• They were operational and hence complied with the requirements of the regulatory 
agency in South Africa; 
• They were typical and therefore similar in crucial aspects to other projects which could 
have been chosen; 
• They had generated data, necessary to inform the research; 
• South Africa has a limited number of operational PPPs, and 
• Some case studies provided unique opportunities, namely the N4 Toll Road and the 
Albert Luthuli Hospital projects. 
 
3.7 Research Methodology 
 
3.7.1 Data Collection - Approach and Strategy 
 
This section explains the research methods followed in the study.  It includes the methods of data 
collection and analysis used and the basis of the analytical framework.  According to Mouton 
(2001), the type of data analysis techniques to be used should be chosen before the data is 
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collected so that the appropriate data collection techniques are utilised.  Hence, in this study, the 
data collection techniques were determined before the data collection commenced. 
 
After obtaining approval for the research proposal, the first step in the second phase of the 
research process, was to implement the research plan.  A detailed work plan, with a complete 
breakdown of tasks that needed to be performed at various stages in achieving the desired 
outcomes, was prepared.  It was discussed and agreed with by the promoter, before being 
implemented, as part of the preparatory stages of the entire research process.  
 
Structured detailed case studies were conducted in the following sectors: power; water / 
wastewater; solid waste management; transport; tourism; sports; telecommunications, and social 
infrastructure.  It is important to recognize that PPP principles can be applied in a wide range of 
projects, covering both physical and social infrastructure. 
 
3.7.2 Work Plan 
 
The format of the work plan is presented in Table 25.  The activity breakdown was based on the 
broad three-year strategic plan for the completion of the PhD programme. 
 
Table 25: Work Plan Format 
Item Description of Activity Latest finish Responsibility Outcome 
1. Field scanning 30/11/2005 Candidate Identify focus area 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
Prepare research proposal 
Approve proposal 
Sign Learning Agreement 
Confidentiality Agreement 
7/27/06 
8/27/06 
1/23/06 
1/23/06 
Candidate 
RTI Committee 
Promoter 
Promoter 
Proposal 
Approved proposal 
LA signed 
CA signed 
 
The specific activities that the researcher undertook included: 
• Developing a detailed work plan for the research project, clearly indicating the schedule 
for instrument preparation, testing, data collection, analysis and thesis writing; 
• Preparing a list of performance indicators based on research objectives; 
• Developing an instrument to be used for collecting the required data from the field; 
• Pre-testing the instrument and making the necessary corrections; 
• Developing the Internet link and uploading the instrument onto the web, and 
• Finalising the design of the instrument and collecting the field data. 
 
3.8  Research Instrument and Data Collection 
 
3.8.1  Instrument Design and Construction 
 
The questionnaire was developed by the researcher and reviewed by the promoter. It addressed 
the following issues relevant to PPP project environments: 
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• Project profiles; 
• PPP actors; 
• Costs and affordability; 
• Budget; 
• Risk transfer; 
• Policy frameworks and guidelines; 
• Project management competency levels, and 
• PPP awareness and training. 
 
The questionnaires were distributed via the NMMU website and also directly by the researcher to 
the targeted respondents.  Completed questionnaires were returned either by facsimile, or 
electronically.  Reminder e-mails were sent to all the respondents, followed by phone calls to 
encourage participation. 
 
Six common ways of information collection were considered.  These were literature searches, 
focus groups, personal interviews, telephone surveys, mail surveys, and web-based surveys.  It 
was decided to collect the primary data by using a web-based questionnaire in order to access 
the necessary data. 
 
The literature survey involved reviewing readily available material from various sources such as: 
academic journals; textbooks; theses; contemporary magazines; technical reports; on-line 
databases, and any other published material concerning PPPs in general.  This approach proved 
an inexpensive method of gathering information, although it took time to conduct a 
comprehensive literature survey.  
 
Various options such as telephone interviews, personal interviews and the use of questionnaires 
were considered for data collection.  Due to the geographical spread of the targeted projects, time 
considerations, and cost implications, it was decided to use web-based survey. 
 
The following general guidelines informed the development and design of the questionnaire.  The 
researcher kept in mind that the response to the questionnaire was voluntary and designed the 
instrument accordingly, to maintain respondent interest.  The questionnaire was designed and 
structured with: 
 
• Precise and clear instructions on how to answer questions; 
• Divisions into logical sections by subject; 
• Initial questions that were easy to answer; 
• A progression from general to specific questions; 
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• Personal questions listed at the end of each section; 
• Little technical jargon; 
• A limited number of questions to avoid respondent fatigue; 
• Questions that were framed with particular issues in mind, and 
• The ranking of each type of question by using simplified recording, tabulation and editing. 
 
3.8.2   Piloting of Survey Instrument 
 
The research instrument was tested for functionality and usability on a group of experts and 
project managers from industry, institutions, and some of the case study organizations.  The 
feedback from the pilot survey was obtained and the necessary changes made before sending 
out the final instrument. 
 
The results from the pilot survey results indicated that the respondents had few questions for 
clarification and little difficulty in understanding what was required.  However, their views on some 
of the items were noted and the relevant changes made.  These included corrections to spelling, 
choices and personal information.  The pilot survey was carried out by e-mailing respondents and 
by providing hypertext links to the test group.  Feedback was then obtained and the necessary 
corrections made, followed by the rolling out of the finalised survey, to the various respondents. 
 
3.8.3   Cover Letter 
 
A cover letter accompanied every questionnaire sent or transmitted to the respondents.  The letter 
was brief and contained an adequate explanation about the proposed research project.  The 
cover letter contained the following: 
 
• Self introduction; 
• Purpose of the study; 
• Brief explanation of the importance of the study; 
• Assurance of confidentiality, and 
• Specific deadlines for returning the questionnaire. 
 
3.8.4   Cost of Implementing Survey 
 
The questionnaires were considered cost effective when compared to face-to-face interviews.  
This is particularly true for studies involving large sample sizes and large geographic areas.  
Written questionnaires become even more cost effective as the number of research questions 
increase.  Questionnaires are easy to analyse.  Data entry for nearly all surveys can be easily 
expedited with standard computer software packages.  Questionnaires are familiar to most 
people.  Nearly everyone has had some experience completing a questionnaire and generally 
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they do not make people apprehensive.  Questionnaires reduce bias.  There is a uniform question 
presentation and no intermediary bias.  The researcher cannot influence the respondent to 
answer the questions in a certain manner.  There are no verbal or visual clues to influence the 
respondent.  Questionnaires are less intrusive than telephone or face-to-face surveys.  When 
respondents receive a questionnaire in the mail or via email, they are free to complete the 
questionnaire in their own time. Indeed, this was the case for some respondents from the 
Buthelezi, Albert Luthuli PPP Project, who wrote back and indicated that they had flagged the 
questionnaire task completion for a later date.  Unlike other research methods, the respondent is 
not expected to complete the questionnaire immediately. 
 
3.8.5   Disadvantages of Written Questionnaires  
 
One major disadvantage of written questionnaires is the possibility of low response rates.  This is 
particularly disadvantageous if high-end statistical analysis is contemplated.  Rigorous statistical 
analysis was not envisaged in this study as was clearly indicated in the research limitations.  
Cognisance was taken for the fact that low response rates could drastically lower confidence in 
the results.  Response rates can vary widely, between 10% and 90%.  However, by improving the 
design of the instrument this was mitigated. 
 
Another disadvantage of questionnaires is their inability to probe responses.  Questionnaires are 
structured instruments.  They allow the respondent flexibility with respect to response format.  In 
essence, they often lose the ‘flavour of the response’, since respondents may sometimes want to 
qualify their responses.  Clearly defined research project goals provided direction and guidance 
for the design of the questionnaire. 
 
3.9   Procedures for Data Collection 
 
Both self-administered and researcher administered questionnaires were used to collect data.  
For the self-administered questionnaires, the respondents were asked to complete the 
questionnaires themselves.  These types of questionnaires were web-based, faxed, mailed, or 
hand-delivered to the respondents.  The researcher conducted personal interviews with the 
respondents in their work places, or at the project sites, using a questionnaire.  
 
Use was made of internet technology to take advantage of its low costs, convenience and 
possibility of high response rates.  The benefits of high response rates far outweighed the 
problem of response bias.  The web-based questionnaire was a simple user-friendly web-page 
hosted at the university website.  
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3.9.1   Web-based questionnaire 
 
The researcher designed the questionnaire as a simple web-page and arranged the hosting of it 
on the NMMU website.  The website was linked to the university’s main server.  The Webmaster 
assigned the researcher a dedicated web address, identity and password.  This site was then 
used to facilitate the research process, especially in questionnaire distribution, monitoring and 
administration.  
 
E-mail messages were then sent to selected or identified respondents inviting them to visit the 
site to complete the questionnaire.  The questionnaire was made simple, colourful and attractive 
with enhanced features to engender optimum response rates.  
 
Respondents were provided with a URL link: http://www.nmmu.ac.za/pppquestionnaire, which 
explained the multi-case study, so that all that a respondent needed to do was double click on the 
link in order to access the website and open the questionnaire.  Respondents were then able to 
select from a pre-defined range of answers and simply submit the completed form at one 
keystroke.  The researcher was then able to secure answers through option buttons and text entry 
boxes, which were then linked automatically into a database with the twin benefits of speed and 
accuracy, in terms of data collection and analysis. 
 
One major advantage of this method of data collection was that, all that was required was an e-
mail account to be able to access and complete the questionnaire.  Given that the proposed 
respondents from each sample project were PPP actors, representing contractors, operators, 
financial advisors, legal advisors, consultants, facility operators, construction managers and 
project managers, this approach was most appropriate.   
 
The main disadvantage of this approach was that it required respondents to have technical skills 
and access to the Internet.  However, this problem was overcome by e-mailing respondents and 
informing them about the survey and including in the e-mail a hypertext link to the website, so that 
all that the respondent needed to do was double click on the link, in order to go to the website and 
open the questionnaire. 
 
3.10   Procedures for Data Analysis 
 
Both qualitative and quantitative data analysis techniques were utilised to analyse the data 
collected.  Given the limited number of cases investigated, a common statistical analysis software 
package, MS Excel, was used.  Each PPP case was analysed individually, before cross-analysis 
was conducted for the whole study.  The investigator studied each PPP project’s written 
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documentation and survey response data as a separate case, to identify unique patterns within 
the data for that particular PPP project.  
 
The researcher prepared detailed case study summaries for each project, and examined the data 
to determine whether there were any similarities, or differences within common or differing 
groups.  Cross-case analysis then followed.  The analysed data has been presented graphically in 
the next chapter to illustrate the various concepts based on the findings. 
 
Research components to be completed in subsequent phases included: 
 
• Data coding and analysis using a relevant statistical software package; 
• Analysis and interpretation; 
• Writing the draft thesis using the data analysed; 
• Presenting research findings to promoter and faculty management; 
• Revising the draft thesis and taking into consideration the comments; 
• Participating in a scientific conference and presenting conference papers; 
• Submitting the thesis for examination; 
• Binding the required number of hard copies and recording CD soft copies and 
submitting for examination, and 
• Graduating and proceeding to post-doctoral research and lecturing. 
 
The next chapter contains the presentation and discussion of data collected and analysed in the 
study. 
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 CHAPTER 4 
 
4.   PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS OF THE DATA 
 
4.1  Introduction 
 
This chapter contains the presentation of the findings emanating from the primary data collected 
during the study.  The statistics in the form of frequencies and mean scores, a measure of central 
tendency, are discussed and interpreted. In that way, both the technical requirements and the 
informational needs are met. 
 
Receipt, monitoring, and handling of completed questionnaires were undertaken online.  Some 
questionnaires were sent and received by facsimile.  Data was then captured on the web-survey 
system for consolidation and processing.  The web-survey programme that was used contained 
tools for editing, modifying, publishing, monitoring progress, and closing the survey.  
 
The first step in processing was to convert the raw data that was collected into meaningful, or 
interpretable information.  This was achieved first by editing and then encoding the data.  The 
primary purpose of editing was to eliminate errors in the raw data, and to encode the data into 
appropriate categories.  The questionnaire that was used in the survey was pre-coded. 
 
The web-survey tool that was used did not contain any reporting of results other than basic raw 
data collection.  Due to the numerous ways in which data can be analysed and graphically 
represented, provision was made for exporting the data to Excel software, where it could be easily 
analysed. 
 
A simple frequency analysis of all the respondents was conducted for various categories and 
questions.  The five-point Likert-type scale used, had sufficient options to accommodate the broad 
spectrum of respondents’ perceptions regarding various issues pertaining to PPP projects.  The 
questions were grouped into different categories, in a way that could best serve the study.  These 
categories were: 
 
• General project profiles; 
• Costs and affordability; 
• Budget; 
• Risk transfer; 
• Policy framework and guidelines; 
• Project management competency, and 
• PPP awareness and training. 
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The above categories dealt with the different dimensions of the research problem and sub-
problems, and addressed the formulated research objectives.  All the categories established were 
mutually exclusive and covered all possible answers.  Personal judgement was used to decide on 
appropriate categories.  A spreadsheet data entry format was used for recording raw data.  The 
responses on each questionnaire were recorded horizontally, under separate headings.   
 
4.1.1   Executive Summary 
 
This thesis is the result of a research project conducted by the researcher at the Department of 
Construction Management at the NMMU, South Africa.  This section summarises the evidence 
from the survey of operational PPP projects in South Africa, organized around the key issues set 
out in the set of hypotheses.  The nineteen case studies that were examined were a 
representative sample of the PPPs implemented in South Africa over the last decade. 
 
The aim of the research was to examine the performance of selected South African PPP projects 
in their operational phase, in an endeavour to further the knowledge and understanding of the 
performance of PPP projects in South Africa and provide direction for a sustainable PPP system. 
 
The PPP projects investigated were chosen on the basis of a survey of the literature and 
consultation with the PPP unit at the National Treasury.  The sample included all PPP projects 
signed in terms of the Treasury Regulation 16, as of September 2005.  It also includes a few 
selected projects that came into operation before the enactment of the Public Finance 
Management Act, 1999 (PFMA).  
 
The approach to reporting the results avoids technical jargon and uses clear explanations to 
enhance communication between the researcher and the user.  This approach is necessary to 
help the user understand the implications of the findings.  The results of this research will also be 
of use to the public and private sector managers across various sectors within South Africa and 
beyond, in managing their contracts. 
 
4.1.2   Response Summary (Type I & II PPPs) 
Table 26 presents a summary of survey responses by sector. There were two categories of PPP 
projects (Type I and II).  Type I operational PPP projects came into operation after the PFMA 
came into effect.  Type II PPP projects were in operation before 1999 
Table 26: Summary of survey responses by sector 
Sector Distributed (No.) Respondents (No.) Response (%) 
Health 4 3 75 
Transportation 4 3 75 
Tourism 2 1 50 
Information Technology 1 1 100 
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Housing 1 0 0 
Finance 1 1 100 
Water 4 3 75 
Correctional 1 0 0 
Other 1 0 0 
Total 19 12 63 
Type I: PPP projects in operation since 1999.  Type II: PPP projects before 1999. 
 
It is clear from the data in Table 26 that the response rate was sufficient to conduct the planned 
statistical analysis.  Moreover, as the report will indicate, the response was representative of the 
PPP sector projects surveyed, and was considered adequate for this study. 
 
4.2   Data Collection 
 
4.2.1   Operational PPP Projects 
Table 27 depicts the sector distribution of  projects surveyed relative to PPP type. 
Table 27: PPP Projects surveyed by sector and type 
Sector Type I PPPs Type II PPPs 
Health 4 0 
Transportation 3 2 
Tourism 2 0 
Information Technology 1 0 
Housing 1 0 
Finance 1 0 
Water 0 4 
Correctional 0 1 
Total 12 7 
Type I PPP projects operationalised after 1999 and Type II PPP projects before 1999. 
 
4.3   Description of the PPP Projects 
 
  The two categories of PPP projects considered are represented in Tables 28 and 29 
respectively. Brief project profiles for the various projects are also presented. 
 
Table 28: Type I Operational South African PPP Projects 
Item Project Name and Location Sector 
A Albert Luthuli Hospital – KwaZulu Natal, DoH Health 
B Fleet Management - Northern Cape, DPW Transportation 
C Eco-tourism, Manyeleti 3 sites - Limpopo, DEAT Tourism 
D Universitas and Pelonomi Hospitals - Free State, DoH Health 
E Information Systems Project - DoL Information Technology 
F Chapman's Peak Drive Toll Road - DPW Transportation 
G State Vaccine Institute - DoH Health 
H Humansdorp District Hospital - Eastern Cape, DoH Health 
I Head Office Accommodation - Gauteng, DTI Housing 
J Cradle of Humankind - Gauteng, Finance & Tourism Tourism 
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K Social Payment Grant System - Free State Finance 
S Other: Fleet Management - Eastern Cape, DoT Transportation 
 
 
Table 29: Type II Operational South African PPP Projects by sector before 1999 
Item Project Name and Location Sector 
L Ilembe Water Concession - KwaZulu Natal Water 
M N4 Toll Road - Johannesburg to Maputo Transportation 
N Correctional Facilities in South Africa Legal 
O N3 Toll Road - Johannesburg to Durban Transportation 
P Queenstown Water Concession - Queenstown Water 
Q Nelspruit Water Concession - Queenstown Water 
R Amanzu Abantu Water Project - Eastern Cape Water 
 
 
4.3.1   Case A: Inkosi Albert Luthuli Hospital, Department of Health, KwaZulu Natal 
 
This South African pioneering PPP project was conceptualised in 2000 and reached financial 
closure on 6 December 2001 (PPP Quarterly, 2001).  The process took five months of 
negotiations between various PPP actors.  The Net Present Value of the project is R5 billion.  The 
agreement provides for the supply and maintenance of specialised medical equipment and certain 
hospital upgrades and facilities management, over a period of 15 years. 
 
Table 30: Inkosi Albert Luthuli Hospital  
Case Study / Province Albert Luthuli Hospital – KwaZulu Natal 
Rationale / Objectives of PPP Hospital equipment & maintenance 
Sector Health 
PPP model DFBOT 
Contract duration 15 years 
Investment level R 5 billion 
Risk allocation Operational risk with private party 
Financing structure Equity and debt financing 
PPP actors DoH and Impilo Consortium 
 
 
4.3.2   Case B: Fleet Management, Department of Public Works, Northern Cape 
 
The PPP Fleet management project reached financial closure on 31 October 2001.  This five-year 
contract, worth R37 million per annum, involved the Northern Cape Department of Transport, 
Pemberley Investments (Pty) Ltd. - Imperial (Pty) Ltd. and Afrika Kosini.  This service contract 
was for the provision of quality and well-maintained vehicles for use by Northern Cape 
departments within approved budget allocations for the province.  This PPP project provided a 
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good lesson for the establishment of more fleet projects across the country.  Table 31 provides a 
short profile of the project. 
 
Table 31: Fleet Management  
Case Study / Province Fleet Management – Northern Cape 
Rationale / Objectives of PPP Quality & well maintained vehicles 
Sector Transportation 
PPP model DFO 
Contract duration Five years 
Investment level R 181 million 
Risk allocation Operational risk with private sector 
Financing structure Equity: 100% 
PPP actors DoT, Pemberley Investments & Deloitte 
 
4.3.3   Case C: Eco–tourism, Manyeleti 3 sites, Department of Environment and Tourism, 
Limpopo 
 
The three 30-year Limpopo eco-tourism PPP projects were signed in December 2001.  The 
concession deals, located in the Manyeleti game reserve, required concessionaires to pay the 
province a concession fee for the rights to develop and operate tourism businesses, under 
specified conditions in three areas: The Khoko Moya Camp was concessioned to Khoko Moya 
Wilderness Trails (Pty) Ltd; Honeybadger Camp to Tinswala Lodges (Pty) Ltd; and Pungwe Camp 
concessioned to Pungwe Game Reserve (Pty) Ltd.  The three concessions involved the 
upgrading of existing facilities and the re-design, construction, and operation of new facilities. 
 
Table 32: Eco-tourism  
Case Study / Province Eco-tourism – Limpopo 
Rationale / Objectives of PPP Develop and operate tourism business 
Sector Tourism 
PPP model DFBOT 
Contract duration 30 years 
Investment level 29 million 
Risk allocation Operational risk to private party. 
Financing structure Equity: 100% 
PPP actors Finance, Economic Affairs & Tourism, DBSA, 
White & Case, Koko Moya, Tinswala & 
Pungwe. 
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4.3.4   Universitas and Pelonomi 
Table 33 presents a brief profile of the 16–year co-location hospital in the Free State. This project 
was closed in November 2002. It provides community health and management services on behalf 
of the Department of Health. 
Table 33: Universitas and Pelonomi  
Case Study / Province Universitas and Pelonomi – Free State 
Rationale / Objectives of PPP Community Health and Management Services 
Sector Health 
PPP model DFBOT 
Contract duration 16 Years 
Investment level N/A 
Risk allocation Operational risk to private party 
Financing structure Equity: 100% 
PPP actors DoH 
N/A: Data not available 
 
4.3.4   Case E: Information Systems Project, Department of Labour 
Table 34 presents a brief profile for the information systems project for the Department of Labour. 
The duration of the project is 10 years and was closed in December 2002. 
Table 34: Information Systems  
Case Study / Province Information Systems – National 
Rationale / Objectives of PPP Information management services 
Sector Information Technology 
PPP model DFBOT 
Contract duration 10 Years 
Investment level N/A 
Risk allocation Public: 46% & Private sector: 44% 
Financing structure Debt:44%, Equity:10% &  Gov; 46% 
PPP actors Semens Consortium & Department of Labour 
 
 
4.3.5   Case F: Chapman’s Peak Drive Toll Road, Department of Public Works, Western Cape 
The Chapman’s Peak Drive project reached financial closure in May 2003 (Table 35). The 
duration of the project is 30 years and the value is R 1.5billion. The project is located in the 
Western Cape.   
Table 35: Chapman’s Peak Drive  
Case Study / Province Chapman’s Peak Drive – W/Cape 
Rationale / Objectives of PPP Safe transportation 
Sector Transportation 
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PPP model DF(part)BOT 
Contract duration 30 Years 
Investment level R 1.5b 
Risk  transfer Private sector 
Financing structure 100 % Equity 
PPP actors Capstone 252 (Pty) Ltd. Consortium & DoT 
 
 
4.3.6   Case G: State Vaccine Institute, Department of Health 
 
According to the PPP Quarterly (2002), the South African government has traditionally been 
involved in the manufacture of human vaccines, through the State Vaccine Institute in Pinelands, 
Cape Town (Table 36).  The process of restructuring the State Vaccine Institute started in 2000, 
with a new entity called Biovac Consortium, which was appointed for a five-year programme for 
the manufacture of a limited number of vaccines.  The marketing of the vaccines in the SADC 
region will be a primary aim of the PPP project.  The PPP project reached financial closure in April 
2003. 
 
Table 36: State Vaccine Institute  
Case Study / Province State Vaccine Institute – Gauteng 
Rationale / Objectives of PPP Manufacture & marketing of vaccines 
Sector Health 
PPP model Equity Partnership 
Contract duration 4 Years 
Investment level N/A 
Risk allocation Operational risk to private party. 
Financing structure Equity: 100% 
PPP actors Biovac Consortium, DoH & PriceWaterhouse 
 
 
4.3.7   Case H: Humansdorp District Hospital, Department of Health, Eastern Cape 
 
This PPP project, an 80-bed hospital, reached financial closure in June 2003 and consists of a 
revitalised, refurbished and upgraded modern hospital, with a long-term maintenance and non-
clinical services agreement (Table 37).  As a co-location hospital, various medical facilities are 
shared between the private and public sectors.  The private operator is Metro-Star Hospital. 
 
Table 37: Humansdorp District Hospital. 
Case Study / Province Humansdorp – Eastern Cape 
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Rationale / Objectives of PPP Upgrading, expansion and maintenance 
Sector Health 
PPP model DFBOT 
Contract duration 20 years 
Investment level 18.9 million 
Risk allocation Operational risk to private party 
Financing structure Equity: 90%, Govt: 10% 
PPP actors DoH, Metro-Star and Ignis 
 
 
4.3.8   Case I: Head Office Accommodation, Department of Trade and Industry, Gauteng 
 
The Head Office Accommodation project is a 25-year design, finance, build, operate and transfer 
type PPP, for the multi-purpose trade and industry campus, located on a 4ha site on Nelson 
Mandela Drive (Table 38). The project was initiated in January 2001 and reached financial closure 
in August, 2003. 
 
Table 38: Head Office Accommodation. 
Case Study / Province Office Accommodation – Gauteng 
Rationale / Objectives of PPP Asset management and support services 
Sector Housing 
PPP model DFBOT 
Contract duration 25 years 
Investment level R 870 million 
Risk transfer N/A 
Financing structure Debt: 80%,Equity: 8%, Contribution :12% 
PPP actors DTI, Ignis, Utho Capital and Standard Bank. 
 
 
4.3.9   Case J: Cradle of Humankind – Maropeng, Departments of Finance and Tourism 
 
The Cradle of Humankind World Heritage PPP project in Gauteng, a ten-year DBOT project, 
reached financial closure in October 2003 (Table 39).   
Table 39: Cradle of Humankind (Maropeng). 
Case Study / Province Cradle of Humankind – Gauteng 
Rationale / Objectives of PPP Scientific research, education and tourism 
Sector Tourism 
PPP model DBOT 
Contract duration 10 years 
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Investment level Not available 
Risk transfer Operation risk to private party 
Financing structure Equity: 100 % 
PPP actors Dept. of Finance and Economic Affairs, 
PriceWaterhouse, Furneaux Stewart Gapp 
 
4.3.10   Case K: Social Payment Grant System, Department of Social Development, Free State. 
 
The Free State province signed a three-year PPP deal with AllPay (Pty) Ltd., in April 2004 for the 
Social Grant Payment System (Table 40).  The short period for the deal was due to the 
anticipated creation of a national agency for managing social grants. The deal envisaged a 28% 
savings in cost of delivery social grant services (PPP Quarterly, 2004). 
 
Table 40: Social Payment Grant  
Case Study / Province Social Payment System – Free State 
Rationale / Objectives of PPP Efficient delivery of social grants 
Sector Social Security 
PPP model DFO 
Contract duration 3 years 
Investment level R260 million 
Risk  transfer Operational risk to the private party 
Financing structure Equity: 100 % 
PPP actors Dept. of Social Development, Ernst and Young 
and AllPay (Pty) Ltd. 
 
 
4.3.11   Case L: Ilembe Water Concession, Ilembe District Municipality, KwaZulu Natal 
 
Located in South Africa’s KwaZulu-Natal province, the then Borough of Dolphin Coast, which now 
falls within the Ilembe district, signed a 30-year concession contract in 1999 with Siza Water 
Company.  The contract provided for the overseeing, managing, and implementation of the 
provision of water and sanitation services within the then Borough of Dolphin Coast municipal 
boundary.  However, the geographical coverage area for the contract changed as a result of the 
restructuring and demarcation of municipal boundaries (Robbins, 2003).  Issues which arose out 
of these changes are not the subject of this research, but nevertheless would present greater 
insights on operational problems of PPPs should it be researched further. 
 
The BODC municipality chose the PPP approach for water and sanitation provision, because the 
municipality lacked adequate funding and experience to upgrade and expand services to cater for 
growing investment and management responsibility. 
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Table 41: Ilembe Water Concession  
Case Study / Province Ilembe Water Concession – KwaZulu Natal 
Rationale / Objectives of PPP Efficient water provision management 
Sector Water 
PPP model DBOT 
Contract duration 30 years 
Investment level 18 million 
Risk transfer Operational risk to private party 
Financing structure N/A 
PPP actors Ilembe, Siza, SAUR & Metropolitan Life 
 
 
4.3.12   Case M: The Pretoria to Maputo N4 Toll Road, Trans African Concessions 
 
The N4 represents a unique trans-boundary PPP agreement, signed between the governments of 
Mozambique and South Africa in 1996, for a 30-year period (Table 42).  Trans African 
Concessions (TRAC) designed and built it, and is now operating the N4 Toll Road from Witbank, 
South Africa to Maputo, Mozambique.  Control and management of the N4 Toll Road will revert 
back to the two governments at the expiry of the concession period. 
 
Table 42: N4 Toll Road  
Case Study / Province N4 Toll Road – Gauteng, Mpumalanga 
Rationale / Objectives of PPP Design, build & efficient operation of N4 road 
Sector Transportation 
PPP model DFBOT 
Contract duration 30 year 
Investment level R3 billion (1996 estimates) 
Risk  transfer Commercial risk shared 
Financing structure Equity: 20% and Debt: 80% 
PPP actors RSA, MZE, SANRAL, TRAC, DBSA, Rand 
Merchant, ABSA, Nedcor, Standard, FNB, and 
Mine Employees and Officials Pension Fund. 
 
4.3.13   Case N: Correctional Facilities in South Africa 
 
The Departments of Correctional Services (DCS) and Public Works used a model of privately built 
and operated prisons to establish this PPP (Table 43).  The above model was based on UK 
models.  The South African government signed two 25-year concessions for maximum security 
prisons in Bloemfontein and Louis Trichadt as part of the Department of Public Works’ Asset 
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Procurement and Operating Partnership Systems (APOPS) in the year 2000, at a total cost of 
R1.7 billion.  The consortium that developed the PPP is responsible for designing, building, 
financing, operating and transferring the prisons back to the government at end of concession. 
 
Table 43: Correctional Facilities  
Case Study / Province Correctional Facilities - Bloemfontein, Free State 
Rationale / Objectives of PPP Efficient management of correctional services 
Sector Correctional 
PPP model DFBOT 
Contract duration 25 years 
Investment level R1.7 billion 
Risk  transfer Operational risk to private party 
Financing structure Debt: Equity: 
PPP actors DCS and others 
 
 
4.3.14   Case O: N3 Toll Concession – Cedara in KwaZulu-Natal to Heidelberg in Gauteng 
 
This 30-year concession is part of the South African government’s efforts at developing 
infrastructure through alternative sources such as PPPs, so as to relieve the burden of financing 
public infrastructure, through tax-based revenues.  According to SANRAL (2006) the N3 Toll 
Road Project represents one successful PPP case that can be replicated in other parts of the 
country.  The value of the N3 Toll Road Project was R3.5 billion, covering a distance of 418 
kilometres from Cedara in KwaZulu-Natal, to Heidelberg in Gauteng Province.  The project 
received the 1999 Project Finance International Deal of the Year Award (SANRAL, 2006).  The 
aims of this project were to: reduce congestion; reduce transport costs; reduce cost of goods; 
enable faster, safer and more efficient transport and reduce travelling time between Durban and 
Johannesburg.2 
 
Table 44: N3 Toll Concession  
Case Study / Province Albert Luthuli Hospital – KwaZulu Natal 
Rationale / Objectives of PPP Faster, safer and more efficient transport 
Sector Transportation 
PPP model DFBOT 
Contract duration 30-Years 
Investment Value R3.5 billion 
Risk transfer Design and operational risk to private party 
                                                
2
 The issues of decongestion, transport & goods costs, speed, safety, efficiency and reduced traveling time 
on the  N3 toll road are ideal for further research to contribute more towards the body of PPP knowledge. 
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Financing structure Equity: 85%, Debt: 15% 
PPP actors N3TC 
 
 
4.3.15   Case P: Queenstown Water Concession, Queenstown 
 
Table 45: Queenstown Water Concession  
Case Study / Province Queenstown Water Concession – E/Cape 
Rationale / Objectives of PPP N/A 
Sector Water 
PPP model N/A 
Contract duration N/A 
Investment level N/A 
Risk  transfer N/A 
Financing structure N/A 
PPP actors N/A 
 
 
4.3.16   Case Q: Nelspruit Water Concession, Ehlanzeni District Municipality, Mpumalanga 
 
The controversy-ridden Nelspruit Water concession faced a lot of challenges from the labour 
union movement.  The contract was finally signed in April 1999, despite strong opposition from 
the South African Municipal Workers Union (SAMWU) and the Congress of South African Trade 
Unions (COSATU), to extend the coverage of services to the town’s poorer areas (Table 46). 
 
Table 46: Nelspruit Water Concession  
Case Study / Province Nelspruit Water Concession – Mpumalanga 
Rationale / Objectives of PPP N/A 
Sector Water 
PPP model N/A 
Contract duration N/A 
Investment level N/A 
Risk  transfer N/A 
Financing structure N/A 
PPP actors N/A 
 
 
4.3.17   Case R: Amanzu Abantu Water Concession Water Project, Eastern Cape 
There is hardly any information available about this concession. However, the first long-term 
municipal public/private partnerships, concluded mostly in the late 1980s and early 1990s 
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included towns like Stutterheim, Fort Beaufort, and Queenstown. These towns entered into 
management contracts for water and sanitation. 
Table 47: Amanzu Abantu Water Concession 
Case Study / Province Amanzu Abantu Water Concession – Eastern 
Cape 
Rationale / Objectives of PPP N/A 
Sector Water 
PPP model N/A 
Contract duration N/A 
Investment level N/A 
Risk  transfer N/A 
Financing structure N/A 
PPP actors N/A 
 
 
4.3.18   Case S: Fleet Management, Eastern Cape Department of Transport 
 
The Fleet Management PPP project, initiated by the Eastern Cape Department of Transport 
(ECDoT), is a pioneering and innovative restructuring of the former Mayibuye Transport 
Corporation (MTC) (Table 48).  According to the PPP Quarterly (2002), it had been operating on a 
government subsidy.  In November 2001, the ECDoT appointed Deloitte & Touche Management 
Solutions as Transaction Advisors to conduct an options analysis and feasibility study, and drive 
the procurement process.  The ECDoT PPP project is among twelve projects signed in terms of 
the Treasury Regulation 16, as at January 2006. 
 
Table 48: Fleet Management  
Case Study / Province Fleet Management, Eastern Cape 
Rationale / Objectives of PPP Provide affordable & accessible transport 
Sector Transport 
PPP model DFO 
Contract duration 5 years 
Investment level R 553 million 
Risk  transfer Operational risk to private party 
Financing structure Debt: 100% 
PPP actors Fleet Africa, ECDoT and Rand Merchant  
 
 
4.3.19   Case S: Bakwena Platinum Toll Road PPP project 
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The Bakwena Platinum Toll Road is a good example of the major role being played by PPPs in 
the development of South Africa’s infrastructure (Table 49).  The 30-year concession is valued at 
R3.5 billion.  The Highway comprises two of the main access roads to Pretoria: the N4-West, 
linking Pretoria to the Botswana Border - 290 kilometres, and the N1-North, connecting Pretoria to 
Warmbaths - 90 kilometres and ultimately, to Zimbabwe. 
 
Table 49: Bakwena Platinum Toll Road* 
Case Study / Province Bakwena Platinum Highway 
Rationale / Objectives of PPP Build, upgrade and maintain 
Sector Transportation 
PPP model DBOT 
Contract duration 30 years 
Investment level R 3.5 billion 
Risk  transfer Operational risk to private party 
Financing structure Debt and Equity 
PPP actors Bakwena, ABSA, NIB, Nedbank, EIB, and SANRAL  
 
4.4   Survey Data 
 
4.4.1   Part I: Project Background 
 
Tables 50 to 56 summary data relative to each project examined and include: sector responses; 
PPP project models; contract durations; investment levels; responsibility transfer, and PPP actors. 
Table 50: Sectors Responses 
Response PPP Sector 
No. % 
Transportation 3 25.0 
Health 3 25.0 
Water 3 25.0 
Housing 0 0.0 
Tourism 0 0.0 
Social Security 0 0.0 
Correctional / Legal 0 0.0 
Other 3 25.0 
 
Table 51: PPP project models 
Response PPP model 
No. % 
Service Contract (SC) 6 50.0 
Design Finance Operate (DFO) 0 0.0 
Design Finance Build Operate Transfer (DFBOT) 5 41.7 
Joint Venture 1 8.3 
Other 0 0.0 
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Table 52: Contract duration  
Response Duration 
No. % 
≤ 5 years  2 16.7 
> 5 ≤ 10 years 3 25.0 
> 10 ≤ 20 years 3 25.0 
> 20 ≤ 30 years 4 33.3 
> 30 years 0 0.0 
 
Table 53: Investment level  
Response Investment Level (Rand) 
No. % 
≤ 10 m  1 8.3 
> 10 ≤ 20 m 0 0.0 
> 20 ≤ 30 m 2 16.7 
> 30 ≤ 40m 1 8.3 
> 40 m 8 66.7 
 
Table 54: Responsibility transfer 
Response Responsibility transfer 
No. % 
Fully public  1 8.3 
70 Public / 30 Private 5 41.7 
50 Public / 50 Private 0 0.0 
30 Public / 70 Private 3 25.0 
Fully private 3 25.0 
 
Table 55: Finance structure 
Response Financing structure 
No. % 
Fully public  2 16.7 
70 Public / 30 Private 1 8.3 
50 Public / 50 Private 2 16.7 
30 Public / 70 Private 4 33.3 
Fully private 3 25.0 
 
Table 56: PPP actors 
Response PPP Actor 
No. % 
Public entity 3 25.0 
Consultant 2 16.7 
Contractor 0 0.0 
Operator 2 16.7 
Transaction advisor 1 8.3 
Financier 1 8.3 
Other 3 25.0 
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4.4.2   Part II: Perceptions on performance of PPP projects 
 
A self-report data collection instrument, using a five-point Likert scale was used to measure the 
opinions of people from diverse backgrounds who were involved directly or indirectly in South 
African PPP projects.  Tables 57 to 86 indicate the perceptions of respondents relative to various 
performance related aspects of South African PPPs in terms of percentage responses to a scale 
of 1 to 5, and a mean score (MS) ranging between 1.00 and 5.00. MSs were computed for each 
statement to enable interpretation of the percentages relative to each point on the response scale. 
Given that there are five points on the scale, and that 5 - 1 = 4, the ranges were determined by 
dividing 4 by 5 which equates to 0.8.  Consequently, the ranges and their definitions are as 
follows: 
 
• > 4.20 ≤ 5.00: between agree and strongly agree / strongly agree, or often to always / 
 always; 
• > 3.40 ≤ 4.20: between  neutral and agree / agree, or sometimes to often / often; 
• > 2.60 ≤ 3.40: between disagree and neutral / neutral, or rarely to sometimes /               
sometimes; 
• > 1.80 ≤ 2.60: between strongly disagree and disagree / disagree, or never to rarely / 
rarely, and 
• > 1.00 ≤ 1.80: between strongly disagree to disagree, or never to rarely. 
 
4.4.2.1. Costs and Affordability 
 
Table 57: Cost savings  
Response Frequency   
No. % 
Mean score 
Always 4 33.3 
Often 5 42.0 
Sometimes 3 25.0 
Rarely 0 0.0 
Never 0 0.0 
4.08 
 
Respondents were required to indicate the frequency ‘PPP procurement delivers cost savings in 
comparison to conventional procurement’.  Given that the MS is 4.08 (> 3.40 ≤ 4.20), PPP 
procurement can be deemed to deliver cost savings in comparison to conventional procurement 
between sometimes to often / often (Table 57). 
 
Table 58: Factual Data 
Response Frequency 
No. % 
Mean score 
Always 0 0.0 
Often 5 42.0 
Sometimes 6 50.0 
Rarely 1 8.0 
3.50 
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Never 0 0.0 
 
With respect to whether cost savings can be assessed with reference to factual data, rather than 
through comparisons with the assumptions used in the Public Sector Comparators, the resultant 
MS of 3.50 (> 3.40 ≤ 4.20) indicates that the frequency of such assessment rather than through 
comparisons, can be deemed to be more appropriate between sometimes and often / often (Table 
58). 
 
Table 59: Affordability 
Response Frequency 
No. % 
Mean score 
Always 4 33.0 
Often 2 17.0 
Sometimes 3 25.0 
Rarely 3 25.0 
Never 0 0.0 
4.08 
 
Based upon the MS of 4.08 (> 3.40 ≤ 4.20), respondents can be deemed to be of the opinion that 
‘various implementing agencies are able to afford project transaction costs’, between sometimes 
and often / often (Table 59). 
 
Table 60: Transaction costs subsidies 
Response Frequency 
No. % 
Mean score 
Always 2 17.0 
Often 4 33.0 
Sometimes 1 8.0 
Rarely 4 33.0 
Never 1 8.0 
3.81 
 
The MS of 3.81 (> 3.40 ≤ 4.20) indicates that respondents can be deemed to be of the opinion 
that ‘PPP transaction costs are subsidised in South Africa’ between sometimes and often / often 
(Table 60).  
 
Table 61: High transaction costs  
Response Frequency 
No. % 
Mean score 
Always 1 8.0 
Often 6 50.0 
Sometimes 3 25.0 
Rarely 1 8.0 
Never 1 8.0 
3.55 
 
The MS of 3.55 (> 3.40 ≤ 4.20) presented in Table 61 indicates that respondents can be deemed 
to be of the opinion that ‘high transaction costs are a major constraint for faster deal flow’, 
between sometimes and often / often. 
 
   
   
133 
The overall MS of 3.80 (> 3.40 ≤ 4.20) for all the five statements included in the category of ‘costs 
and affordability’, indicates that respondents can be deemed to be of  the opinion that the 
contentions expressed in the statements apply between sometimes and often / often. 
 
4.4.2.2   Budget 
 
Table 62: PPP benefits  
Response Frequency 
No. % 
Mean score 
Strongly agree 7 58.0 
Agree 3 25.0 
Neutral 2 17.0 
Disagree 0 0.0 
Strongly disagree 0 0.0 
4.41 
 
The MS of 4.41 (> 4.20 ≤ 5.00) indicates that the degree of concurrence relative to the statement 
‘the use of PPPs delivers benefits due to budget restrictions in the public sector capital budgets’ 
can be deemed to be between agree and strongly agree / strongly agree (Table 62). 
 
Table 63: Investment acceleration 
Response Frequency 
No. % 
Mean score 
Strongly agree 9 75.0 
Agree 3 25.0 
Neutral 0 0.0 
Disagree 0 0.0 
Strongly disagree 0 0.0 
4.75 
 
Given that the MS is 4.75 (> 4.20 ≤ 5.00), the degree of concurrence relative to the statement 
‘PPP procurement brings forward investment and / or ensures that optimal maintenance 
strategies are followed’ can be deemed to be between agree and strongly agree / strongly agree 
(Table 63). 
 
The overall MS of 4.58 (> 4.20 ≤ 5.00) for the two statements included in the category of ‘budget’, 
indicates that the overall degree of concurrence relative to the statements can be deemed to be 
between agree and strongly agree / strongly agree. 
 
4.4.2.3   Risk Transfer 
 
Table 64: Risk management system  
Response Frequency 
No. % 
Mean score 
Strongly agree 7 58.0 
Agree 4 34.0 
Neutral 1 8.0 
Disagree 0 0.0 
4.50 
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Strongly disagree 0 0.0 
 
Based upon the MS of 4.50 (> 4.20 ≤ 5.00) presented in Table 64, the degree of concurrence 
relative to the statement ‘successful PPPs require the existence of an adequate risk management 
system, for appropriate transfer of risks to the party best suited to manage it at least cost’ can be 
deemed to be between agree and strongly agree / strongly agree. 
 
Table 65: Risk management training   
Response Frequency 
No. % 
Mean score 
Strongly agree 8 67.0 
Agree 2 16.5 
Neutral 2 16.5 
Disagree 0 0.0 
Strongly disagree 0 0.0 
4.52 
 
Given that the MS is 4.52 (> 4.20 ≤ 5.00), the concurrence relative to the statement  ‘PPP risk 
management training and awareness, is necessary to ensure that project risks are adequately 
identified and mitigation strategies are followed’ can be deemed to be  between agree and 
strongly agree / strongly agree (Table 65). 
 
Table 66: Risk is transferred in practice. 
Response Frequency 
No. % 
Mean score 
Strongly agree 5 41.7 
Agree 4 33.3 
Neutral 3 25.0 
Disagree 0 0.0 
Strongly disagree 0 0.0 
4.17 
 
The MS of 4.17 (> 3.40 ≤ 4.20) indicates that the degree of concurrence relative to the statement 
‘risk is transferred in practice’ can be deemed to be between neutral and agree / agree (Table 66). 
 
Table 67: Risk allocation 
Response Frequency 
No. % 
Mean score 
Strongly agree 1 8.3 
Agree 7 58.3 
Neutral 2 16.7 
Disagree 1 8.3 
Strongly disagree 1 8.3 
3.66 
 
The MS of 3.66 (> 3.40 ≤ 4.20) indicates that the degree of concurrence relative to the statement 
‘it is always clear where risk lies in PPP projects’ can be deemed to be between neutral and agree 
/ agree (Table 67). 
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Table 68: Risk shifting 
Response Frequency 
No. % 
Mean score 
Strongly agree 1 8.3 
Agree 6 50.0 
Neutral 1 8.3 
Disagree 3 25.0 
Strongly disagree 1 8.3 
3.75 
 
The MS of 3.75 (> 3.40 ≤ 4.20) indicates that the degree of concurrence relative to the  statement 
‘there is evidence of contractors or customers seeking to shift risk to the other party, after signing 
the contract’ can be deemed to be between neutral and agree / agree (Table 68) 
 
The overall MS of 4.12 (> 3.40 ≤ 4.20) for the five statements included in the category of ‘risk 
transfer’, indicates that the overall degree of concurrence relative to the statements can be 
deemed to be between neutral and agree / agree. 
 
4.4.2.4   Policy Framework and Guidelines 
 
Table 69: PPP effectiveness and sustainability  
Response Frequency 
No. % 
Mean score 
Strongly agree 8 66.7 
Agree 2 16.7 
Neutral 2 16.7 
Disagree 0 0.0 
Strongly disagree 0 0.0 
4.50 
 
The MS of 4.50 (> 4.20 ≤ 5.00)  indicates that the degree of concurrence relative to the statement 
‘the existence of an effective and sustainable legal and regulatory framework, is essential for 
promoting and fostering successful PPPs’ can be deemed to be between agree and strongly 
agree / strongly agree (Table 69). 
 
Table 70: Credibility of legal and regulatory framework 
Response Frequency 
No. % 
Mean score 
Strongly agree 6 50.0 
Agree 3 25.0 
Neutral 2 16.7 
Disagree 1 8.3 
Strongly disagree 0 0.0 
4.33 
 
The MS of 4.33 (> 4.20 ≤ 5.00)  indicates that the degree of concurrence relative to the statement 
‘there exists a credible legal and regulatory framework in South Africa, for the implementation of 
PPP projects’ can be deemed to be between agree and strongly agree / strongly agree (Table 
70). 
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Table 71: Private sector participation 
Response Frequency 
No. % 
Mean score 
Strongly agree 4 33.3 
Agree 2 16.7 
Neutral 3 25.0 
Disagree 3 25.0 
Strongly disagree 0 0.0 
4.08 
 
Given that the MS is 4.08 (> 3.40 ≤ 4.20) that the degree of concurrence relative to the statement 
‘the government is committed to private sector participation in infrastructure development and 
service delivery’ can be deemed to be between neutral and agree / agree (Table 71). 
 
Table 72: Market access and competition 
Response Frequency 
No. % 
Mean  score 
Strongly agree 0 0.0 
Agree 8 66.7 
Neutral 3 25.0 
Disagree 1 8.3 
Strongly disagree 0 0.0 
3.75 
 
The MS of 3.75 (> 3.40 ≤ 4.20) indicates that the degree of concurrence relative to the statement 
‘the existing policy framework environment supports open market access and fair PPP 
competition’ can be deemed to be between neutral and agree / agree (Table 72). 
 
Table 73: Public interest and value added  
Response Frequency 
No. % 
Mean score 
Strongly agree 3 25.0 
Agree 7 58.3 
Neutral 1 8.3 
Disagree 1 8.3 
Strongly disagree 0 0.0 
4.16 
 
Based upon the MS of 4.16 (> 3.40 ≤ 4.20), respondents can be deemed to be of the opinion that 
‘PPPs protect public interest and maximise value added for projects’, between neutral and agree / 
agree (Table 73). 
 
Table 74: Investment climate  
Response Frequency 
No. % 
Mean score 
Strongly agree 4 33.3 
Agree 5 41.7 
Neutral 3 33.3 
Disagree 0 8.3 
Strongly disagree 0 0.0 
4.08 
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The MS of 4.08 (> 3.40 ≤ 4.20) indicates that the degree of concurrence relative to the statement 
‘the existing investment climate in South Africa promotes a viable and sustainable PPP project 
system’ can be deemed to be between neutral and agree / agree (Table 74). 
 
Table 75: Effective PPP Options 
Response Frequency 
No. % 
Mean score 
Strongly agree 2 16.7 
Agree 5 41.7 
Neutral 4 33.3 
Disagree 1 8.3 
Strongly disagree 0 0.0 
3.83 
 
Table 75 depicts the MS as 3.83 (>3.40 ≤ 4.20), which indicates the degree of concurrence 
relative to the statement ‘the current PPP guidelines in South Africa provide adequate opportunity 
to assess the most effective type of PPP, for a given project’ can be deemed to be between 
neutral and agree / agree. 
 
Table 76: PPP policy environment  
Response Frequency 
No. % 
Mean score 
Strongly agree 0 0.0 
Agree 4 33.3 
Neutral 6 50.0 
Disagree 2 16.7 
Strongly disagree 0 0.0 
3.50 
 
Given that the MS is 3.50 (> 3.40 ≤ 4.20) the concurrence relative to the statement ‘the policy 
environment favours PPP growth in South Africa’ can be deemed to be between neutral and 
agree / agree (Table 76). 
 
Table 77: Consistency of PPP policies 
Response Frequency 
No. % 
Mean score 
Strongly agree 1 8.3 
Agree 2 16.7 
Neutral 6 50.0 
Disagree 2 16.7 
Strongly disagree 1 8.3 
3.33 
 
The MS of 3.33 (> 2.60 ≤ 3.40) presented in Table 77, indicates that the degree of concurrence 
relative to the statement ‘policies relative to PPPs are consistent with other government policies, 
i.e. land use, social policies and so on’, can be deemed to be between disagree and neutral / 
neutral. 
 
Table 78: PPP agreements. 
Frequency Response Mean score 
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No. % 
Strongly agree 4 33.3 
Agree 4 33.3 
Neutral 2 16.7 
Disagree 1 8.3 
Strongly disagree 1 8.3 
3.91 
 
Table 78 depicts a MS of 3.91 (> 3.40 ≤ 4.20), which indicates that the respondents’ concurrence 
with the statement ‘there is sufficient legislative authority for entering into PPP agreements’ can 
be deemed to be between neutral and agree / agree. 
 
Table 79: Management of PPPs. 
Response Frequency 
No. % 
Mean score 
Strongly agree 2 16.7 
Agree 4 33.3 
Neutral 4 33.3 
Disagree 2 16.7 
Strongly disagree 0 0.0 
3.83 
 
The MS of 3.83 (> 3.40 ≤ 4.20) indicates that the degree of concurrence relative to the statement 
‘there is sufficient legislation to support the management and supervisory role of the public sector 
in PPPs’ can be deemed to be between neutral and agree / agree (Table 79). 
 
Table 80:    Debt agreements by the PPP agencies. 
Response Frequency 
No. % 
Mean score 
Strongly agree 0 0.0 
Agree 7 58.3 
Neutral 4 33.3 
Disagree 1 8.3 
Strongly disagree 0 0.0 
3.66 
 
Given that the MS is 3.66 (> 3.40 ≤ 4.20), the degree of concurrence relative to the statement 
‘there is sufficient authorisations and leeway, to enter into debt agreements by the PPP agencies’ 
can be deemed to be between neutral and agree / agree (Table 80). 
 
Table 81:    PPP procurement, management and auditing. 
Response Frequency 
No. % 
Mean score 
Strongly agree 3 25.0 
Agree 2 16.7 
Neutral 4 33.3 
Disagree 3 25.0 
Strongly disagree 0 0.0 
3.92 
 
The MS of 3.92 (> 3.40 ≤ 4.20) indicates that the degree of concurrence relative to the statement 
‘existing PPP regulations and guidelines provide for an efficient and effective mechanism, for the 
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procurement, management and auditing of PPP projects in South Africa’ can be deemed to be 
between neutral and agree / agree (Table 81). 
 
The overall MS of 3.91 (> 3.40 ≤ 4.20) for all thirteen statements included in the category of 
‘policy and regulatory framework’, indicates that the overall degree of concurrence relative to the 
statements can be deemed to be between neutral and agree / agree. 
 
4.4.2.5   Project Management Competency Levels 
 
Table 82: Capacity constraints 
Response Frequency 
No. % 
Mean score 
Strongly agree 3 25.0 
Agree 7 58.3 
Neutral 0 0.0 
Disagree 2 16.7 
Strongly disagree 0 0.0 
4.25 
 
Given that the MS is 4.25 (> 4.20 ≤ 5.00), the degree of concurrence relative to the statement ‘the 
slow deal flow for PPP projects in South Africa, is due to capacity constraints in provincial 
governments and municipalities’ can be deemed to be between agree and strongly agree / 
strongly agree (Table 82). 
 
Table 83: Project management approach  
Response Frequency 
No. % 
Mean score 
Strongly agree 4 33.3 
Agree 5 41.7 
Neutral 3 25.0 
Disagree 0 0.0 
Strongly disagree 0 0.0 
4.08 
 
The MS of 4.08 (> 3.40 ≤ 4.20) presented in Table 83 indicates that the degree of concurrence 
relative to the statement ‘the lack of, or an inadequate project management approach, slows 
down the implementation of PPP projects’ can be deemed to be between neutral and agree / 
agree. 
 
The overall MS of 4.20 (> 3.40 ≤ 4.20) for the two statements included in the category of ‘project 
management’ indicates that the overall degree of concurrence relative to the statements can be 
deemed to be between neutral and agree / agree. 
 
4.4.2.6   PPP Awareness and Training 
 
Table 84: Lack of PPP training and awareness 
Frequency Response Mean score 
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No. % 
Strongly agree 4 33.3 
Agree 5 41.7 
Neutral 0 0.0 
Disagree 3 25.0 
Strongly disagree 0 0.0 
4.25 
 
Given that the MS is 4.25 (> 4.20 ≤ 5.00), the concurrence relative to the statement ‘a lack of PPP 
training and awareness hampers PPP growth and development’ can be deemed to be between 
agree and strongly agree / strongly agree (Table 84). 
 
Table 85: The level of PPP awareness and training.  
Response Frequency 
No. % 
Mean score 
Strongly agree 1 8.3 
Agree 2 16.7 
Neutral 2 16.7 
Disagree 5 41.7 
Strongly disagree 2 16.7 
4.08 
 
Table 85 depicts the MS as 4.08 (> 3.40 ≤ 4.20), which indicates that the degree of concurrence 
relative to the statement ‘the level of PPP awareness and training, within the public and private 
sectors in South Africa, is sufficient for PPP development and growth’ can be deemed to be 
between agree and strongly agree / strongly agree. 
 
The overall MS of 4.20 (> 3.40 ≤ 4.20) for the two statements included in the category of ‘PPP 
awareness and training’ indicates that the overall degree of concurrence relative to the 
statements can be deemed to be between neutral and agree / agree. 
 
4.4.2.8 Organizational Level 
Table 86: Organisational Level of Respondents 
Management Level No. % 
Director 4 33.3 
Senior Management 3 25.0 
Middle Management 3 25.0 
Other 2 16.7 
 
Directors (33.3%) predominated in terms of the organisational level of respondents, followed 
jointly by senior management and middle management. This was expected, given that in projects 
of this nature, directors and managers play a more active role in the management of PPP projects 
(Table 86). 
 
In Chapter Five, a systemic model for PPP planning and implementation is evolved and tested for 
appropriateness.
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CHAPTER 5 
 
A SYSTEMIC MODEL FOR PPP PLANNING AND IMPLEMENTATION 
 
5.1   Introduction 
 
This is partial output for a PhD case study being conducted at the Department of Construction 
Management, NMMU, based on Yin (2006) methodology and culminates in the evolution of a 
systemic model for implementation and monitoring of performance of PPP projects in South Africa 
and the Southern Africa Development Corporation (SADC) region.  This is an approach to a 
holistic understanding of the PPP process and the complexity of the interrelationships within the 
PPP environment.  Systemic PPP planning and procurement is a strategic process of translating 
ideas and beliefs into policies and projects.  It treats the total PPP process and the environment 
as one system.  Given a statement of the problem, systemic PPP planning, procurement and 
management provides for a continuously iterative analysis of the PPP cycle and the environment, 
to identify preferred courses of action most likely to lead to the achievement of a given set of 
goals.  
 
The model focuses on the inputs, processes, outputs, outcomes and eventual impact of the PPP 
process.  Currently South Africa is experiencing an era of shifting accountability in asset and 
service delivery, coupled with the ever-increasing need for producing results.  There is a need to 
ensure that PPP practitioners are provided with an efficient tool, to guide planned activities 
through a sound process that produces results, outcomes and creates the desired impact on 
society.  
 
Systemic models are considered most useful, when developed at the beginning of project 
activities.  This could be at the planning stage of a PPP project, or within a proposed development 
phase, in order to facilitate the coordination of resources.  It is useful for the setting up of realistic 
expectations for outcomes that may result from a PPP project.  However, models are also useful 
for ongoing projects, since they can be used to clarify how current project activities are unfolding.  
This would help to accomplish specific objectives and to identify data sources and collection 
strategies to be used that could help to achieve the expected outcomes. 
 
5.2   Purpose 
 
The purpose of this new systemic PPP model is to: 
 
• Introduce a ‘systems thinking approach’ in the PPP environment; 
• Define the systemic processes that will be used to plan and implement PPP projects; 
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• Clarify the complexity of elements and causal interrelationships within the PPP 
system, and 
• Provide direction for current and future researchers into making new discoveries. 
 
5.3   Scope 
 
The proposed model addresses the processes for PPP project implementation and management 
of end user outputs over the entire project life cycle. 
 
5.4   A Systemic Model 
 
A systemic model is a graphical method of demonstrating relationships between project 
resources, activities, outputs, and outcomes.  Systemic models are planning, implementation and 
monitoring tools that indicate the resources a PPP project will employ, to conduct activities that 
are intended to produce specific, describable, and measurable changes, or results in people, 
organizations, or the broader physical and social environment (Senge, 2006).  
 
It is important to understand the context in which the PPP projects were studied and how they 
unfold, and the basic assumptions related to the purpose of the project and the target systems the 
project is designed to impact upon.  Specific terms are used in systemic modelling that help to 
establish a common foundation for describing and understanding a PPP project process.  
 
The elements of the systemic model, depicted in Figure 7, are displayed in individual cells that are 
read from left to right.  The cells depict a set of ‘if-then’ relationships.  For example, if resources 
are available, then a certain set of activities can be implemented.  Certain outputs, such as a PPP 
agreement, could then be expected and the outputs, if successfully achieved, would then be likely 
to produce the expected outcomes, such as assets and or services.  Finally as a result of 
successful outcomes, the end user / community would enjoy a better quality of life.  
 
5.5   Motivation for a Systemic Model for PPPs 
 
Systemic models are useful tools to demonstrate integrated, systemic planning in relation to the 
achievement of goals and expected outcomes.  Often PPP project proposals may not clearly 
specify the relationship shared among resources, planned activities / outputs, and the benefits 
expected from the PPP project.  The systemic model helps to crystallise the extent to which the 
PPP project has made a difference, or how it can make a difference.  
 
The graphic features of a model serve to depict the relationships among the components of the 
PPP project.  A model provides a common vocabulary to describe elements of project work in a 
way that encourages deeper understanding over a variety of projects.  Once internalised within 
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the PPP sector, this approach will transform the mindset of PPP managers in the way of solving 
PPP-related problems systemically.  
 
The new model will also be an effective tool in communicating the desired results, or effects of a 
PPP project’s scope of work.  It represents a vision of how staff and other stakeholders with input 
into the planning process, intend to produce anticipated results through resources and activities.  
Furthermore, the PPP model is helpful in focussing activities and in clarifying how each is 
expected to contribute to the stated outcomes.  
 
Through linking PPP project elements, activities and resources in a graphic model format, PPP 
actors are better able to monitor the direction of project activities regarding the most important 
project objectives.  Systemic models encourage practical project planning and enable investors to 
envision what can reasonably be expected from the implementation of the planned activities and 
the delivery of intended outputs.  This approach is also extended to risk management of large and 
complex construction projects (Wibowo & Patria, 2007). 
 
According to MacNamara (2006), systemic modelling is a tool that helps to organize the 
relationship between major project activities and anticipated outcomes.  It can be effective in 
planning a PPP project design, implementing project activities, and evaluating project success.  It 
should be noted that while a systemic model demonstrates the relationships shared by PPP 
project elements, such as expected results, changes, or effects, derived through project activities, 
a systemic model does not take the place of the performance indicators within a PPP project 
context.  
 
Relevant performance indicators, or criteria, must still be developed for each specific PPP project.  
Relevant evaluation questions, targeted data and data sources, and data collection strategies, are 
essential elements of a PPP project’s ongoing continuous quality assurance and improvement.  It 
is acknowledged that models are not static; hence there is a need for continuous review and 
improvement.  The intention is to transform the systemic model into a dynamic tool that will assist 
PPP teams in planning, implementation and assessment efforts.  The existing generic PPP model 
adapted from the PPP Unit is shown in Figure 4 below.  
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Figure 4: A Generic PPP Model 
Source: Adapted from National Treasury, PPP Unit website generic PPP model. 
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5.6   The Status Quo 
 
The PPP structure in South Africa is currently governed by both the Public Finance Management 
Act of 1999 and the Municipal Finance Management Act of  2003..  Under these arrangements, 
the National Treasury has evolved a generic PPP project life cycle for national and provincial 
governments.  In addition to this, the MFMA’s PPP regulations help to guide the implementation 
of the PPP projects. 
 
5.7   Project Inception 
 
According to the Gazette Notice No. 27368 (Republic of South Africa, 2005), only the accounting 
officer or the accounting authority of an institution may enter into a PPP agreement on behalf of 
that institution.  Clause 16.3.1 states that as soon as the institution identifies a project that may be 
concluded as a PPP, the accounting officer or accounting authority must in writing: 
 
• Register the PPP with the relevant treasury; 
• Inform the relevant treasury of the expertise within the institution to proceed with a PPP; 
• Appoint a project officer from within or outside the institution, and 
• Appoint a transaction advisor if the relevant treasury so requests (Republic of South 
Africa, 2005). 
 
5.8   Shortcomings - The ’Missing Link’ 
 
The Treasury Regulations, which provide policy direction for the implementation, do not make any 
mention about the following: 
 
• Project management competency levels required for both the accounting officer, 
institution, or officer responsible for implementing the PPP project; 
• The appointment of the project political champion; 
• The appointment of a PPP project manager; 
• The appointment of an independent PPP project auditor; 
• The establishment of the project management office and systems, and 
• PPP education and training. 
It is clear from the current structure and policy arrangements that an accounting officer is 
responsible for PPP agreement management, and that an appointed project officer operates in a 
‘systems vacuum’ to deliver important projects worth millions of rand.  Furthermore, the issues of 
a PPP project champion and independent PPP project auditor are not addressed.  The need for a 
project office and associated systems is also lacking, as well as the policy direction on PPP 
education, training, and awareness. 
   
   
146 
 
An extensive survey of the related literature has been conducted relative to the broad aspects of 
PPP implementation.  However, there is no evidence as to how PPP implementing agencies are 
supposed to address the above issues.  However, it is notable that the MFMA (Republic of South 
Africa, 2005) makes clear provision for the following: 
 
• Competency levels for financial officials; 
• Resources or opportunities for training of officials by the municipality, and 
• External intervention by the National Treasury in training of officials. 
 
The above issues constitute the ‘missing link’ in the existing model for the PPP life cycle process.  
The new PPP systemic model intends to fill this gap. 
 
5.9  Proposed PPP Model 
 
The proposed model consists of the following added functions besides the generic ones as 
depicted in Figure 4. 
 
5.9.1  The Political Champion  
 
This function is targeted at the chief executive level in the form of a Mayor or a Member of the 
Executive Committee (MEC), and will provide input towards political support and broader 
stakeholder consultation relative to PPP procurement.  This role should be seen as a unique, 
active role, as opposed to the passive generic role of politicians, when it comes to the 
implementation of projects of this nature. 
 
5.9.2  The PPP Project Manager 
 
This should be a well-rounded and experienced person in PPP projects’ policies, procedures and 
processes.  The PPP project manager’s principal responsibility is to deliver the project end-item.  
This is the asset or service, within the specified objectives.  Although responsibilities are likely to 
vary, they will usually include: planning, organizing and controlling project resources; selecting 
and organizing the project team; interfacing with stakeholders; monitoring project status; 
identifying technical and functional problems; solving problems; and closing the project.  The PPP 
project manager should establish a fully functional institutional framework, consisting of a project 
support office, staff and relevant infrastructure.  He should have clearly defined roles and tacit 
authority to initiate, plan and management the PPP Agreement for PPP projects.  
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5.9.3  PPP Project Auditor 
 
The PPP project auditor is expected to establish and administer project-monitoring procedures 
during contract negotiations and implement them during operation to ensure fulfilment of quality-
related requirements for the asset and, or service.  The overall responsibilities encompass raising 
awareness of quality and instituting means for improving PPP operations, to meet desired goals.  
 
5.9.4  PPP Training and Awareness 
 
The solution of PPP-related problems in South Africa, and in the SADC region requires a 
paradigm shift by PPP actors, from traditional ‘systematic thinking’ to ‘systemic thinking’.  The 
problems must be viewed from a broader, real world context.  PPP actors must create learning 
organizations, to view issues from a systems perspective.  Systemic thinking employs the concept 
of a system: an organized whole in which parts are related.  By continuous training and by 
creating awareness, the model will contribute to the creation of a PPP-friendly environment that is 
supportive of the whole process.  The current problems of slow deal flow are due to several 
factors, both internal and external, to the PPP delivery system.  
 
5.9.5  Motivation for the New Model 
 
The new PPP Model is based on systems theory developed in the 1950s.  The model adopts the 
systems thinking viewpoint, where role players are supposed to see the broader picture of 
ongoing, reciprocal relationships, which a PPP project may be exhibiting (Andrew, 1999).  One of 
the core impediments to a systems thinking approach, relative to PPP processes, is a lack of 
project management expertise.  The new model proposes to encapsulate a fully-fledged role of a 
qualified project manager, complete with an integrated project management system in the delivery 
processes.  The project management system that is envisaged is rooted in the following simplified 
systems engineering flow chart shown in Figure 5.  The model functions are performed in parallel 
and are iterative in manner. Figures 6, 7 and 8 depict the proposed, tasks linkage and causal loop  
diagrams respectively. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Generic Systems Engineering Flow Chart 
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Figure 6: Proposed PPP structure 
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Figure 7: Model Systemic Phases, Parallel and Linked Tasks 
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Figure 8: Causal Loop Diagram
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5.10 Testing of New Model 
 
The new PPP systemic model was tested for appropriateness by surveying sixty PPP and non-PPP 
participants, who were attending an international conference on ‘Financing Infrastructure in Africa 
through Public Private Partnerships’ held at the Saint Georges Hotel, Johannesburg on 28 and 29 
August 2007.  The researcher administered a two-page questionnaire during the two-day conference.  
A summary in the form of statements and their related MSs is presented in Table 87 in eight 
categories. 
 
Table 87: Summary of test results 
A. Infrastructure & poor service delivery Mean Score 
1 Lack of infrastructure and poor service delivery activates policy 
reforms to address the problem 3.89 
2 Service delivery problems decrease with an increase in investment 
levels 2.95 
3 Service delivery problems result in increased demand for policy 
reforms 3.86 
4 Poor service delivery leads to an increase in PPP agreements closure 2.78 
5 Poor service delivery leads to high demand for more PPP experts 3.43 
B. Project management  
6 Increased PPP tenders leads to increased demand for project 
management services 3.81 
7 Increased use of project management approach facilitates PPP deal 
flow / throughput 3.81 
 
C. PPP awareness and training Mean Score 
8 A PPP culture exists within the public sector 3.03 
9 A PPP culture exists within the private sector 3.38 
10 A PPP culture exists within the built environment 3.54 
11 PPP expertise is pervasive within the public sector   2.68 
12 PPP expertise is pervasive within the private sector   3.38 
13 PPP expertise is pervasive within the built environment   3.22 
14 Increased demand for PPP monitoring increases demand for PPP 
experts. 4.19 
15 A high demand for monitoring experts increases demand for PPP 
training and awareness and vice versa 3.95 
16 High demand for education and training leads to an increased role for 
universities in the PPP sector 3.73 
17 Tertiary built environment PPP related education is inadequate 3.68 
18 Corrupt practices lead to increase in infrastructure and service delivery 
problems 4.32 
 
D. Investment level Mean Score 
19 Increased PPP agreement throughput facilitates investments 4.22 
20 Increase in PPP agreements increases portfolio of assets and scope 
for service delivery 4.11 
21 High demand for service delivery increases demand for private sector 
investment and expertise 4.32 
22 Increased level of investment leads to a decrease in demand for 2.73 
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infrastructure and service delivery 
 
E. PPP monitoring Mean Score 
23 High throughput for assets / services leads to a high demand for 
monitoring and evaluation services 3.73 
 
F. Policy and regulatory framework Mean Score 
24 Policy reforms lead to the establishment of PPP regulatory agencies 3.76 
25 Policy reforms lead to a reduction in infrastructure and service delivery 
problems 3.14 
26 Establishment of PPP legal and regulatory agencies leads to a 
decrease in need for policy reforms 3.00 
27 PPP legal and regulatory agencies promotes PPP growth 3.81 
28 Closure of more PPP deals leads to reduction in service delivery 
problems 3.51 
 
G. Costs and affordability Mean Score 
29 High transaction costs reduce the number of agencies participating in 
PPP deals 3.89 
30 High transaction costs lead to a decrease in PPP deals output 3.84 
 
H. Risk Transfer Mean Score 
31 Inadequate risk management increases inappropriate risk transfers 4.11 
32 Higher risk projects decreases  investment levels in PPP projects 3.84 
 
 
Given that the MSs of ‘lack of infrastructure and poor service delivery activates policy reforms to 
address the problem’, ‘service delivery problems result in increased demand for policy reforms’, and 
‘poor service delivery leads to high demand for more PPP experts’ are > 3.40 ≤ 4.20, the degree of 
concurrence relative to the statements can be deemed to be between neutral and agree / agree.  
However, given that the MSs of ‘service delivery problems decrease with an increase in investment 
levels’ and ‘poor service delivery leads to an increase in PPP agreements closure’ are > 2.60 ≤ 3.40, 
the degree of concurrence relative to the statements can be deemed to be between disagree and 
neutral / neutral (Table 96). 
 
Furthermore the MS of 3.81 (>3.40 ≤ 4.20) for the category of the statements under project 
management indicates that the degree of concurrence relative to the statements that: ‘Increased PPP 
tenders leads to an increased demand for project management services’ and ‘increased use of a 
project management approach facilitates PPP deal flow / throughput’, can be deemed to be between 
neutral and agree / agree. 
 
The overall MS of 3.55  (>3.40 ≤ 4.20), as shown in the category of ‘PPP awareness and training’ 
indicates that ‘a PPP culture exists within the public sector’, ‘a PPP culture exists within the private 
sector’, ‘a PPP culture exists within the built environment’, PPP expertise is pervasive within the 
public sector’, ‘PPP expertise is pervasive within the private sector’, ‘PPP expertise is pervasive 
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within the built environment’, ‘Increased demand for PPP monitoring increases demand for PPP 
experts’, ‘a high demand for monitoring experts increases demand for PPP training and awareness 
and vice versa’, ‘a high demand for education and training leads to an increased role for universities 
in the PPP sector’, ‘tertiary built environment PPP related education is inadequate’ and ‘corrupt 
practices lead to an increase in infrastructure and service delivery problems’ indicates that the degree 
of concurrence, relative to the statement that: ‘A PPP culture exists within the public sector’, can be 
deemed to be between neutral and agree / agree.  
 
Given that the MS for the category of investment level is 3.85 (>3.40 ≤ 4.20), the degree of 
concurrence relative to the statements ‘Increased PPP agreement throughput facilitates investments’, 
which leads to ‘an increase in PPP agreements increases portfolio of assets and scope for service 
delivery’,  a ‘high demand for service delivery increases demand for private sector investment and 
expertise’, and an increased level of investment leads to a decrease in demand for infrastructure and 
service delivery’ can be deemed to be between neutral and agree / agree. 
 
A MS of 3.73 (>3.40 ≤ 4.20) indicates that the concurrence relative to the statement ‘High throughput 
for assets / services leads to a high demand for monitoring and evaluation services’ can be deemed 
to be between neutral and agree / agree. 
 
The MS of 3.44 (>3.40 ≤ 4.20) for the category of ‘policy and regulatory framework’ indicates that 
respondents’ concurrence relative to the statements that: ‘Policy reforms lead to the establishment of 
PPP regulatory agencies’, ‘leads to a reduction in infrastructure and service delivery problems’, 
’establishment of PPP legal and regulatory agencies leads to a decrease in need for policy reforms’, 
‘PPP legal and regulatory agencies promotes PPP growth and that ‘closure of more PPP deals leads 
to  reduction in service delivery problems’ can be deemed to be between neutral and agree / agree. 
 
Table 96 depicts a MS of 3.87 (> 3.40 ≤ 4.20) for both statements under the category of ‘costs and 
affordability’, which indicates that the concurrence relative to the statements ‘High transaction costs 
reduces number of agencies participating in PPP deals’, and high transaction costs lead to decrease 
in PPP deals output’ can be deemed to be between neutral and agree / agree. 
 
The overall mean score of 3.98 (> 3.40 ≤ 4.20) for both statements under the category of ‘risk 
transfer’ indicates that the overall degree of concurrence relative to the statements ‘inadequate risk 
management increases inappropriate risk transfers’ and ‘higher risk projects decreases investment 
levels in PPP projects’ can be deemed to be between neutral and agree / agree. 
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5.11   Application of the New Model 
 
This model will be applicable to all PPP projects, resource persons, activities and processes that 
have holistic interrelationships (Boisjoly & DeMichiell, 1994).  It is anticipated that PPP and non-PPP 
practitioners in South Africa and the SADC region will use the model. 
 
5.12  Causal Loop Analysis - Results 
 
Table 88: Infrastructure and poor service delivery 
PPP aspect Causal 
effects 
Interventions required 
Lack of infrastructure & poor service delivery Negative Accelerate infrastructure 
development and improve service 
delivery. 
Policy reforms Positive None 
PPP agreements closure Positive None 
Lack of PPP experts Negative Train more PPP experts 
 
Table 89: Project management 
PPP aspect Causal 
effects 
Interventions required 
Increased PPP tenders Negative Accelerate training of PPP project 
managers 
Use of project management approach Positive  None 
 
Table 90: PPP awareness and training 
PPP aspect Causal 
effects 
Interventions required 
PPP culture exists within public, private and built 
environment 
Positive None 
Lack of PPP expertise within the public, private 
and the built environment 
Negative  Train more PPP exerts 
Lack of monitoring experts Negative Train more monitoring experts 
Inadequate tertiary level PPP education Negative Introduce PPP training at tertiary 
level 
Existence of corrupt practices Negative Uphold high professional ethics 
 
Table 91: Investment level 
PPP aspect Causal 
effects 
Interventions required 
Increase in PPP agreement output Positive None 
High demand for service delivery Negative  Increase investments in PPPs 
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Table 92: PPP monitoring 
PPP aspect Causal 
effects 
Interventions required 
High demand for PPP monitoring experts Negative Train more experts  
 
Table 93: Policy and regulatory framework 
PPP aspect Causal 
effects 
Interventions required 
PPP policy reforms Positive  None 
 
Table 94: Costs and affordability 
PPP aspect Causal 
effects 
Interventions required 
High transaction costs Negative Reduce transaction costs through 
standardization of processes 
 
Table 95: Risk transfer 
PPP aspect Causal 
effects 
Interventions required 
Inadequate risk management Negative Train and use Risk Managers 
High risk projects Negative Avoid high risk projects 
 
Tables 88 to 95 depict summaries of causal effects and interventions required relative to the 8 
categories of PPP factors. These causal effects are based on the causal loop diagram representation 
of the internal PPP system structure that underpins the behaviour patterns in the PPP environment.  
A causal loop diagram for the PPP process is shown in Figure 8. This diagram includes elements and 
arrows, which are called causal links. The arrows link the PPP elements and also include a + or – 
sign on each link. A causal link from one element A to another element B is positive, that means a 
change in A produces a change in B in the same direction. A causal link from one element A to 
another element B is negative, that is if a change in A produces a change in B in the opposite 
direction. This notation is also illustrated by the causal loop diagram presented in Figure 8. 
 
The method of systems thinking used over the years and promoted by Senge (2000) provides a tool 
for better understanding complex PPP planning and management problems. The methods have been 
used for over thirty years and are now well established. However, these approaches require a 
mindset shift in the way PPP actors think about the performance of PPP projects. In particular, it is 
necessary that PPP and non-PPP managers move away from looking at isolated events and their 
causes and start to look at the PPP environment as a system made up of interacting and interrelated 
parts. Once there is a shift from the event orientation to focusing on the internal PPP system 
structure, there is a possibility of improving PPP performance. This is because system structure is 
often the underlying sources of difficulty. Unless one corrects system structure deficiencies through 
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specific interventions, it is likely that the problems will resurface, or be replaced by an even more 
difficult problem.  
 
In Chapter Six, the primary conclusions of the study are summarised, discussed and interpreted, and 
where appropriate, recommendations will be made for further research, practice and or 
implementation. 
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CHAPTER   6 
 
6   SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
6.1   Introduction 
 
This chapter contains a summary of the study, which includes a summary of the findings, 
conclusions, recommendations and where appropriate, suggestions for further research, practice and 
/ or implementation. 
 
6.2   Summary of the Study 
 
This study was designed to examine the performance of operational South African PPP projects, 
contribute towards the existing body of knowledge on PPPs, and provide a model for a sustainable 
PPP system in South Africa and beyond. 
 
The performance issues examined, included: project management competency; affordability; level of 
investment; contract type and duration; transfer of responsibilities; risk management; policy and 
guidelines; PPP awareness; and training.  The research was organized around a set of eight 
hypotheses, which were as follows: 
 
6.2.1   First Hypothesis 
 
The low number of PPP projects is due to inadequate project management skills among accounting 
officers and other staff to conceptualise PPP viable projects. 
 
6.2.2   Second Hypothesis 
 
PPP projects are considered unaffordable due to government budgetary constraints, and / or 
inadequate subsidies for PPP projects. 
 
6.2.3   Third Hypothesis 
 
The level of investment in PPP projects depends on the public sector’s marketing strategy, 
involvement, and incentives offered to the private sector. 
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6.2.4   Fourth Hypothesis 
 
The PPP model used for procurement is determined by the type and nature of the project, the 
expected value-for-money, and public interest. 
 
6.2.5   Fifth Hypothesis 
 
The degree of transfer of responsibilities determines the success, or failure of a PPP project. 
 
6.2.6   Sixth Hypothesis 
 
Ineffective risk distribution can lead to huge financial losses and renegotiation of PPP contracts. 
 
6.2.7   Seventh Hypothesis 
 
The existing PPP policy framework and guidelines in South Africa are adequate, if properly 
interpreted and applied can catalyse more PPP projects and spur growth in the infrastructure sector. 
 
6.2.8   Eighth Hypothesis 
 
Sustained PPP awareness, training and community education is fundamental to the mainstreaming 
and success of the PPP sector in South Africa. 
 
To test these hypotheses, eighteen case study projects of operational South African PPP projects, 
consisting of 12 Type I PPP projects, and six Type II PPP projects were selected by the researcher 
using non-probabilistic technique-judgement sampling.  This was based on sound judgement, from 
the National Treasury PPP unit database, as a sample for this study.  A total of 18 PPP project case 
studies were examined.  Thirteen institutions returned questionnaires, representing a response rate of 
63%.  Six case study institutions did not complete and return the questionnaire.  
 
An explanation for this might be that the managers responsible did not want to be associated with an 
assessment of the operational performance of their PPP project.  They might also have been too 
busy, or they might have considered the questions too sensitive.  They may have forgotten to 
complete the questionnaires, or it may have been a combination of these factors. 
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The instrument used for this study consisted of affirmative statements in which respondents had to 
rate items based on a five–point Likert scale.  The instrument consisted of six categories with 38 
statements.  The instrument was developed by the researcher and reviewed by the promoter.  A pilot 
test was conducted using three pioneer respondents drawn from some of the targeted respondent 
institutions to establish reliability and validity. 
 
The instrument consisted of the following eight main categories: costs and affordability; budget; risk 
transfer; legal and regulatory framework; project management, and PPP awareness and training. 
 
The researcher administered the instrument by hosting it on the NMMU website, www.nmmu.ac.za 
with a hypertext URL link, with which respondents could log on. 
 
Survey respondents rated the various categories of statements using a five-point Likert scale: ’never’ 
to ‘always’ relative to frequency, and ’strongly disagree’ to ’strongly agree’ relative to concurrence.  
MSs were computed for each statement to determine the measure of central tendency to enable 
interpretation of the percentage responses.  The hypotheses that were formulated were tested 
empirically.  The test of the hypotheses involved collection and analysis of data.   
 
6.3   Testing of Hypotheses 
Tables 96 to 104 summarise the results of the testing of the hypotheses. The results indicate that all 
the hypotheses are supported. 
 
6.3.1   Project Management 
 
It was determined that the low number of PPP projects was due to inadequate project management 
skills among accounting officers and other staff resulting in the inability to conceptualise viable PPP 
projects. 
 
Table 96: Project Management 
Theoretical Proposition 5-Project Management Mean 
score 
Overall 
mean 
score 
The slow deal flow for PPP projects in South Africa is due to capacity 
constraints in provincial governments and municipalities 4.25 
Lack of or an inadequate project management approach slows down 
the implementation of PPP projects 4.08 
4.20 
 
Table 96 depicts an overall mean score of 4.20 (> 3.40 ≤ 4.20) for the two statements included in the 
category of project management, which indicates that the overall degree of concurrence relative to 
the statements can be deemed to be between neutral and agree / agree. 
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6.3.2   Budget  
 
The costliness of PPP projects is due to government budgetary constraints, and / or inadequate 
subsidies for PPP projects. 
 
Table 97: Budget 
Theoretical Proposition 2: Budget Mean 
score 
Overall 
mean 
score 
The use of PPPs delivers benefits due to budget restrictions in the 
public sector capital budgets. 4.41 
PPP procurement brings forward investment and / or ensures that 
optimal maintenance strategies are followed. 4.75 
4.58 
 
The overall mean score of 4.58 (> 4.20 ≤ 5.00) for the two statements included in the category of 
budget indicates that the overall degree of concurrence relative to the statements can be deemed to 
be between agree and strongly agree / strongly agree (Table 97). 
 
6.3.3   Costs and affordability 
 
The level of investment in PPP projects depends on the public sector’s marketing strategy, 
involvement and incentives to the private sector. 
 
Table 98: Costs and affordability 
Theoretical Proposition 3: Costs and Affordability  Mean 
score 
Overall 
mean 
score 
PPP procurement delivers overall cost savings in comparison to 
conventional procurement. 4.08 
Cost savings can be assessed with reference to factual data, rather 
than through comparisons with the assumptions used in the Public 
Sector Comparators. 
3.50 
The various PPP implementing agencies are able to afford project 
transaction costs? 4.08 
PPP transaction costs are subsidised in South Africa. 3.81 
High transaction costs are a major constraint for faster deal flow. 3.55 
3.80 
 
The overall MS of 3.80 for the five statements included in the category of ‘costs and affordability’ 
indicates that the overall degree of concurrence relative to the statements can be deemed to be 
between neutral and agree / agree (Table 98). 
 
   
   
161 
6.3.4   Relevant PPP model selected 
Table 99: PPP model selected for projects 
PPP model  No. % 
Service Contract (SC) 6 50.0 
Design Finance Operate (DFO) 0 0.0 
Design Finance Build Operate Transfer (DFBOT) 5 41.7 
Joint Venture 1 8.3 
Other 0 0.0 
 
Table 99 indicates the different types of PPP models that are used for procurement  in the various 
projects that were investigated. Service contract model dominates representing 50% operational 
PPPs. A further 41.7% of PPP projects are the DFBOT  type. Joint ventures represent a mere 8.3%.   
 
6.3.5   Responsibility transfer 
 
Table 100: Level of responsibility transfer 
Level of responsibility transfer No. % 
Fully public  1 8.3 
70 Public / 30 Private 5 41.7 
50 Public / 50 Private 0 0.0 
30 Public / 70 Private 3 25.0 
Fully private 3 25.0 
 
The level of responsibility transfer determines the success or failure of a PPP project. Table 100 
depicts the level of responsibility transfer. According to the study the preferred level of responsibility 
transfer is 70 Public / 30 Private as represented by 41.7% responses. Respondents indicate that fully 
private responsibility represents only 25%. Furthermore the results show that 0% projects have 
responsibilities shared on a 50 Public / 50 Private basis. 
 
6.3.6   Risk transfer 
 
Ineffective risk distribution can lead to huge financial losses and renegotiation of PPP contracts. 
 
Table 101: Risk transfer 
Theoretical Proposition 6 – Risk Transfer 
Mean score 
Overall 
mean 
score 
Successful PPPs require existence of an adequate risk management 
system for appropriate transfer of risks to the party best suited to manage 
it at least cost. 
4.50 
PPP risk management training and awareness is necessary to ensure 
that project risks are adequately identified and mitigation strategies are 
followed. 
4.52 
Risk is transferred in practice. 4.17 
4.12 
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It is always clear where risk lies in a PPP project. 3.66 
There is evidence of contractors or customers seeking to shift risk onto 
the other party after signing the contract. 3.75 
 
The overall mean score of 4.12 (> 3.40 ≤ 4.20) for the five statements included in the category of ‘risk 
transfer’ depicted in Table 101 indicates that the respondents’ overall degree of concurrence relative 
to the statements can be deemed to be between neutral and agree / agree. 
 
6.3.7   Policy and regulatory framework 
 
 The existing PPP policy framework and guidelines in South Africa are adequate, if properly 
interpreted and applied and can catalyse more PPP projects and spur growth in infrastructure. 
 
Table 102: Policy and regulatory framework 
Theoretical Proposition 7- Policy and Regulatory Framework 
Mean score 
Overall 
 mean 
score 
Existence of an effective and sustainable legal and regulatory framework 
is essential for promoting and fostering successful PPPs. 4.50 
A credible legal and regulatory framework exists in South Africa for the 
implementation of PPP projects. 4.33 
The government is committed to private sector participation in 
infrastructure development and service delivery. 4.08 
The existing policy framework environment supports open market access 
and fair PPP competition. 3.75 
PPPs protect public interest and maximize value added for projects. 4.16 
The existing investment climate in South Africa promotes a viable and 
sustainable PPP project system. 4.08 
The current PPP guidelines in South Africa provide adequate opportunity 
to asses the most effective type of PPP for a given project. 3.83 
The policy environment favours PPP growth in South Africa.  3.50 
Policies relative to PPPs are consistent with other government policies 
i.e. land use, social policies etc. 3.33 
There is sufficient legislative authority for entering into PPP agreements. 3.91 
There is sufficient legislation to support the management and supervisory 
role of the public sector in PPPs. 3.83 
There is sufficient authorisations and leeway to enter into debt 
agreements by the PPP agencies. 3.66 
Existing PPP regulations and guidelines provide for an efficient and 
effective mechanism for the procurement, management and auditing of 
PPP projects in South Africa. 
3.92 
3.91 
 
The overall mean score of 3.91 (>3.40 ≤ 4.20) for the thirteen statements included in the category of 
‘policy and regulatory framework’ indicates that the overall degree of concurrence relative to the 
statements can be deemed to be between neutral and agree / agree (Table 102). 
 
   
   
163 
6.3.8   PPP awareness and training 
 
Sustained PPP awareness, training and community education is fundamental to the mainstreaming 
and success of the PPP sector in South Africa. 
 
Table 103: PPP awareness and training 
Theoretical Framework 8 - PPP Awareness and Training 
Mean score 
Overall  
mean 
score 
Lack of PPP training and awareness hamper PPP growth and 
development 4.25 
The level of PPP awareness and training within the public and private 
sectors in South Africa is sufficient for PPP development and growth. 4.08 
4.20 
 
Table 103 depicts an overall mean score of 4.20 (> 3.40 ≤ 4.20) for the two statements included in the 
category of PPP awareness and training, which indicates the overall degree of concurrence relative to 
the statements can be deemed to be between neutral and agree / agree. 
 
6.3.9   Project Deal Flow 
 
The slow implementation of infrastructure development and provision of social services in South 
Africa is due to capacity and finance constraints, resulting from inadequate utilisation of the PPP 
approach, in the procurement, development, and management of government projects. 
 
Table 104: Project Deal Flow 
Theoretical Proposition 5 - Project Management Mean 
score 
Overall 
Mean score 
The slow deal flow for PPP projects in South Africa is due to capacity 
constraints in provincial governments and municipalities. 4.25 
Lack of or an inadequate project management approach slows down 
the implementation of PPP projects 4.08 
4.20 
 
The overall mean score of 4.20 (> 4.20 ≤ 5.00) for the two statements included in the category of 
‘project management’ indicates that the overall degree of concurrence relative to the statements can 
be deemed to be between agree and strongly agree / strongly agree(Table 104). 
 
6.4  CONCLUSIONS 
 
The conclusions from the review of the related literature, interviews and questionnaire survey are: 
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• The slow deal flow for PPP projects in South Africa is due to capacity constraints in provincial 
governments and municipalities;   
• The lack of, or an inadequate project management approach, slows down the implementation 
of PPP projects;   
• The use of PPPs delivers benefits due to budget restrictions in the public sector capital 
budgets;   
• The low number of PPP projects is due to inadequate project management skills among 
accounting officers and other staff to conceptualise PPP viable projects;   
• The costliness of PPP projects is due to government budgetary constraints, and / or 
inadequate subsidies for PPP projects;   
• The level of investment in PPP projects depends on the public sector’s marketing strategy, 
involvement and incentives to the private sector; 
• Ineffective risk distribution can lead to huge financial losses and renegotiation of PPP 
contracts;   
• The existing PPP policy framework and guidelines in South Africa are adequate, if properly 
interpreted and applied can provide the catalyst for more PPP projects and spur growth in the 
infrastructure sector;   
• Sustained PPP awareness, training and community education is fundamental to the 
mainstreaming and success of the PPP sector in South Africa, and   
• The slow implementation of infrastructure development and provision of social services in 
South Africa is due to capacity and finance constraints resulting from inadequate utilisation of 
the PPP approach in the procurement, development, and management of government 
projects. 
Chapter 5, focused on the evolution of a systemic model for the implementation and monitoring of the 
performance of PPP projects in South Africa and the Southern Africa Development Corporation 
(SADC) region. This approach provides a holistic understanding of the PPP processes and the 
complexity of the interrelationships within the PPP environment.  Systemic PPP planning and 
procurement is a strategic process of translating ideas / beliefs into policies and projects.  It treats the 
total PPP process and the environment as one system.  Given a statement of the problem, systemic 
PPP planning, procurement and management, provides for a continuously iterative analysis of the 
PPP cycle and the environment, to identify preferred courses of action that are most likely to lead to 
the achievement of a given set of goals. 
 
6.5   RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
The following recommendations are based upon the findings and conclusions of the study: 
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• There is a need for government departments and other PPP implementing agencies to build 
and sustain capacity, in order to facilitate deal flow for PPP projects in provincial 
governments and municipalities; 
• It is necessary to adopt a project management approach to the implementation of PPP 
projects in South Africa at all levels; 
• Where appropriate, the use of PPPs should be adopted as an alternative procurement 
strategy, since the research findings indicate that it delivers benefits due to budget 
restrictions in public sector capital budgets; 
• There is a need for training in project management skills for accounting officers and other 
staff to be able to conceptualise PPP viable projects, in order to increase PPP projects 
throughput; 
• Empirical evidence from the study shows that the costliness of PPP projects is due to 
government budgetary constraints, and / or inadequate subsidies for PPP projects.  
Government or other agencies should subsidise PPP transactions; 
• The level of investment in PPP projects depends on the public sector’s marketing strategy, 
involvement and incentives for the private sector.  A clear marketing strategy should be 
formulated and implemented by all PPP agencies; 
• Ineffective risk distribution can lead to huge financial losses and renegotiation of PPP 
contracts.  PPP agencies should ensure fair and appropriate risk allocation; 
• The research findings show that the existing PPP policy framework and guidelines in South 
Africa are adequate, and if properly interpreted and applied can catalyse more PPP projects 
and spur growth in the infrastructure sector.  PPP guidelines and implementation toolkits 
should be standardised and used by various PPP agencies, and 
• There is a need for sustained PPP awareness, training and community education for the 
public, as a fundamental tool to the mainstreaming and success of the PPP sector in South 
Africa, and beyond.  PPP courses should be developed at various levels and used for training 
PPP implementing officers, and according to the findings, the slow implementation of 
infrastructure development and provision of social services in South Africa is due to capacity 
and finance constraints resulting from inadequate utilisation of the PPP approach in the 
procurement, development, and management of government projects.  The various agencies 
should adopt a PPP approach, where appropriate, in infrastructure development and service 
delivery. 
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6.6   RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
The following recommendations for future research are based upon the findings and conclusions of 
this study: 
 
• Further systemic research should be conducted relative to the causal interrelationships for 
the various PPP factors  within the PPP environment; 
• The PPP model developed by the researcher can be enhanced by conducting further 
research to parameterise the model;  
• PPP performance surveys should be conducted on a yearly basis, preferably twice, so that 
trend analysis results can inform decision-makers and management for effective monitoring 
and control; 
• A comparative study on transaction costs of PPPs between South Africa and other country 
perceived as ‘least corrupt’ in Africa;  
• Risk management should ensure a fair allocation and monitoring system for risks, to avoid 
the tendency to transfer risks after contracts have been signed, and 
• It is recommended that the PPP Unit commissions sector specific studies that seek to 
compare performance across PPP and non-PPP contracts. 
• Researchers need to examine the processes that need systemic improvement to facilitate 
PPP delivery; 
• Researchers should examine why deal flow is low despite concerted efforts to improve, and  
• Researchers should investigate how PPP managers can implement systemic strategies in the 
PPP procurement processes. 
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APPENDICES 
APPENDIX 1: 
 
 
COVER LETTER 
R/No. 
SOUTH AFRICAN PUBLIC PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP (PPP) PROJECTS 
 
Dear  
 
SUBJECT: INTRODUCTION AND REQUEST TO COMPLETE QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
I am a PhD (Construction Management) candidate in the Department of Construction Management, 
Faculty of Engineering, Built Environment and Information Technology, Nelson Mandela Metropolitan 
University, conducting research relative to South African Public Private Partnership (PPP) projects. 
 
The purpose of this study is to contribute to the existing body of knowledge on South African PPPs, 
gain in depth understanding of the performance of operational South African PPP projects and 
provide direction for a sustainable PPP system in South Africa. 
 
You are invited to participate in this study, in which approximately 60 people from diverse 
backgrounds, both in the public and private sectors will be asked to complete a self administered 
questionnaire, which includes questions about PPP projects.  It should take approximately 15 minutes 
to complete the simple and brief questionnaire. 
 
Your participation in this study is completely voluntary. However, it is very important to glean your 
opinions and perceptions relating to the project(s) included in the study and the PPP sector in 
general. 
 
Your responses to the survey will be treated in the strictest confidence and data from this research 
will be reported on in aggregate format.  Therefore, your information will remain confidential and used 
for academic purposes only. You will be notified of the findings of the survey through e-mail.  
 
Please return completed (hard copy or electronic) questionnaire to Josiah Nyagwachi by postal, fax or 
e-mail at the following addresses: 
 
Josiah Nyagwachi 
PO Box 76649, 
(NMMU South Campus) 
Port Elizabeth 
6031 
Fax +27 (0) 41 504 2345 / 2574 
Email: nyagwachi@yahoo.com 
 
If you have questions at any time about the survey or procedures, please contact me at:  
082 533 5172, or my e-mail: nyagwachi@yahoo.com 
 
Thank you very much for your support 
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APPENDIX 2: 
 
QUESTIONNAIRE 
          R /No. 
 
SOUTH AFRICAN PUBLIC PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP (PPP) PROJECTS 
  
QUESTIONNAIRE 
PART I:   GENERAL 
 
A. PPP BUILT ENVIRONMENT ACTORS 
 
1.  Which of the following best describes your role in the built environment?  Tick 
one 
A1 
Contractor   
Consultant   
Financier   
0ther: Please specify   
Contacts:   
Telephone: Fax:   
Email address:   
 
PART II:   PERFORMANCE OF PPP PROJECTS IN THE BUILT ENVIRONMENT 
 
Use the scale 1 (never) to 5 (always) and put a check ( √ ) to indicate the extent to which each of the following statements 
apply to PPP projects in the built environment. 
 
• SCALE 
1 = Never             2 = Rarely               3 = Sometimes                4 = Often                      5 = Always 
 
B. COSTS AND AFFORDABILITY 1 2 3 4 5 Code 
2 PPP procurement delivers overall cost savings in comparison to conventional 
procurement. 
     B2 
3 Cost savings can be assessed with reference to factual data, rather than through 
comparisons with the assumptions used in the Public Sector Comparators. 
     B3 
4 The various PPP implementing agencies are able to afford project transaction costs      B4 
5 PPP transaction costs are subsidised in South Africa.      B5 
6 High transaction costs are a major constraint for faster deal flow.      B6 
• SCALE 
1 = Strongly Disagree        2 = Disagree           3 = Neutral           4 = Agree            5 = Strongly Agree 
C. Project Management 1 2 3 4 5 Code 
7 The slow deal flow for PPP projects in South Africa is due to capacity constraints in 
provincial governments and municipalities. 
     C7 
8 Lack of or an inadequate project management approach slows down the 
implementation of PPP projects 
     C8 
 
 PPP Awareness and Training 1 2 3 4 5 Code 
9 Lack of PPP training and awareness hamper PPP growth and development      C9 
10. The level of PPP awareness and training is adequate in South Africa.      C10 
Use the scale 1 (Strongly Disagree) to 5 (Strongly Agree), to indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree about 
each of the following statements regarding PPP projects in the built environment. 
  
   
   
176 
• SCALE 
1 = Strongly Disagree       2 = Disagree        3 = Neutral          4 = Agree             5 = Strongly Agree 
 
D. BUDGET 1 2 3 4 5 Code 
11 The use of PPPs delivers benefits due to budget restrictions in the public sector capital 
budgets. 
     D11 
12 PPP procurement brings forward investment and / or ensures that optimal maintenance 
strategies are followed. 
     D12 
 
E. RISK TRANSFER 1 2 3 4 5 Code 
13 Successful PPPs require existence of an adequate risk management system for 
appropriate transfer of risks to the party best suited to manage it at least cost. 
     E13 
14 PPP procurement brings forward investment and / or ensures that optimal maintenance 
strategies are followed. 
     E14 
15 Risk is transferred in practice.      E15 
16 It is always clear where risk lies in a PPP project.      E16 
17 There is evidence of contractors or customers seeking to shift risk onto the other party 
after signing the contract. 
     E17 
 
F. POLICY AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 1 2 3 4 5 Code 
18 Existence of an effective and sustainable legal and regulatory framework is essential 
for promoting and fostering successful PPPs. 
     F18 
19 A credible legal and regulatory framework exists in South Africa for the 
implementation of PPP projects. 
     F19 
20 The government is committed to private sector participation in infrastructure 
development and service delivery through PPPs. 
     F20 
21 The existing policy framework environment supports open market access and fair PPP 
competition. 
     F21 
22 PPPs protect public interest and maximize value added for projects.      F22 
23 The existing investment climate in South Africa promotes a viable and sustainable 
PPP project system. 
     F23 
24 The current PPP guidelines in South Africa provide adequate opportunity to asses the 
most effective type of PPP for a given project. 
     F24 
25 The policy environment favours PPP growth in South Africa.       F25 
26 Policies relative to PPPs are consistent with other government policies i.e. land use, 
social policies etc. 
     F26 
27 There is sufficient legislative authority for entering into PPP agreements.      F27 
28 Existing PPP regulations and guidelines are efficient and effective mechanism for PPP 
transactions  and auditing  in South Africa. 
     F28 
THANK YOU FOR COMPLETING AND RETURNING THE QUESTIONNAIRE. 
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APPENDIX 3: 
SYSTEMIC MODEL – COVER LETTER 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
22 August 2007 
 
Attention: The PPP Practitioner / Consultant / Manager 
   
Dear Madam / Sir                 
 
Re: South African Public Private Partnership (PPP) Projects- Systemic Model for 
Implementation  
 
The enclosed survey ‘South African Public Private Partnership Projects-Systemic model for 
implementation and performance monitoring’ constitutes part of a PhD (Construction Management) 
study to determine: 
 
• Causal effects of various variables within a PPP project system; 
• The interrelationships between the various PPP system elements (variables), and 
• Potential interventions to contribute to an improvement in implementation and management 
of PPP projects. 
 
The sample stratum consists of all PPP and non-PPP practitioners such as architects, engineers, 
contractors, financiers, project managers, finance managers, and lawyers, involved in the South 
African built environment.    
 
The questionnaire should not take more than 10-15 minutes to complete.  We would be grateful if 
you would endeavour to complete the questionnaire and return it by the 17 September 2007 to: 
 
Department of Construction Management                
Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University                                                                   
PO Box 77000                                                                                         
Port Elizabeth                                                                              
6031             
                                                                                             
Attention:  Professor John Smallwood  or  Josiah Nyagwachi   
or per facsimile to (041) 504 2345 or 504 2574 (preferably per facsimile).                                                  
(041) 504 2790 or per e-mail: john.smallwood@nmmu.ac.za          
 
Thanking you in anticipation of your response. 
 
John Smallwood, PhD (Construction Management) 
Professor, and Head, Department of Construction Management 
Programme Director, MSc (Built Environment) Programme 
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APPENDIX 4: 
 
SYSTEMIC MODEL – QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
 
R/No. 
SOUTH AFRICAN PUBLIC PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP (PPP) PROJECTS 
  
SYSTEMIC MODEL QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
PART I:   CAUSAL EFFECTS OF PPP VARIABLES IN THE BUILT ENVIRONMENT 
 
Use the scale 1 (Strongly Disagree) to 5 (Strongly Agree), and record a check ( X ) to indicate the extent to which each of 
the following statements for variables apply to the PPP projects in the built environment. 
SCALE 
1 = Strongly Disagree     2 = Disagree       3 = Neutral         4 = Agree           5 = Strongly Agree 
 
A. Infrastructure & poor service delivery 1 2 3 4 5 Code 
1 Lack of infrastructure and poor service delivery activates policy reforms to address the 
problem 
     A1 
2 Service delivery problems decrease with increase in investment levels      A2 
3 Service delivery problems result in increased demand for policy reforms      A3 
4 Poor service delivery leads to an increase in PPP agreements closure      A4 
5 Poor service delivery leads to increased demand for PPP experts      A5 
SCALE 
1 = Strongly Disagree      2 = Disagree         3 = Neutral          4 = Agree          5 = Strongly Agree 
B. Project management 1 2 3 4 5 Code 
6 Increased PPP tenders leads to increased demand for project management services      B6 
7 Increased use of a project management approach facilitates PPP deal flow / 
throughput 
     B7 
 
C. PPP awareness and training 1 2 3 4 5 Code 
8 A PPP culture exists within the public sector      C8 
9 A PPP culture exists within the private sector      C9 
10 A PPP culture exists within the built environment      C10 
11 PPP expertise is pervasive within the public sector        C11 
12 PPP expertise is pervasive within the private sector        C12 
13 PPP expertise is pervasive within the built environment        C13 
14 Increased demand for PPP monitoring increases demand for PPP experts.      C14 
15 A high demand for monitoring experts increases demand for PPP training and 
awareness and vice versa. 
     C15 
16 High demand for education and training leads to an increased role for universities in 
the PPP sector. 
     C16 
17 Tertiary built environment PPP related education is inadequate      C17 
18 Corrupt practices lead to increase in infrastructure and service delivery problems.      C18 
 
 
Use the scale 1 (Strongly Disagree) to 5 (Strongly Agree), and record a check ( X ) to indicate the extent to which each of 
the following statements for variables apply to the PPP projects in the built environment 
SCALE 
1 = Strongly Disagree    2 = Disagree        3 = Neutral          4 = Agree         5 = Strongly Agree 
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D. Investment level 1 2 3 4 5 Code 
13 Increased PPP agreement throughput facilitates investments      D13 
14 Increase in PPP agreements increases portfolio of assets and scope for service 
delivery. 
     D14 
15 High demand for service delivery increases demand for private sector investment and 
expertise. 
     D15 
16 Increased level of investment leads to a decrease in demand for infrastructure and 
service delivery. 
     D16 
 
E. PPP monitoring 1 2 3 4 5 Code 
17 High throughput for assets / services leads to a high demand for monitoring and 
evaluation services 
     E17 
 
F. Policy and regulatory framework 1 2 3 4 5 Code 
18 Policy reforms lead to the establishment of PPP regulatory agencies.      F18 
19 Policy reforms lead to a reduction in infrastructure and service delivery problems.      F19 
20 Establishment of PPP legal and regulatory agencies leads to a decrease in need for 
policy reforms 
     F20 
21 PPP legal and regulatory agencies promotes PPP growth      F21 
22 Closure of more PPP deals leads to reduction in service delivery problems.      F22 
 
G. Costs and affordability 1 2 3 4 5 Code 
23 High transaction costs reduces number of agencies participating in PPP deals      G23 
24 High transaction costs leads to decrease in PPP deals output      G24 
 
H. Risk Transfer 1 2 3 4 5 Code 
25 Inadequate risk management increases inappropriate risk transfers      H25 
26 Higher risk projects decreases  investment levels in PPP projects      H26 
PART II:  PPP BUILT ENVIRONMENT ACTORS 
I.  Which of the following best describes your role in the built environment?  X I27 
Contractor   
Consultant   
Financier   
0ther: Please specify   
J. Please fill your contact details below.  J28 
Name: Title:   
Telephone: Fax:   
Email address:   
 
   
   
180 
 
APPENDIX 5 
 
 
LIST OF PPP PROJECTS 
 
Table 135 : List of PPP Projects 
PPP projects signed in terms of Treasury Regulation 16, as at December 2005 
Data source: PPP Quarterly, Public-Private Partnerships: Innovative infrastructure and service delivery in South Africa, Dec 2005, No.21. 
Key: D: design, F: finance, B: build, O: operate, T: transfer of assets back to government 
Item Public institution PPP type 
Contract dur. 
Date Fin. Close 
Project 
Officer 
Private Partner 
(Consortia) 
Transaction Advisors Financing 
Structure 
Project 
Cost  
1. Fleet Management       
 Northern Cape Dot, Roads 
and Public Works 
DFO 
5 years 
November 2001 
Elliot Monosi 
(053) 839-2154 
Pembeley Investments (Pty) 
Ltd. 
Imperial Holdings and 
Africa Kosini 
Deloitte Equity: 
100% 
R181 
million 
 Email Addresses       
2. Inkosi Albert Luthuli 
Hospital 
      
 KwaZulu-Natal Dept of 
Health 
DFBOT 
15 years 
December 2001 
Herman 
Conradie 
(033) 395-2019 
Impilo Consortium (Pty) 
Ltd. 
Mbekane Health and 
Wellbeing, AME 
International, Vulindlela 
holdings, Siemens, drake 
and Skull, Omame 
PricewaterhouseCoopers; 
White & Case, EC 
Harris;Alicecap;Hilton 
 
Debt: 70% 
Equity: 
20% 
Gov. : 10% 
Rand 
Merch. 
Bank 
R4.5 
billion 
 Email Addresses       
3. Eco-tourism       
 Manyeleti 3 sites. 
Limpompo Dept  Finance, 
Economic Affairs, Tourism 
DFBOT 
30 years 
December 2001 
Charles 
Maluleke 
(015) 290-7300 
 
Koko Moya Wilderness 
Trail (Pty) Ltd.; Tinswala 
Lodges (Pty) Ltd.; Pungwe 
Game Reserve (Pty) Ltd. 
DBSA; White and Case Equity: 
100% 
N/A 
 Email Address       
4. Universitas and Pelonomi       
   
   
181 
Hospitals 
 Co-location, Free State 
Dept Health 
DFBOT 
16 years 
November 2002 
Mr. Shuping 
(083) 380-6306 
 
Community Health 
Management/Netcare 
Consortium 
Ignis, Naude’s Attorneys Equity: 
100% 
N/A 
 Email Address       
5. Information Systems       
 Department of labour DFBOT 
10 years 
December 2002 
Dean 
Haaasbroek 
(012) 309-4551 
Siemens Business Solutions 
Consortium 
KPMG Debt:44% 
Equity:10% 
Gov.:46% 
N/A 
6. Chapman’s Peak Drive 
toll road 
      
 Western cape DoT DF(part)BOT 
30 years 
May 2003 
Ben Veldman 
(021) 483-2004 
Capstone 252 (Pty) Ltd; 
Concor, Thebe Investments; 
Marib Holdings; Haw and 
Ingles 
Ignis; Jeffares & Green; 
Hofmeyr; Herbstein & 
Gihwale; Intertoll; 
decathlon 
Equity: 
100% 
R1.5billion 
 Email Address       
 
 
Key: D: design, F: finance, B: build, O: operate, T: transfer of assets back to government 
Item Public institution PPP type 
Contract dur. 
Date Fin. 
Close 
Project 
Officer 
Private Partner 
(Consortia) 
Transaction Advisors Financing 
Structure 
Project 
Cost  
7. State Vaccine Institute       
 Department of Health Equity 
partnership 
4 years 
April 2003 
Gerrit Muller 
(021) 312-
0717 
Biovac Consortium PricewaterhouseCoopers 
 
Equity: 
100% 
N/A 
 Email Addresses       
8. Humansdorp District 
Hospital 
      
 Eastern Cape Dept Health DFBOT 
20 years 
June 2003 
Eugene 
Jooste 
(040) 609-
3702 
Metro-Star Hospital (Pty) 
Ltd.; 
Metropal Hospital and 
Season Star Trading 123 
Ignis, PHI Attorneys 
 
Equity: 90% 
Gov. : 10% 
 
R18.9 
million 
 Email Addresses       
9. 
 
      
 Department of Foreign DFO Mr. M. Fleet Africa Eastern Cape Deloitte Debt: 100% R553million 
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Affairs 5 years 
August 2003 
Nkalane 
(043) 604-
7425 
(Pty) Ltd. 
 Email Address       
10. Head Office 
Accommodation 
      
 Department of Trade & 
Industry 
DFBOT 
25 years 
August 2003 
Harrida Fakir 
(012) 310-
1564 
Rainpropp Consortium: 
WBHO, Atterbury Property 
Holdings,Parkdev S.A., 
Reserve Facility 
Management,Propnet, 
Zwelinzima Holdings, Prop 
5 Corp, Rainbow 
Construction, WDB 
Investment Holdings, 
PDSA 
Ignis, Utho Capital, 
Ledwaba 
Mazwa/Masons B.I. 
Assoc. 
Equity: 8% 
Debt: 80% 
Gov.: 12% 
R870million 
 Email Address       
11. Cradle of Humankind        
 Interpretation Centre 
Complex 
Gauteng Dept. Agriculture, 
Conservation, Environment 
and Land Affairs 
DFBOT 
10 years 
October 2003 
Michael 
Worship 
(011) 355-
1385 
Furneaux Stewart Gapp 
Consort.; 
Stocks, Fikile, Thebe 
PricewaterhouseCoopers, 
White & Case 
Equity:100% 
Gov.:100% 
Capex 
N/A 
12. Social Grant Payment 
System 
      
 Free State Dept: Social 
Development 
DFO 
3 years 
April 2004 
Shirley 
Havenga 
(015) 409-
0923 
AllPay (Pty) Ltd. Ernst & Young Equity: 
100% 
R260 
million 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
   
183 
 
APPENDIX 6 
 
 
PPP Model-Mean Scores 
Table 105: Lack of infrastructure and poor service delivery activates policy reforms to address the 
problem 
Perception   Frequency Percent Mean score 
Strongly agree 7 18.9 
Agree 23 62.2 
Neutral 3 8.1 
Disagree 4 10.8 
Strongly disagree 0 0.0 
3.89 
 
 
Table 106: Service delivery problems decrease with an increase in investment levels 
Perception Frequency Percent Mean score 
Strongly agree 3 8.1 
Agree 10 27.0 
Neutral 12 32.4 
Disagree 6 16.2 
Strongly disagree 6 16.2 
2.95 
 
 
Table 107: Service delivery problems result in increased demand for policy reforms 
Perception Frequency Percent Mean score 
Strongly agree 9 24.3 
Agree 20 54.1 
Neutral 2 5.4 
Disagree 6 16.2 
Strongly disagree 0 0.0 
3.86 
 
 
Table 108: Poor service delivery leads to an increase in PPP agreements closure 
Perception Frequency Percent Mean score 
Strongly agree 2 5.4 
Agree 6 16.2 
Neutral 11 29.7 
Disagree 17 45.9 
Strongly disagree 2 5.4 
2.78 
 
 
Table 109: Poor service delivery leads to a high demand for more PPP experts 
Perception Frequency Percent Mean score 
Strongly agree 5 13.5 
Agree 15 40.5 
3.43 
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Neutral 9 24.3 
Disagree 7 18.9 
Strongly disagree 1 2.7 
 
 
Table 110: Increased PPP tenders lead to an increased demand for project management services 
Perception Frequency Percent Mean score 
Strongly agree 7 18.9 
Agree 17 45.9 
Neutral 10 27.0 
Disagree 4 10.8 
Strongly disagree 0 0 
3.81 
 
 
Table 111: Increased use of a project management approach facilitates PPP deal flow / throughput 
Perception Frequency Percent Mean score 
Strongly agree 9 24.3 
Agree 16 43.2 
Neutral 10 27.0 
Disagree 0 0.0 
Strongly disagree 2 5.4 
3.81 
 
 
Table 112: A PPP culture exists within the public sector 
Perception Frequency Percent Mean score 
Strongly agree 6 16.2 
Agree 4 10.8 
Neutral 12 32.4 
Disagree 15 40.5 
Strongly disagree 0 0 
3.03 
 
 
Table 113: A PPP culture exists within the private sector 
Perception Frequency Percent Mean score 
Strongly agree 3 8.1 
Agree 18 48.6 
Neutral 8 21.6 
Disagree 6 16.2 
Strongly disagree 2 5.4 
3.38 
 
 
Table 114: A PPP culture exists within the built environment 
Perception Frequency Percent Mean score 
Strongly agree 3 8.1 
Agree 16 43.2 
Neutral 2 5.4 
Disagree 0 0 
3.54 
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Strongly disagree 3 8.1 
 
 
Table 115: PPP expertise is pervasive within the public sector 
Perception Frequency Percent Mean score 
Strongly agree 0 0 
Agree 5 13.5 
Neutral 17 45.9 
Disagree 13 35.1 
Strongly disagree 2 5.4 
2.68 
 
 
Table 116: PPP expertise is pervasive within the private sector 
Perception Frequency Percent Mean score 
Strongly agree 1 2.7 
Agree 17 45.9 
Neutral 14 37.8 
Disagree 6 13.5 
Strongly disagree 0 0.0 
3.38 
 
 
Table 117: PPP expertise is pervasive within the built environment 
Perception Frequency Percent Mean score 
Strongly agree 1 2.7 
Agree 15 40.5 
Neutral 14 37.8 
Disagree 6 16.2 
Strongly disagree 0 0.0 
3.22 
 
 
Table 118: Increased demand for PPP monitoring increases demand for PPP experts 
Perception Frequency Percent Mean score 
Strongly agree 10 27.0 
Agree 24 64.9 
Neutral 3 8.1 
Disagree 0 0.0 
Strongly disagree 0 0.0 
4.19 
 
 
Table 119: A high demand for monitoring experts increases demand for PPP training and awareness 
and vice versa 
Perception Frequency Percent Mean score 
Strongly agree 8 21.7 
Agree 21 56.8 
Neutral 6 16.2 
Disagree 2 5.4 
3.95 
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Strongly disagree 0 0.0 
 
 
Table 120: High demand for education and training leads to an increased role for public universities in 
the PPP sector 
Perception Frequency Percent Mean score 
Strongly agree 10 27.0 
Agree 14 37.3 
Neutral 7 18.9 
Disagree 0 0.0 
Strongly disagree 8 21.6 
3.73 
 
 
Table 121: Tertiary built environment PPP related education is inadequate 
Perception Frequency Percent Mean score 
Strongly agree 10 27.0 
Agree 9 24.3 
Neutral 14 37.8 
Disagree 4 10.8 
Strongly disagree 0 0.0 
3.68 
 
 
Table 122: Corrupt practices lead to increase in infrastructure and service delivery problems 
Perception Frequency Percent Mean score 
Strongly agree 22 59.5 
Agree 7 18.9 
Neutral 6 16.2 
Disagree 2 5.4 
Strongly disagree 0 0.0 
4.32 
 
 
Table 123: Increased PPP agreement throughput facilitates investments 
Perception Frequency Percent Mean score 
Strongly agree 10 27.0 
Agree 25 67.6 
Neutral 2 5.4 
Disagree 0 0.0 
Strongly disagree 0 0.0 
4.22 
 
 
Table 124: An increase in PPP agreements increases portfolio of assets and scope for service 
delivery 
Perception Frequency Percent Mean score 
Strongly agree 13 35.1 
Agree 17 45.9 
Neutral 5 13.5 
4.11 
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Disagree 2 5.4 
Strongly disagree 0 0.0 
 
 
Table 125: High demand for service delivery increases demand for private sector investment and 
expertise 
Perception Frequency Percent Mean score 
Strongly agree 15 40.5 
Agree 21 56.8 
Neutral 0 0.0 
Disagree 0 0.0 
Strongly disagree 1 2.7 
4.32 
 
 
Table 126: An increased level of investment leads to a decrease in demand for infrastructure and 
service delivery 
Perception Frequency Percent Mean score 
Strongly agree 7 18.9 
Agree 2 5.4 
Neutral 21 56.8 
Disagree 5 13.5 
Strongly disagree 15 40.5 
2.73 
 
 
Table 127: High throughput for assets / services leads to a high demand for monitoring and 
evaluation services 
Perception Frequency Percent Mean score 
Strongly agree 6 16.2 
Agree 20 54.1 
Neutral 6 16.2 
Disagree 5 13.5 
Strongly disagree 0 0.0 
3.73 
 
 
Table 128: Policy reforms lead to the establishment of PPP regulatory agencies 
Perception Frequency Percent Mean score 
Strongly agree 4 10.8 
Agree 24 64.9 
Neutral 5 13.5 
Disagree 4 10.8 
Strongly disagree 0 0.0 
3.76 
 
 
Table 129: Policy reforms lead to a reduction in infrastructure and service delivery problems 
Perception Frequency Percent Mean score 
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Strongly agree 5 13.5 
Agree 9 24.3 
Neutral 13 35.1 
Disagree 6 16.2 
Strongly disagree 4 10.8 
3.14 
 
 
Table 130: Establishment of PPP legal and regulatory agencies leads to a decrease in need for policy 
reforms 
Perception Frequency Percent Mean score 
Strongly agree 4 10.8 
Agree 5 13.5 
Neutral 17 45.9 
Disagree 9 24.3 
Strongly disagree 2 5.4 
3.00 
  
 
Table 131: PPP legal and regulatory agencies promote PPP growth 
Perception Frequency Percent Mean score 
Strongly agree 3 8.1 
Agree 25 67.6 
Neutral 8 21.6 
Disagree 1 2.7 
Strongly disagree 0 0.0 
3.81 
 
 
Table 132: Closure of more PPP deals leads to reduction in service delivery problems 
Perception Frequency Percent Mean score 
Strongly agree 4 10.8 
Agree 20 54.1 
Neutral 6 16.2 
Disagree 5 13.5 
Strongly disagree 2 5.4 
3.51 
 
 
Table 133: High transaction costs reduce the number of agencies participating in PPP deals 
Perception Frequency Percent Mean score 
Strongly agree 6 16.2 
Agree 21 56.8 
Neutral 10 27.0 
Disagree 0 0.0 
Strongly disagree 0 0.0 
3.89 
 
 
Table 134: High transaction costs lead to decrease in PPP deals output 
Perception Frequency Percent Mean score 
   
   
189 
Strongly agree 6 16.2 
Agree 21 56.8 
Neutral 8 21.6 
Disagree 2 5.4 
Strongly disagree 0 0.0 
3.84 
 
 
Table 135: Inadequate risk management increases inappropriate risk transfers 
Perception Frequency Percent Mean score 
Strongly agree 15 40.5 
Agree 16 43.2 
Neutral 3 8.1 
Disagree 1 2.7 
Strongly disagree 2 5.4 
4.11 
 
 
Table 136: Higher risk projects decreases investment levels in PPP projects 
Perception Frequency Percent Mean score 
Strongly agree 10 27 
Agree 18 48.6 
Neutral 2 5.4 
Disagree 7 18.9 
Strongly disagree 0 0.0 
3.84 
 
 
 
